Accelerator system for use with secure data storage

ABSTRACT

Data processing and an accelerator system therefore are described. An embodiment relates generally to a data processing system. In such an embodiment, a bus and an accelerator are coupled to one another. The accelerator has an application function block. The application function block is to process data to provide processed data to storage. A network interface is coupled to obtain the processed data from the storage for transmission.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application claims the benefit of U.S. provisional application No.61/349,560, filed on May 28, 2010, which is hereby incorporated byreference herein in its entirety.

FIELD OF THE INVENTION

One or more embodiments generally relate to data processing and, moreparticularly, to an accelerator system for use with a secure data parserto remotely store data. The systems and methods described herein may beused in conjunction with other systems and methods described incommonly-owned U.S. Pat. No. 7,391,865 and commonly-owned U.S. patentapplication Ser. Nos. 11/258,839, filed Oct. 25, 2005, 11/602,667, filedNov. 20, 2006, 11/983,355, filed Nov. 7, 2007, 11/999,575, filed Dec. 5,2007, 12/148,365, filed Apr. 18, 2008, 12/209,703, filed Sep. 12, 2008,12/349,897, filed Jan. 7, 2009, 12/391,025, filed Feb. 23, 2009,12/783,276, filed May 19, 2010, 12/953,877, filed Nov. 24, 2010,13/077,770, filed Mar. 31, 2011, and 13/077,802, filed Mar. 31, 2011,all of which are hereby incorporated by reference herein in theirentireties.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Standard microprocessors may not include circuitry for performing somealgorithms. By using a Field Programmable Gate Array (“FPGA”) forexample to provide an accelerator system, an algorithm can be programmedinto hardware to build a circuit for an algorithm, resulting insignificant acceleration in the execution of such algorithm. However,even with an accelerator system, data transactions associated with suchalgorithms are often handled by system resources, such as system memory,a central processing unit (“CPU”), a Southbridge, or a Northbridge(collectively and singly “motherboard system resources”).

Furthermore, data may be stored remotely from such motherboard systemresources, using computing and storage resources that may be coupled tosuch motherboard systems over a network. Such resources may be referredto as “cloud computing” resources, and such remote storage of data issometimes referred to as “cloud storage.” However, data handling via anetwork interface coupled to motherboard system resources may burdenoperation of a host system.

Accordingly, it would be desirable and useful to provide an acceleratorsystem for offloading at least some of such data transactions from suchmotherboard system resources for remote data storage and/or networking.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

One or more embodiments generally relate to data processing and, moreparticularly, to an accelerator system for processing data using asecure data parser for remote data storage or other networkingapplication.

An embodiment relates generally to a data processing system. In such anembodiment, a bus and an accelerator are coupled to one another. Theaccelerator has an application function block. The application functionblock is to provide secure data parser functionality, and to provideprocessed data to storage. A network interface is coupled to obtain theprocessed data from the storage for transmission.

Yet another embodiment relates generally to a computer system. In suchan embodiment, a general-purpose processor is for execution of a userapplication in an application mode and kernel-mode drivers in a kernelmode. An accelerator system is coupled to the general-purpose processorvia a first bus, where the kernel-mode drivers include a class driverand a filter driver. The class driver is in communication with the userapplication to receive a request packet to provide a request block inresponse to the request packet. The filter driver is in communicationwith the class driver to receive the request block. The request blockincludes a system payload pointer and a write command or a read command.For the write command, a Programmable Logic Device of the acceleratorsystem provides secure data parser functionality on a data set stored insystem memory to store the data in local memory of the accelerator.

Still yet another embodiment relates generally to a method forprocessing data. In such an embodiment, data and a system payloadpointer are provided from a host system to an accelerator system. Theaccelerator system provides secure data parser functionality to processthe data. The processed data is stored in memory of the acceleratorsystem. The system payload pointer is converted into at least one localpayload pointer for the storing. The at least one local payload pointeris passed to an interface. The processed data is accessed from thememory by the interface using the at least one local payload pointer.The processed data accessed by the interface is transmitted.

A further embodiment relates generally to another method for processingdata. In such an embodiment, a command and a payload pointer areprovided to an accelerator system. The accelerator system obtains dataresponsive to the payload pointer. The accelerator system providessecure data parser functionality to process the data responsive to thecommand to provide processed data. The processed data is stored locallyin memory of the accelerator system. A memory access is initiated by anetwork interface of the accelerator system. The processed data isobtained from the memory responsive to the memory access, andtransmitted by the network interface to a cloud computing storagenetwork.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The present invention is described in more detail below in connectionwith the attached drawings, which are meant to illustrate and not tolimit the invention, and in which:

FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a cryptographic system, accordingto aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of the trust engine of FIG. 1,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the transaction engine of FIG. 2,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of the depository of FIG. 2,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of the authentication engine of FIG.2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of the cryptographic engine of FIG.2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 7 illustrates a block diagram of a depository system, according toaspects of another embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 8 illustrates a flow chart of a data splitting process according toaspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 9, Panel A illustrates a data flow of an enrollment processaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 9, Panel B illustrates a flow chart of an interoperability processaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 10 illustrates a data flow of an authentication process accordingto aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 11 illustrates a data flow of a signing process according toaspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 12 illustrates a data flow and an encryption/decryption processaccording to aspects and yet another embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust engine systemaccording to aspects of another embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust engine systemaccording to aspects of another embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 15 illustrates a block diagram of the redundancy module of FIG. 14,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 16 illustrates a process for evaluating authentications accordingto one aspect of the invention;

FIG. 17 illustrates a process for assigning a value to an authenticationaccording to one aspect as shown in FIG. 16 of the invention;

FIG. 18 illustrates a process for performing trust arbitrage in anaspect of the invention as shown in FIG. 17; and

FIG. 19 illustrates a sample transaction between a user and a vendoraccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention where an initialweb based contact leads to a sales contract signed by both parties.

FIG. 20 illustrates a sample user system with a cryptographic serviceprovider module which provides security functions to a user system.

FIG. 21 illustrates a process for parsing, splitting and/or separatingdata with encryption and storage of the encryption master key with thedata.

FIG. 22 illustrates a process for parsing, splitting and/or separatingdata with encryption and storing the encryption master key separatelyfrom the data.

FIG. 23 illustrates the intermediary key process for parsing, splittingand/or separating data with encryption and storage of the encryptionmaster key with the data.

FIG. 24 illustrates the intermediary key process for parsing, splittingand/or separating data with encryption and storing the encryption masterkey separately from the data.

FIG. 25 illustrates utilization of the cryptographic methods and systemsof the present invention with a small working group.

FIG. 26 is a block diagram of an illustrative physical token securitysystem employing the secure data parser in accordance with oneembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 27 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is integrated into a system in accordance with oneembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 28 is a block diagram of an illustrative data in motion system inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 29 is a block diagram of another illustrative data in motion systemin accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 30-32 are block diagrams of an illustrative system having thesecure data parser integrated in accordance with one embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 33 is a process flow diagram of an illustrative process for parsingand splitting data in accordance with one embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 34 is a process flow diagram of an illustrative process forrestoring portions of data into original data in accordance with oneembodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 35 is a process flow diagram of an illustrative process forsplitting data at the bit level in accordance with one embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 36 is a process flow diagram of illustrative steps and features inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 37 is a process flow diagram of illustrative steps and features inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 38 is a simplified block diagram of the storage of key and datacomponents within shares in accordance with one embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 39 is a simplified block diagram of the storage of key and datacomponents within shares using a workgroup key in accordance with oneembodiment of the present invention.

FIGS. 40A and 40B are simplified and illustrative process flow diagramsfor header generation and data splitting for data in motion inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 41 is a simplified block diagram of an illustrative share format inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 42 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is integrated into a system connected to cloudcomputing resources in accordance with one embodiment of the presentinvention.

FIG. 43 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is integrated into a system for sending data throughthe cloud in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 44 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure data services in the cloud inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 45 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure data storage in the cloud inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 46 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure network access control inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 47 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure high performance computingresources in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 48 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure access using virtual machines inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention.

FIGS. 49 and 50 show block diagrams of alternative illustrativearrangements for securing access using virtual machines in accordancewith embodiments of the present invention.

FIG. 51 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure orthogonal frequency-divisionmultiplexing (OFDM) networks in accordance with one embodiment of thepresent invention.

FIG. 52 is a block diagram of an illustrative arrangement in which thesecure data parser is used to secure the power grid in accordance withone embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 53 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a hostsystem.

FIG. 54 is a block diagram depicting another exemplary embodiment of ahost system.

FIG. 55 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of anaccelerator system.

FIG. 56 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of controlflow for the accelerator system of FIG. 3.

FIG. 57 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of dataflow in a write direction for the accelerator system of FIG. 3.

FIG. 58 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of dataflow in a read direction for the accelerator system of FIG. 3.

FIG. 59 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional storage driver architecture.

FIG. 60 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional device objects flow.

FIG. 61 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional packet format.

FIG. 62 is a block diagram depicting a conventional Hyper-Varchitecture.

FIG. 63 is a block diagram depicting a conventional Hyper-V architecturefor a storage model.

FIG. 64 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional virtual machine server architecture.

FIG. 65 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of akernel-mode flow for the accelerator system of FIG. 3.

FIG. 66 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of adriver stack for the kernel-mode of FIG. 13 and the accelerator systemof FIG. 3.

FIG. 67 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of asoftware flow for the driver stack of FIG. 14 for the accelerator systemof FIG. 3.

FIG. 16 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of astorage area network (“SAN”).

FIGS. 68-70 are block diagrams depicting respective exemplaryembodiments of network input/output systems for hypervisor-basedvirtualization.

FIG. 71 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of avirtual machine ware (“VMware”) storage and network interface stack

FIG. 72 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a writethrough a filter driver flow.

FIG. 73 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a readthrough a filter driver flow.

FIG. 74 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a parsedata through a device driver flow.

FIG. 75 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a restoredata through device driver flow.

FIG. 76 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a devicedriver interrupt service routine (“ISR”) and deferred procedure call(“DPC”) flow.

FIG. 77 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of acomputer system.

FIG. 78 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of acomputer system.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

One aspect of the present invention is to provide a cryptographic systemwhere one or more secure servers, or a trust engine, storescryptographic keys and user authentication data. Users access thefunctionality of conventional cryptographic systems through networkaccess to the trust engine, however, the trust engine does not releaseactual keys and other authentication data and therefore, the keys anddata remain secure. This server-centric storage of keys andauthentication data provides for user-independent security, portability,availability, and straightforwardness.

Because users can be confident in, or trust, the cryptographic system toperform user and document authentication and other cryptographicfunctions, a wide variety of functionality may be incorporated into thesystem. For example, the trust engine provider can ensure againstagreement repudiation by, for example, authenticating the agreementparticipants, digitally signing the agreement on behalf of or for theparticipants, and storing a record of the agreement digitally signed byeach participant. In addition, the cryptographic system may monitoragreements and determine to apply varying degrees of authentication,based on, for example, price, user, vendor, geographic location, placeof use, or the like.

To facilitate a complete understanding of the invention, the remainderof the detailed description describes the invention with reference tothe figures, wherein like elements are referenced with like numeralsthroughout.

FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of a cryptographic system 100,according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.1, the cryptographic system 100 includes a user system 105, a trustengine 110, a certificate authority 115, and a vendor system 120,communicating through a communication link 125.

According to one embodiment of the invention, the user system 105comprises a conventional general-purpose computer having one or moremicroprocessors, such as, for example, an Intel-based processor.Moreover, the user system 105 includes an appropriate operating system,such as, for example, an operating system capable of including graphicsor windows, such as Windows, Unix, Linux, or the like. As shown in FIG.1, the user system 105 may include a biometric device 107. The biometricdevice 107 may advantageously capture a user's biometric and transferthe captured biometric to the trust engine 110. According to oneembodiment of the invention, the biometric device may advantageouslycomprise a device having attributes and features similar to thosedisclosed in U.S. patent application Ser. No. 08/926,277, filed on Sep.5, 1997, entitled “RELIEF OBJECT IMAGE GENERATOR,” U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/558,634, filed on Apr. 26, 2000, entitled“IMAGING DEVICE FOR A RELIEF OBJECT AND SYSTEM AND METHOD OF USING THEIMAGE DEVICE,” U.S. patent application Ser. No. 09/435,011, filed onNov. 5, 1999, entitled “RELIEF OBJECT SENSOR ADAPTOR,” and U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 09/477,943, filed on Jan. 5, 2000, entitled “PLANAROPTICAL IMAGE SENSOR AND SYSTEM FOR GENERATING AN ELECTRONIC IMAGE OF ARELIEF OBJECT FOR FINGERPRINT READING,” all of which are owned by theinstant assignee, and all of which are hereby incorporated by referenceherein.

In addition, the user system 105 may connect to the communication link125 through a conventional service provider, such as, for example, adial up, digital subscriber line (DSL), cable modem, fiber connection,or the like. According to another embodiment, the user system 105connects the communication link 125 through network connectivity suchas, for example, a local or wide area network. According to oneembodiment, the operating system includes a TCP/IP stack that handlesall incoming and outgoing message traffic passed over the communicationlink 125.

Although the user system 105 is disclosed with reference to theforegoing embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives embodiments of the user system105, including almost any computing device capable of sending orreceiving information from another computer system. For example, theuser system 105 may include, but is not limited to, a computerworkstation, an interactive television, an interactive kiosk, a personalmobile computing device, such as a digital assistant, mobile phone,laptop, or the like, personal networking equipment, such as a homerouter, a network storage device (“NAS”), personal hotspot, or the like,or a wireless communications device, a smartcard, an embedded computingdevice, or the like, which can interact with the communication link 125.In such alternative systems, the operating systems will likely differand be adapted for the particular device. However, according to oneembodiment, the operating systems advantageously continue to provide theappropriate communications protocols needed to establish communicationwith the communication link 125.

FIG. 1 illustrates the trust engine 110. According to one embodiment,the trust engine 110 comprises one or more secure servers for accessingand storing sensitive information, which may be any type or form ofdata, such as, but not limited to text, audio, video, userauthentication data and public and private cryptographic keys. Accordingto one embodiment, the authentication data includes data designed touniquely identify a user of the cryptographic system 100. For example,the authentication data may include a user identification number, one ormore biometrics, and a series of questions and answers generated by thetrust engine 110 or the user, but answered initially by the user atenrollment. The foregoing questions may include demographic data, suchas place of birth, address, anniversary, or the like, personal data,such as mother's maiden name, favorite ice cream, or the like, or otherdata designed to uniquely identify the user. The trust engine 110compares a user's authentication data associated with a currenttransaction, to the authentication data provided at an earlier time,such as, for example, during enrollment. The trust engine 110 mayadvantageously require the user to produce the authentication data atthe time of each transaction, or, the trust engine 110 mayadvantageously allow the user to periodically produce authenticationdata, such as at the beginning of a string of transactions or thelogging onto a particular vendor website.

According to the embodiment where the user produces biometric data, theuser provides a physical characteristic, such as, but not limited to,facial scan, hand scan, ear scan, iris scan, retinal scan, vascularpattern, DNA, a fingerprint, writing or speech, to the biometric device107. The biometric device advantageously produces an electronic pattern,or biometric, of the physical characteristic. The electronic pattern istransferred through the user system 105 to the trust engine 110 foreither enrollment or authentication purposes.

Once the user produces the appropriate authentication data and the trustengine 110 determines a positive match between that authentication data(current authentication data) and the authentication data provided atthe time of enrollment (enrollment authentication data), the trustengine 110 provides the user with complete cryptographic functionality.For example, the properly authenticated user may advantageously employthe trust engine 110 to perform hashing, digitally signing, encryptingand decrypting (often together referred to only as encrypting), creatingor distributing digital certificates, and the like. However, the privatecryptographic keys used in the cryptographic functions will not beavailable outside the trust engine 110, thereby ensuring the integrityof the cryptographic keys.

According to one embodiment, the trust engine 110 generates and storescryptographic keys. According to another embodiment, at least onecryptographic key is associated with each user. Moreover, when thecryptographic keys include public-key technology, each private keyassociated with a user is generated within, and not released from, thetrust engine 110. Thus, so long as the user has access to the trustengine 110, the user may perform cryptographic functions using his orher private or public key. Such remote access advantageously allowsusers to remain completely mobile and access cryptographic functionalitythrough practically any Internet connection, such as cellular andsatellite phones, kiosks, laptops, hotel rooms and the like.

According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 performs thecryptographic functionality using a key pair generated for the trustengine 110. According to this embodiment, the trust engine 110 firstauthenticates the user, and after the user has properly producedauthentication data matching the enrollment authentication data, thetrust engine 110 uses its own cryptographic key pair to performcryptographic functions on behalf of the authenticated user.

A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that thecryptographic keys may advantageously include some or all of symmetrickeys, public keys, and private keys. In addition, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein that the foregoing keys may beimplemented with a wide number of algorithms available from commercialtechnologies, such as, for example, RSA, ELGAMAL, or the like.

FIG. 1 also illustrates the certificate authority 115. According to oneembodiment, the certificate authority 115 may advantageously comprise atrusted third-party organization or company that issues digitalcertificates, such as, for example, VeriSign, Baltimore, Entrust, or thelike. The trust engine 110 may advantageously transmit requests fordigital certificates, through one or more conventional digitalcertificate protocols, such as, for example, PKCS10, to the certificateauthority 115. In response, the certificate authority 115 will issue adigital certificate in one or more of a number of differing protocols,such as, for example, PKCS7. According to one embodiment of theinvention, the trust engine 110 requests digital certificates fromseveral or all of the prominent certificate authorities 115 such thatthe trust engine 110 has access to a digital certificate correspondingto the certificate standard of any requesting party.

According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 internallyperforms certificate issuances. In this embodiment, the trust engine 110may access a certificate system for generating certificates and/or mayinternally generate certificates when they are requested, such as, forexample, at the time of key generation or in the certificate standardrequested at the time of the request. The trust engine 110 will bedisclosed in greater detail below.

FIG. 1 also illustrates the vendor system 120. According to oneembodiment, the vendor system 120 advantageously comprises a Web server.Typical Web servers generally serve content over the Internet using oneof several internet markup languages or document format standards, suchas the Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) or the Extensible MarkupLanguage (XML). The Web server accepts requests from browsers likeNetscape and Internet Explorer and then returns the appropriateelectronic documents. A number of server or client-side technologies canbe used to increase the power of the Web server beyond its ability todeliver standard electronic documents. For example, these technologiesinclude Common Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts, SSL security, and ActiveServer Pages (ASPs). The vendor system 120 may advantageously provideelectronic content relating to commercial, personal, educational, orother transactions.

Although the vendor system 120 is disclosed with reference to theforegoing embodiments, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein that the vendor system 120 may advantageously comprise any of thedevices described with reference to the user system 105 or combinationthereof.

FIG. 1 also illustrates the communication link 125 connecting the usersystem 105, the trust engine 110, the certificate authority 115, and thevendor system 120. According to one embodiment, the communication link125 preferably comprises the Internet. The Internet, as used throughoutthis disclosure is a global network of computers. The structure of theInternet, which is well known to those of ordinary skill in the art,includes a network backbone with networks branching from the backbone.These branches, in turn, have networks branching from them, and so on.Routers move information packets between network levels, and then fromnetwork to network, until the packet reaches the neighborhood of itsdestination. From the destination, the destination network's hostdirects the information packet to the appropriate terminal, or node. Inone advantageous embodiment, the Internet routing hubs comprise domainname system (DNS) servers using Transmission Control Protocol/InternetProtocol (TCP/IP) as is well known in the art. The routing hubs connectto one or more other routing hubs via high-speed communication links.

One popular part of the Internet is the World Wide Web. The World WideWeb contains different computers, which store documents capable ofdisplaying graphical and textual information. The computers that provideinformation on the World Wide Web are typically called “websites.” Awebsite is defined by an Internet address that has an associatedelectronic page. The electronic page can be identified by a UniformResource Locator (URL). Generally, an electronic page is a document thatorganizes the presentation of text, graphical images, audio, video, andso forth.

Although the communication link 125 is disclosed in terms of itspreferred embodiment, one of ordinary skill in the art will recognizefrom the disclosure herein that the communication link 125 may include awide range of interactive communications links. For example, thecommunication link 125 may include interactive television networks,telephone networks, wireless data transmission systems, two-way cablesystems, customized private or public computer networks, interactivekiosk networks, automatic teller machine networks, direct links,satellite or cellular networks, and the like.

FIG. 2 illustrates a block diagram of the trust engine 110 of FIG. 1according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.2, the trust engine 110 includes a transaction engine 205, a depository210, an authentication engine 215, and a cryptographic engine 220.According to one embodiment of the invention, the trust engine 110 alsoincludes mass storage 225. As further shown in FIG. 2, the transactionengine 205 communicates with the depository 210, the authenticationengine 215, and the cryptographic engine 220, along with the massstorage 225. In addition, the depository 210 communicates with theauthentication engine 215, the cryptographic engine 220, and the massstorage 225. Moreover, the authentication engine 215 communicates withthe cryptographic engine 220. According to one embodiment of theinvention, some or all of the foregoing communications mayadvantageously comprise the transmission of XML documents to IPaddresses that correspond to the receiving device. As mentioned in theforegoing, XML documents advantageously allow designers to create theirown customized document tags, enabling the definition, transmission,validation, and interpretation of data between applications and betweenorganizations. Moreover, some or all of the foregoing communications mayinclude conventional SSL technologies.

According to one embodiment, the transaction engine 205 comprises a datarouting device, such as a conventional Web server available fromNetscape, Microsoft, Apache, or the like. For example, the Web servermay advantageously receive incoming data from the communication link125. According to one embodiment of the invention, the incoming data isaddressed to a front-end security system for the trust engine 110. Forexample, the front-end security system may advantageously include afirewall, an intrusion detection system searching for known attackprofiles, and/or a virus scanner. After clearing the front-end securitysystem, the data is received by the transaction engine 205 and routed toone of the depository 210, the authentication engine 215, thecryptographic engine 220, and the mass storage 225. In addition, thetransaction engine 205 monitors incoming data from the authenticationengine 215 and cryptographic engine 220, and routes the data toparticular systems through the communication link 125. For example, thetransaction engine 205 may advantageously route data to the user system105, the certificate authority 115, or the vendor system 120.

According to one embodiment, the data is routed using conventional HTTProuting techniques, such as, for example, employing URLs or UniformResource Indicators (URIs). URIs are similar to URLs, however, URIstypically indicate the source of files or actions, such as, for example,executables, scripts, and the like. Therefore, according to the oneembodiment, the user system 105, the certificate authority 115, thevendor system 120, and the components of the trust engine 210,advantageously include sufficient data within communication URLs or URIsfor the transaction engine 205 to properly route data throughout thecryptographic system.

Although the data routing is disclosed with reference to its preferredembodiment, a skilled artisan will recognize a wide number of possibledata routing solutions or strategies. For example, XML or other datapackets may advantageously be unpacked and recognized by their format,content, or the like, such that the transaction engine 205 may properlyroute data throughout the trust engine 110. Moreover, a skilled artisanwill recognize that the data routing may advantageously be adapted tothe data transfer protocols conforming to particular network systems,such as, for example, when the communication link 125 comprises a localnetwork.

According to yet another embodiment of the invention, the transactionengine 205 includes conventional SSL encryption technologies, such thatthe foregoing systems may authenticate themselves, and vise-versa, withtransaction engine 205, during particular communications. As will beused throughout this disclosure, the term “½ SSL” refers tocommunications where a server but not necessarily the client, is SSLauthenticated, and the term “FULL SSL” refers to communications wherethe client and the server are SSL authenticated. When the instantdisclosure uses the term “SSL”, the communication may comprise ½ or FULLSSL.

As the transaction engine 205 routes data to the various components ofthe cryptographic system 100, the transaction engine 205 mayadvantageously create an audit trail. According to one embodiment, theaudit trail includes a record of at least the type and format of datarouted by the transaction engine 205 throughout the cryptographic system100. Such audit data may advantageously be stored in the mass storage225.

FIG. 2 also illustrates the depository 210. According to one embodiment,the depository 210 comprises one or more data storage facilities, suchas, for example, a directory server, a database server, or the like. Asshown in FIG. 2, the depository 210 stores cryptographic keys andenrollment authentication data. The cryptographic keys mayadvantageously correspond to the trust engine 110 or to users of thecryptographic system 100, such as the user or vendor. The enrollmentauthentication data may advantageously include data designed to uniquelyidentify a user, such as, user ID, passwords, answers to questions,biometric data, or the like. This enrollment authentication data mayadvantageously be acquired at enrollment of a user or anotheralternative later time. For example, the trust engine 110 may includeperiodic or other renewal or reissue of enrollment authentication data.

According to one embodiment, the communication from the transactionengine 205 to and from the authentication engine 215 and thecryptographic engine 220 comprises secure communication, such as, forexample conventional SSL technology. In addition, as mentioned in theforegoing, the data of the communications to and from the depository 210may be transferred using URLs, URIs, HTTP or XML documents, with any ofthe foregoing advantageously having data requests and formats embeddedtherein.

As mentioned above, the depository 210 may advantageously comprises aplurality of secure data storage facilities. In such an embodiment, thesecure data storage facilities may be configured such that a compromiseof the security in one individual data storage facility will notcompromise the cryptographic keys or the authentication data storedtherein. For example, according to this embodiment, the cryptographickeys and the authentication data are mathematically operated on so as tostatistically and substantially randomize the data stored in each datastorage facility. According to one embodiment, the randomization of thedata of an individual data storage facility renders that dataundecipherable. Thus, compromise of an individual data storage facilityproduces only a randomized undecipherable number and does not compromisethe security of any cryptographic keys or the authentication data as awhole.

FIG. 2 also illustrates the trust engine 110 including theauthentication engine 215. According to one embodiment, theauthentication engine 215 comprises a data comparator configured tocompare data from the transaction engine 205 with data from thedepository 210. For example, during authentication, a user suppliescurrent authentication data to the trust engine 110 such that thetransaction engine 205 receives the current authentication data. Asmentioned in the foregoing, the transaction engine 205 recognizes thedata requests, preferably in the URL or URI, and routes theauthentication data to the authentication engine 215. Moreover, uponrequest, the depository 210 forwards enrollment authentication datacorresponding to the user to the authentication engine 215. Thus, theauthentication engine 215 has both the current authentication data andthe enrollment authentication data for comparison.

According to one embodiment, the communications to the authenticationengine comprise secure communications, such as, for example, SSLtechnology. Additionally, security can be provided within the trustengine 110 components, such as, for example, super-encryption usingpublic key technologies. For example, according to one embodiment, theuser encrypts the current authentication data with the public key of theauthentication engine 215. In addition, the depository 210 also encryptsthe enrollment authentication data with the public key of theauthentication engine 215. In this way, only the authentication engine'sprivate key can be used to decrypt the transmissions.

As shown in FIG. 2, the trust engine 110 also includes the cryptographicengine 220. According to one embodiment, the cryptographic enginecomprises a cryptographic handling module, configured to advantageouslyprovide conventional cryptographic functions, such as, for example,public-key infrastructure (PKI) functionality. For example, thecryptographic engine 220 may advantageously issue public and privatekeys for users of the cryptographic system 100. In this manner, thecryptographic keys are generated at the cryptographic engine 220 andforwarded to the depository 210 such that at least the privatecryptographic keys are not available outside of the trust engine 110.According to another embodiment, the cryptographic engine 220 randomizesand splits at least the private cryptographic key data, thereby storingonly the randomized split data. Similar to the splitting of theenrollment authentication data, the splitting process ensures the storedkeys are not available outside the cryptographic engine 220. Accordingto another embodiment, the functions of the cryptographic engine can becombined with and performed by the authentication engine 215.

According to one embodiment, communications to and from thecryptographic engine include secure communications, such as SSLtechnology. In addition, XML documents may advantageously be employed totransfer data and/or make cryptographic function requests.

FIG. 2 also illustrates the trust engine 110 having the mass storage225. As mentioned in the foregoing, the transaction engine 205 keepsdata corresponding to an audit trail and stores such data in the massstorage 225. Similarly, according to one embodiment of the invention,the depository 210 keeps data corresponding to an audit trail and storessuch data in the mass storage device 225. The depository audit traildata is similar to that of the transaction engine 205 in that the audittrail data comprises a record of the requests received by the depository210 and the response thereof. In addition, the mass storage 225 may beused to store digital certificates having the public key of a usercontained therein.

Although the trust engine 110 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred and alternative embodiments, the invention is not intended tobe limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize in thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the trust engine110. For example, the trust engine 110, may advantageously perform onlyauthentication, or alternatively, only some or all of the cryptographicfunctions, such as data encryption and decryption. According to suchembodiments, one of the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 may advantageously be removed, thereby creating a morestraightforward design for the trust engine 110. In addition, thecryptographic engine 220 may also communicate with a certificateauthority such that the certificate authority is embodied within thetrust engine 110. According to yet another embodiment, the trust engine110 may advantageously perform authentication and one or morecryptographic functions, such as, for example, digital signing.

FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the transaction engine 205 of FIG.2, according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. According tothis embodiment, the transaction engine 205 comprises an operatingsystem 305 having a handling thread and a listening thread. Theoperating system 305 may advantageously be similar to those found inconventional high volume servers, such as, for example, Web serversavailable from Apache. The listening thread monitors the incomingcommunication from one of the communication link 125, the authenticationengine 215, and the cryptographic engine 220 for incoming data flow. Thehandling thread recognizes particular data structures of the incomingdata flow, such as, for example, the foregoing data structures, therebyrouting the incoming data to one of the communication link 125, thedepository 210, the authentication engine 215, the cryptographic engine220, or the mass storage 225. As shown in FIG. 3, the incoming andoutgoing data may advantageously be secured through, for example, SSLtechnology.

FIG. 4 illustrates a block diagram of the depository 210 of FIG. 2according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. According tothis embodiment, the depository 210 comprises one or more lightweightdirectory access protocol (LDAP) servers. LDAP directory servers areavailable from a wide variety of manufacturers such as Netscape, ISO,and others. FIG. 4 also shows that the directory server preferablystores data 405 corresponding to the cryptographic keys and data 410corresponding to the enrollment authentication data. According to oneembodiment, the depository 210 comprises a single logical memorystructure indexing authentication data and cryptographic key data to aunique user ID. The single logical memory structure preferably includesmechanisms to ensure a high degree of trust, or security, in the datastored therein. For example, the physical location of the depository 210may advantageously include a wide number of conventional securitymeasures, such as limited employee access, modern surveillance systems,and the like. In addition to, or in lieu of, the physical securities,the computer system or server may advantageously include softwaresolutions to protect the stored data. For example, the depository 210may advantageously create and store data 415 corresponding to an audittrail of actions taken. In addition, the incoming and outgoingcommunications may advantageously be encrypted with public keyencryption coupled with conventional SSL technologies.

According to another embodiment, the depository 210 may comprisedistinct and physically separated data storage facilities, as disclosedfurther with reference to FIG. 7.

FIG. 5 illustrates a block diagram of the authentication engine 215 ofFIG. 2 according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. Similarto the transaction engine 205 of FIG. 3, the authentication engine 215comprises an operating system 505 having at least a listening and ahandling thread of a modified version of a conventional Web server, suchas, for example, Web servers available from Apache. As shown in FIG. 5,the authentication engine 215 includes access to at least one privatekey 510. The private key 510 may advantageously be used for example, todecrypt data from the transaction engine 205 or the depository 210,which was encrypted with a corresponding public key of theauthentication engine 215.

FIG. 5 also illustrates the authentication engine 215 comprising acomparator 515, a data splitting module 520, and a data assemblingmodule 525. According to the preferred embodiment of the invention, thecomparator 515 includes technology capable of comparing potentiallycomplex patterns related to the foregoing biometric authentication data.The technology may include hardware, software, or combined solutions forpattern comparisons, such as, for example, those representing fingerprint patterns or voice patterns. In addition, according to oneembodiment, the comparator 515 of the authentication engine 215 mayadvantageously compare conventional hashes of documents in order torender a comparison result. According to one embodiment of theinvention, the comparator 515 includes the application of heuristics 530to the comparison. The heuristics 530 may advantageously addresscircumstances surrounding an authentication attempt, such as, forexample, the time of day, IP address or subnet mask, purchasing profile,email address, processor serial number or ID, or the like.

Moreover, the nature of biometric data comparisons may result in varyingdegrees of confidence being produced from the matching of currentbiometric authentication data to enrollment data. For example, unlike atraditional password which may only return a positive or negative match,a fingerprint may be determined to be a partial match, e.g. a 90% match,a 75% match, or a 10% match, rather than simply being correct orincorrect. Other biometric identifiers such as voice print analysis orface recognition may share this property of probabilisticauthentication, rather than absolute authentication.

When working with such probabilistic authentication or in other caseswhere an authentication is considered less than absolutely reliable, itis desirable to apply the heuristics 530 to determine whether the levelof confidence in the authentication provided is sufficiently high toauthenticate the transaction which is being made.

It will sometimes be the case that the transaction at issue is arelatively low value transaction where it is acceptable to beauthenticated to a lower level of confidence. This could include atransaction which has a low dollar value associated with it (e.g., a $10purchase) or a transaction with low risk (e.g., admission to amembers-only web site).

Conversely, for authenticating other transactions, it may be desirableto require a high degree of confidence in the authentication beforeallowing the transaction to proceed. Such transactions may includetransactions of large dollar value (e.g., signing a multi-million dollarsupply contract) or transaction with a high risk if an improperauthentication occurs (e.g., remotely logging onto a governmentcomputer).

The use of the heuristics 530 in combination with confidence levels andtransactions values may be used as will be described below to allow thecomparator to provide a dynamic context-sensitive authentication system.

According to another embodiment of the invention, the comparator 515 mayadvantageously track authentication attempts for a particulartransaction. For example, when a transaction fails, the trust engine 110may request the user to re-enter his or her current authentication data.The comparator 515 of the authentication engine 215 may advantageouslyemploy an attempt limiter 535 to limit the number of authenticationattempts, thereby prohibiting brute-force attempts to impersonate auser's authentication data. According to one embodiment, the attemptlimiter 535 comprises a software module monitoring transactions forrepeating authentication attempts and, for example, limiting theauthentication attempts for a given transaction to three. Thus, theattempt limiter 535 will limit an automated attempt to impersonate anindividual's authentication data to, for example, simply three“guesses.” Upon three failures, the attempt limiter 535 mayadvantageously deny additional authentication attempts. Such denial mayadvantageously be implemented through, for example, the comparator 515returning a negative result regardless of the current authenticationdata being transmitted. On the other hand, the transaction engine 205may advantageously block any additional authentication attemptspertaining to a transaction in which three attempts have previouslyfailed.

The authentication engine 215 also includes the data splitting module520 and the data assembling module 525. The data splitting module 520advantageously comprises a software, hardware, or combination modulehaving the ability to mathematically operate on various data so as tosubstantially randomize and split the data into portions. According toone embodiment, original data is not recreatable from an individualportion. The data assembling module 525 advantageously comprises asoftware, hardware, or combination module configured to mathematicallyoperate on the foregoing substantially randomized portions, such thatthe combination thereof provides the original deciphered data. Accordingto one embodiment, the authentication engine 215 employs the datasplitting module 520 to randomize and split enrollment authenticationdata into portions, and employs the data assembling module 525 toreassemble the portions into usable enrollment authentication data.

FIG. 6 illustrates a block diagram of the cryptographic engine 220 ofthe trust engine 200 of FIG. 2 according to aspects of one embodiment ofthe invention. Similar to the transaction engine 205 of FIG. 3, thecryptographic engine 220 comprises an operating system 605 having atleast a listening and a handling thread of a modified version of aconventional Web server, such as, for example, Web servers availablefrom Apache. As shown in FIG. 6, the cryptographic engine 220 comprisesa data splitting module 610 and a data assembling module 620 thatfunction similar to those of FIG. 5. However, according to oneembodiment, the data splitting module 610 and the data assembling module620 process cryptographic key data, as opposed to the foregoingenrollment authentication data. Although, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein that the data splitting module 910and the data splitting module 620 may be combined with those of theauthentication engine 215.

The cryptographic engine 220 also comprises a cryptographic handlingmodule 625 configured to perform one, some or all of a wide number ofcryptographic functions. According to one embodiment, the cryptographichandling module 625 may comprise software modules or programs, hardware,or both. According to another embodiment, the cryptographic handlingmodule 625 may perform data comparisons, data parsing, data splitting,data separating, data hashing, data encryption or decryption, digitalsignature verification or creation, digital certificate generation,storage, or requests, cryptographic key generation, or the like.Moreover, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure hereinthat the cryptographic handling module 825 may advantageously comprisesa public-key infrastructure, such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), anRSA-based public-key system, or a wide number of alternative keymanagement systems. In addition, the cryptographic handling module 625may perform public-key encryption, symmetric-key encryption, or both. Inaddition to the foregoing, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayinclude one or more computer programs or modules, hardware, or both, forimplementing seamless, transparent, interoperability functions.

A skilled artisan will also recognize from the disclosure herein thatthe cryptographic functionality may include a wide number or variety offunctions generally relating to cryptographic key management systems.

FIG. 7 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a depository system 700according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.7, the depository system 700 advantageously comprises multiple datastorage facilities, for example, data storage facilities D1, D2, D3, andD4. However, it is readily understood by those of ordinary skill in theart that the depository system may have only one data storage facility.According to one embodiment of the invention, each of the data storagefacilities D1 through D4 may advantageously comprise some or all of theelements disclosed with reference to the depository 210 of FIG. 4.Similar to the depository 210, the data storage facilities D1 through D4communicate with the transaction engine 205, the authentication engine215, and the cryptographic engine 220, preferably through conventionalSSL. Communication links transferring, for example, XML documents.Communications from the transaction engine 205 may advantageouslyinclude requests for data, wherein the request is advantageouslybroadcast to the IP address of each data storage facility D1 through D4.On the other hand, the transaction engine 205 may broadcast requests toparticular data storage facilities based on a wide number of criteria,such as, for example, response time, server loads, maintenanceschedules, or the like.

In response to requests for data from the transaction engine 205, thedepository system 700 advantageously forwards stored data to theauthentication engine 215 and the cryptographic engine 220. Therespective data assembling modules receive the forwarded data andassemble the data into useable formats. On the other hand,communications from the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 to the data storage facilities D1 through D4 may include thetransmission of sensitive data to be stored. For example, according toone embodiment, the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographicengine 220 may advantageously employ their respective data splittingmodules to divide sensitive data into undecipherable portions, and thentransmit one or more undecipherable portions of the sensitive data to aparticular data storage facility.

According to one embodiment, each data storage facility, D1 through D4,comprises a separate and independent storage system, such as, forexample, a directory server. According to another embodiment of theinvention, the depository system 700 comprises multiple geographicallyseparated independent data storage systems. By distributing thesensitive data into distinct and independent storage facilities D1through D4, some or all of which may be advantageously geographicallyseparated, the depository system 700 provides redundancy along withadditional security measures. For example, according to one embodiment,only data from two of the multiple data storage facilities, D1 throughD4, are needed to decipher and reassemble the sensitive data. Thus, asmany as two of the four data storage facilities D1 through D4 may beinoperative due to maintenance, system failure, power failure, or thelike, without affecting the functionality of the trust engine 110. Inaddition, because, according to one embodiment, the data stored in eachdata storage facility is randomized and undecipherable, compromise ofany individual data storage facility does not necessarily compromise thesensitive data. Moreover, in the embodiment having geographicalseparation of the data storage facilities, a compromise of multiplegeographically remote facilities becomes increasingly difficult. Infact, even a rogue employee will be greatly challenged to subvert theneeded multiple independent geographically remote data storagefacilities.

Although the depository system 700 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred and alternative embodiments, the invention is not intended tobe limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the depositorysystem 700. For example, the depository system 700 may comprise one, twoor more data storage facilities. In addition, sensitive data may bemathematically operated such that portions from two or more data storagefacilities are needed to reassemble and decipher the sensitive data.

As mentioned in the foregoing, the authentication engine 215 and thecryptographic engine 220 each include a data splitting module 520 and610, respectively, for splitting any type or form of sensitive data,such as, for example, text, audio, video, the authentication data andthe cryptographic key data. FIG. 8 illustrates a flowchart of a datasplitting process 800 performed by the data splitting module accordingto aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG. 8, thedata splitting process 800 begins at step 805 when sensitive data “S” isreceived by the data splitting module of the authentication engine 215or the cryptographic engine 220. Preferably, in step 810, the datasplitting module then generates a substantially random number, value, orstring or set of bits, “A.” For example, the random number A may begenerated in a wide number of varying conventional techniques availableto one of ordinary skill in the art, for producing high quality randomnumbers suitable for use in cryptographic applications. In addition,according to one embodiment, the random number A comprises a bit lengthwhich may be any suitable length, such as shorter, longer or equal tothe bit length of the sensitive data, S.

In addition, in step 820 the data splitting process 800 generatesanother statistically random number “C.” According to the preferredembodiment, the generation of the statistically random numbers A and Cmay advantageously be done in parallel. The data splitting module thencombines the numbers A and C with the sensitive data S such that newnumbers “B” and “D” are generated. For example, number B may comprisethe binary combination of A XOR S and number D may comprise the binarycombination of C XOR S. The XOR function, or the “exclusive-or”function, is well known to those of ordinary skill in the art. Theforegoing combinations preferably occur in steps 825 and 830,respectively, and, according to one embodiment, the foregoingcombinations also occur in parallel. The data splitting process 800 thenproceeds to step 835 where the random numbers A and C and the numbers Band D are paired such that none of the pairings contain sufficient data,by themselves, to reorganize and decipher the original sensitive data S.For example, the numbers may be paired as follows: AC, AD, BC, and BD.According to one embodiment, each of the foregoing pairings isdistributed to one of the depositories D1 through D4 of FIG. 7.According to another embodiment, each of the foregoing pairings israndomly distributed to one of the depositories D1 through D4. Forexample, during a first data splitting process 800, the pairing AC maybe sent to depository D2, through, for example, a random selection ofD2's IP address. Then, during a second data splitting process 800, thepairing AC may be sent to depository D4, through, for example, a randomselection of D4's IP address. In addition, the pairings may all bestored on one depository, and may be stored in separate locations onsaid depository.

Based on the foregoing, the data splitting process 800 advantageouslyplaces portions of the sensitive data in each of the four data storagefacilities D1 through D4, such that no single data storage facility D1through D4 includes sufficient encrypted data to recreate the originalsensitive data S. As mentioned in the foregoing, such randomization ofthe data into individually unusable encrypted portions increasessecurity and provides for maintained trust in the data even if one ofthe data storage facilities, D1 through D4, is compromised.

Although the data splitting process 800 is disclosed with reference toits preferred embodiment, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives for the data splitting process800. For example, the data splitting process may advantageously splitthe data into two numbers, for example, random number A and number Band, randomly distribute A and B through two data storage facilities.Moreover, the data splitting process 800 may advantageously split thedata among a wide number of data storage facilities through generationof additional random numbers. The data may be split into any desired,selected, predetermined, or randomly assigned size unit, including butnot limited to, a bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes or larger, orany combination or sequence of sizes. In addition, varying the sizes ofthe data units resulting from the splitting process may render the datamore difficult to restore to a useable form, thereby increasing securityof sensitive data. It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill inthe art that the split data unit sizes may be a wide variety of dataunit sizes or patterns of sizes or combinations of sizes. For example,the data unit sizes may be selected or predetermined to be all of thesame size, a fixed set of different sizes, a combination of sizes, orrandomly generates sizes. Similarly, the data units may be distributedinto one or more shares according to a fixed or predetermined data unitsize, a pattern or combination of data unit sizes, or a randomlygenerated data unit size or sizes per share.

As mentioned in the foregoing, in order to recreate the sensitive dataS, the data portions need to be derandomized and reorganized. Thisprocess may advantageously occur in the data assembling modules, 525 and620, of the authentication engine 215 and the cryptographic engine 220,respectively. The data assembling module, for example, data assemblymodule 525, receives data portions from the data storage facilities D1through D4, and reassembles the data into useable form. For example,according to one embodiment where the data splitting module 520 employedthe data splitting process 800 of FIG. 8, the data assembling module 525uses data portions from at least two of the data storage facilities D1through D4 to recreate the sensitive data S. For example, the pairingsof AC, AD, BC, and BD, were distributed such that any two provide one ofA and B, or, C and D. Noting that S=A XOR B or S=C XOR D indicates thatwhen the data assembling module receives one of A and B, or, C and D,the data assembling module 525 can advantageously reassemble thesensitive data S. Thus, the data assembling module 525 may assemble thesensitive data S, when, for example, it receives data portions from atleast the first two of the data storage facilities D1 through D4 torespond to an assemble request by the trust engine 110.

Based on the above data splitting and assembling processes, thesensitive data S exists in usable format only in a limited area of thetrust engine 110. For example, when the sensitive data S includesenrollment authentication data, usable, nonrandomized enrollmentauthentication data is available only in the authentication engine 215.Likewise, when the sensitive data S includes private cryptographic keydata, usable, nonrandomized private cryptographic key data is availableonly in the cryptographic engine 220.

Although the data splitting and assembling processes are disclosed withreference to their preferred embodiments, the invention is not intendedto be limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for splitting andreassembling the sensitive data S. For example, public-key encryptionmay be used to further secure the data at the data storage facilities D1through D4. In addition, it is readily apparent to those of ordinaryskill in the art that the data splitting module described herein is alsoa separate and distinct embodiment of the present invention that may beincorporated into, combined with or otherwise made part of anypre-existing computer systems, software suites, database, orcombinations thereof, or other embodiments of the present invention,such as the trust engine, authentication engine, and transaction enginedisclosed and described herein.

FIG. 9A illustrates a data flow of an enrollment process 900 accordingto aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG. 9A, theenrollment process 900 begins at step 905 when a user desires to enrollwith the trust engine 110 of the cryptographic system 100. According tothis embodiment, the user system 105 advantageously includes aclient-side applet, such as a Java-based, that queries the user to enterenrollment data, such as demographic data and enrollment authenticationdata. According to one embodiment, the enrollment authentication dataincludes user ID, password(s), biometric(s), or the like. According toone embodiment, during the querying process, the client-side appletpreferably communicates with the trust engine 110 to ensure that achosen user ID is unique. When the user ID is nonunique, the trustengine 110 may advantageously suggest a unique user ID. The client-sideapplet gathers the enrollment data and transmits the enrollment data,for example, through and XML document, to the trust engine 110, and inparticular, to the transaction engine 205. According to one embodiment,the transmission is encoded with the public key of the authenticationengine 215.

According to one embodiment, the user performs a single enrollmentduring step 905 of the enrollment process 900. For example, the userenrolls himself or herself as a particular person, such as Joe User.When Joe User desires to enroll as Joe User, CEO of Mega Corp., thenaccording to this embodiment, Joe User enrolls a second time, receives asecond unique user ID and the trust engine 110 does not associate thetwo identities. According to another embodiment of the invention, theenrollment process 900 provides for multiple user identities for asingle user ID. Thus, in the above example, the trust engine 110 willadvantageously associate the two identities of Joe User. As will beunderstood by a skilled artisan from the disclosure herein, a user mayhave many identities, for example, Joe User the head of household, JoeUser the member of the Charitable Foundations, and the like. Even thoughthe user may have multiple identities, according to this embodiment, thetrust engine 110 preferably stores only one set of enrollment data.Moreover, users may advantageously add, edit/update, or deleteidentities as they are needed.

Although the enrollment process 900 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred embodiment, the invention is not intended to be limitedthereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosureherein, a wide number of alternatives for gathering of enrollment data,and in particular, enrollment authentication data. For example, theapplet may be common object model (COM) based applet or the like.

On the other hand, the enrollment process may include graded enrollment.For example, at a lowest level of enrollment, the user may enroll overthe communication link 125 without producing documentation as to his orher identity. According to an increased level of enrollment, the userenrolls using a trusted third party, such as a digital notary. Forexample, and the user may appear in person to the trusted third party,produce credentials such as a birth certificate, driver's license,military ID, or the like, and the trusted third party may advantageouslyinclude, for example, their digital signature in enrollment submission.The trusted third party may include an actual notary, a governmentagency, such as the Post Office or Department of Motor Vehicles, a humanresources person in a large company enrolling an employee, or the like.A skilled artisan will understand from the disclosure herein that a widenumber of varying levels of enrollment may occur during the enrollmentprocess 900.

After receiving the enrollment authentication data, at step 915, thetransaction engine 205, using conventional FULL SSL technology forwardsthe enrollment authentication data to the authentication engine 215. Instep 920, the authentication engine 215 decrypts the enrollmentauthentication data using the private key of the authentication engine215. In addition, the authentication engine 215 employs the datasplitting module to mathematically operate on the enrollmentauthentication data so as to split the data into at least twoindependently undecipherable, randomized, numbers. As mentioned in theforegoing, at least two numbers may comprise a statistically randomnumber and a binary XORed number. In step 925, the authentication engine215 forwards each portion of the randomized numbers to one of the datastorage facilities D1 through D4. As mentioned in the foregoing, theauthentication engine 215 may also advantageously randomize whichportions are transferred to which depositories.

Often during the enrollment process 900, the user will also desire tohave a digital certificate issued such that he or she may receiveencrypted documents from others outside the cryptographic system 100. Asmentioned in the foregoing, the certificate authority 115 generallyissues digital certificates according to one or more of severalconventional standards. Generally, the digital certificate includes apublic key of the user or system, which is known to everyone.

Whether the user requests a digital certificate at enrollment, or atanother time, the request is transferred through the trust engine 110 tothe authentication engine 215. According to one embodiment, the requestincludes an XML document having, for example, the proper name of theuser. According to step 935, the authentication engine 215 transfers therequest to the cryptographic engine 220 instructing the cryptographicengine 220 to generate a cryptographic key or key pair.

Upon request, at step 935, the cryptographic engine 220 generates atleast one cryptographic key. According to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 generates a key pair, where one key isused as a private key, and one is used as a public key. Thecryptographic engine 220 stores the private key and, according to oneembodiment, a copy of the public key. In step 945, the cryptographicengine 220 transmits a request for a digital certificate to thetransaction engine 205. According to one embodiment, the requestadvantageously includes a standardized request, such as PKCS10, embeddedin, for example, an XML document. The request for a digital certificatemay advantageously correspond to one or more certificate authorities andthe one or more standard formats the certificate authorities require.

In step 950 the transaction engine 205 forwards this request to thecertificate authority 115, who, in step 955, returns a digitalcertificate. The return digital certificate may advantageously be in astandardized format, such as PKCS7, or in a proprietary format of one ormore of the certificate authorities 115. In step 960, the digitalcertificate is received by the transaction engine 205, and a copy isforwarded to the user and a copy is stored with the trust engine 110.The trust engine 110 stores a copy of the certificate such that thetrust engine 110 will not need to rely on the availability of thecertificate authority 115. For example, when the user desires to send adigital certificate, or a third party requests the user's digitalcertificate, the request for the digital certificate is typically sentto the certificate authority 115. However, if the certificate authority115 is conducting maintenance or has been victim of a failure orsecurity compromise, the digital certificate may not be available.

At any time after issuing the cryptographic keys, the cryptographicengine 220 may advantageously employ the data splitting process 800described above such that the cryptographic keys are split intoindependently undecipherable randomized numbers. Similar to theauthentication data, at step 965 the cryptographic engine 220 transfersthe randomized numbers to the data storage facilities D1 through D4.

A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that theuser may request a digital certificate anytime after enrollment.Moreover, the communications between systems may advantageously includeFULL SSL or public-key encryption technologies. Moreover, the enrollmentprocess may issue multiple digital certificates from multiplecertificate authorities, including one or more proprietary certificateauthorities internal or external to the trust engine 110.

As disclosed in steps 935 through 960, one embodiment of the inventionincludes the request for a certificate that is eventually stored on thetrust engine 110. Because, according to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 issues the keys used by the trustengine 110, each certificate corresponds to a private key. Therefore,the trust engine 110 may advantageously provide for interoperabilitythrough monitoring the certificates owned by, or associated with, auser. For example, when the cryptographic engine 220 receives a requestfor a cryptographic function, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayinvestigate the certificates owned by the requesting user to determinewhether the user owns a private key matching the attributes of therequest. When such a certificate exists, the cryptographic handlingmodule 625 may use the certificate or the public or private keysassociated therewith, to perform the requested function. When such acertificate does not exist, the cryptographic handling module 625 mayadvantageously and transparently perform a number of actions to attemptto remedy the lack of an appropriate key. For example, FIG. 9Billustrates a flowchart of an interoperability process 970, whichaccording to aspects of an embodiment of the invention, discloses theforegoing steps to ensure the cryptographic handling module 625 performscryptographic functions using appropriate keys.

As shown in FIG. 9B, the interoperability process 970 begins with step972 where the cryptographic handling module 925 determines the type ofcertificate desired. According to one embodiment of the invention, thetype of certificate may advantageously be specified in the request forcryptographic functions, or other data provided by the requestor.According to another embodiment, the certificate type may be ascertainedby the data format of the request. For example, the cryptographichandling module 925 may advantageously recognize the request correspondsto a particular type.

According to one embodiment, the certificate type may include one ormore algorithm standards, for example, RSA, ELGAMAL, or the like. Inaddition, the certificate type may include one or more key types, suchas symmetric keys, public keys, strong encryption keys such as 256 bitkeys, less secure keys, or the like. Moreover, the certificate type mayinclude upgrades or replacements of one or more of the foregoingalgorithm standards or keys, one or more message or data formats, one ormore data encapsulation or encoding schemes, such as Base 32 or Base 64.The certificate type may also include compatibility with one or morethird-party cryptographic applications or interfaces, one or morecommunication protocols, or one or more certificate standards orprotocols. A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure hereinthat other differences may exist in certificate types, and translationsto and from those differences may be implemented as disclosed herein.

Once the cryptographic handling module 625 determines the certificatetype, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 974, anddetermines whether the user owns a certificate matching the typedetermined in step 974. When the user owns a matching certificate, forexample, the trust engine 110 has access to the matching certificatethrough, for example, prior storage thereof, the cryptographic handlingmodule 825 knows that a matching private key is also stored within thetrust engine 110. For example, the matching private key may be storedwithin the depository 210 or depository system 700. The cryptographichandling module 625 may advantageously request the matching private keybe assembled from, for example, the depository 210, and then in step976, use the matching private key to perform cryptographic actions orfunctions. For example, as mentioned in the foregoing, the cryptographichandling module 625 may advantageously perform hashing, hashcomparisons, data encryption or decryption, digital signatureverification or creation, or the like.

When the user does not own a matching certificate, the interoperabilityprocess 970 proceeds to step 978 where the cryptographic handling module625 determines whether the users owns a cross-certified certificate.According to one embodiment, cross-certification between certificateauthorities occurs when a first certificate authority determines totrust certificates from a second certificate authority. In other words,the first certificate authority determines that certificates from thesecond certificate authority meets certain quality standards, andtherefore, may be “certified” as equivalent to the first certificateauthority's own certificates. Cross-certification becomes more complexwhen the certificate authorities issue, for example, certificates havinglevels of trust. For example, the first certificate authority mayprovide three levels of trust for a particular certificate, usuallybased on the degree of reliability in the enrollment process, while thesecond certificate authority may provide seven levels of trust.Cross-certification may advantageously track which levels and whichcertificates from the second certificate authority may be substitutedfor which levels and which certificates from the first. When theforegoing cross-certification is done officially and publicly betweentwo certification authorities, the mapping of certificates and levels toone another is often called “chaining.”

According to another embodiment of the invention, the cryptographichandling module 625 may advantageously develop cross-certificationsoutside those agreed upon by the certificate authorities. For example,the cryptographic handling module 625 may access a first certificateauthority's certificate practice statement (CPS), or other publishedpolicy statement, and using, for example, the authentication tokensrequired by particular trust levels, match the first certificateauthority's certificates to those of another certificate authority.

When, in step 978, the cryptographic handling module 625 determines thatthe users owns a cross-certified certificate, the interoperabilityprocess 970 proceeds to step 976, and performs the cryptographic actionor function using the cross-certified public key, private key, or both.Alternatively, when the cryptographic handling module 625 determinesthat the users does not own a cross-certified certificate, theinteroperability process 970 proceeds to step 980, where thecryptographic handling module 625 selects a certificate authority thatissues the requested certificate type, or a certificate cross-certifiedthereto. In step 982, the cryptographic handling module 625 determineswhether the user enrollment authentication data, discussed in theforegoing, meets the authentication requirements of the chosencertificate authority. For example, if the user enrolled over a networkby, for example, answering demographic and other questions, theauthentication data provided may establish a lower level of trust than auser providing biometric data and appearing before a third-party, suchas, for example, a notary. According to one embodiment, the foregoingauthentication requirements may advantageously be provided in the chosenauthentication authority's CPS.

When the user has provided the trust engine 110 with enrollmentauthentication data meeting the requirements of chosen certificateauthority, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 984, wherethe cryptographic handling module 825 acquires the certificate from thechosen certificate authority. According to one embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 acquires the certificate by followingsteps 945 through 960 of the enrollment process 900. For example, thecryptographic handling module 625 may advantageously employ one or morepublic keys from one or more of the key pairs already available to thecryptographic engine 220, to request the certificate from thecertificate authority. According to another embodiment, thecryptographic handling module 625 may advantageously generate one ormore new key pairs, and use the public keys corresponding thereto, torequest the certificate from the certificate authority.

According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 may advantageouslyinclude one or more certificate issuing modules capable of issuing oneor more certificate types. According to this embodiment, the certificateissuing module may provide the foregoing certificate. When thecryptographic handling module 625 acquires the certificate, theinteroperability process 970 proceeds to step 976, and performs thecryptographic action or function using the public key, private key, orboth corresponding to the acquired certificate.

When the user, in step 982, has not provided the trust engine 110 withenrollment authentication data meeting the requirements of chosencertificate authority, the cryptographic handling module 625 determines,in step 986 whether there are other certificate authorities that havedifferent authentication requirements. For example, the cryptographichandling module 625 may look for certificate authorities having lowerauthentication requirements, but still issue the chosen certificates, orcross-certifications thereof.

When the foregoing certificate authority having lower requirementsexists, the interoperability process 970 proceeds to step 980 andchooses that certificate authority. Alternatively, when no suchcertificate authority exists, in step 988, the trust engine 110 mayrequest additional authentication tokens from the user. For example, thetrust engine 110 may request new enrollment authentication datacomprising, for example, biometric data. Also, the trust engine 110 mayrequest the user appear before a trusted third party and provideappropriate authenticating credentials, such as, for example, appearingbefore a notary with a drivers license, social security card, bank card,birth certificate, military ID, or the like. When the trust engine 110receives updated authentication data, the interoperability process 970proceeds to step 984 and acquires the foregoing chosen certificate.

Through the foregoing interoperability process 970, the cryptographichandling module 625 advantageously provides seamless, transparent,translations and conversions between differing cryptographic systems. Askilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein, a wide numberof advantages and implementations of the foregoing interoperable system.For example, the foregoing step 986 of the interoperability process 970may advantageously include aspects of trust arbitrage, discussed infurther detail below, where the certificate authority may under specialcircumstances accept lower levels of cross-certification. In addition,the interoperability process 970 may include ensuring interoperabilitybetween and employment of standard certificate revocations, such asemploying certificate revocation lists (CRL), online certificate statusprotocols (OCSP), or the like.

FIG. 10 illustrates a data flow of an authentication process 1000according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. According to oneembodiment, the authentication process 1000 includes gathering currentauthentication data from a user and comparing that to the enrollmentauthentication data of the user. For example, the authentication process1000 begins at step 1005 where a user desires to perform a transactionwith, for example, a vendor. Such transactions may include, for example,selecting a purchase option, requesting access to a restricted area ordevice of the vendor system 120, or the like. At step 1010, a vendorprovides the user with a transaction ID and an authentication request.The transaction ID may advantageously include a 192 bit quantity havinga 32 bit timestamp concatenated with a 128 bit random quantity, or a“nonce,” concatenated with a 32 bit vendor specific constant. Such atransaction ID uniquely identifies the transaction such that copycattransactions can be refused by the trust engine 110.

The authentication request may advantageously include what level ofauthentication is needed for a particular transaction. For example, thevendor may specify a particular level of confidence that is required forthe transaction at issue. If authentication cannot be made to this levelof confidence, as will be discussed below, the transaction will notoccur without either further authentication by the user to raise thelevel of confidence, or a change in the terms of the authenticationbetween the vendor and the server. These issues are discussed morecompletely below.

According to one embodiment, the transaction ID and the authenticationrequest may be advantageously generated by a vendor-side applet or othersoftware program. In addition, the transmission of the transaction IDand authentication data may include one or more XML documents encryptedusing conventional SSL technology, such as, for example, ½ SSL, or, inother words vendor-side authenticated SSL.

After the user system 105 receives the transaction ID and authenticationrequest, the user system 105 gathers the current authentication data,potentially including current biometric information, from the user. Theuser system 105, at step 1015, encrypts at least the currentauthentication data “B” and the transaction ID, with the public key ofthe authentication engine 215, and transfers that data to the trustengine 110. The transmission preferably comprises XML documentsencrypted with at least conventional ½ SSL technology. In step 1020, thetransaction engine 205 receives the transmission, preferably recognizesthe data format or request in the URL or URI, and forwards thetransmission to the authentication engine 215.

During steps 1015 and 1020, the vendor system 120, at step 1025,forwards the transaction ID and the authentication request to the trustengine 110, using the preferred FULL SSL technology. This communicationmay also include a vendor ID, although vendor identification may also becommunicated through a non-random portion of the transaction ID. Atsteps 1030 and 1035, the transaction engine 205 receives thecommunication, creates a record in the audit trail, and generates arequest for the user's enrollment authentication data to be assembledfrom the data storage facilities D1 through D4. At step 1040, thedepository system 700 transfers the portions of the enrollmentauthentication data corresponding to the user to the authenticationengine 215. At step 1045, the authentication engine 215 decrypts thetransmission using its private key and compares the enrollmentauthentication data to the current authentication data provided by theuser.

The comparison of step 1045 may advantageously apply heuristical contextsensitive authentication, as referred to in the forgoing, and discussedin further detail below. For example, if the biometric informationreceived does not match perfectly, a lower confidence match results. Inparticular embodiments, the level of confidence of the authentication isbalanced against the nature of the transaction and the desires of boththe user and the vendor. Again, this is discussed in greater detailbelow.

At step 1050, the authentication engine 215 fills in the authenticationrequest with the result of the comparison of step 1045. According to oneembodiment of the invention, the authentication request is filled with aYES/NO or TRUE/FALSE result of the authentication process 1000. In step1055 the filled-in authentication request is returned to the vendor forthe vendor to act upon, for example, allowing the user to complete thetransaction that initiated the authentication request. According to oneembodiment, a confirmation message is passed to the user.

Based on the foregoing, the authentication process 1000 advantageouslykeeps sensitive data secure and produces results configured to maintainthe integrity of the sensitive data. For example, the sensitive data isassembled only inside the authentication engine 215. For example, theenrollment authentication data is undecipherable until it is assembledin the authentication engine 215 by the data assembling module, and thecurrent authentication data is undecipherable until it is unwrapped bythe conventional SSL technology and the private key of theauthentication engine 215. Moreover, the authentication resulttransmitted to the vendor does not include the sensitive data, and theuser may not even know whether he or she produced valid authenticationdata.

Although the authentication process 1000 is disclosed with reference toits preferred and alternative embodiments, the invention is not intendedto be limited thereby. Rather, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for the authenticationprocess 1000. For example, the vendor may advantageously be replaced byalmost any requesting application, even those residing with the usersystem 105. For example, a client application, such as Microsoft Word,may use an application program interface (API) or a cryptographic API(CAPI) to request authentication before unlocking a document.Alternatively, a mail server, a network, a cellular phone, a personal ormobile computing device, a workstation, or the like, may all makeauthentication requests that can be filled by the authentication process1000. In fact, after providing the foregoing trusted authenticationprocess 1000, the requesting application or device may provide access toor use of a wide number of electronic or computer devices or systems.

Moreover, the authentication process 1000 may employ a wide number ofalternative procedures in the event of authentication failure. Forexample, authentication failure may maintain the same transaction ID andrequest that the user reenter his or her current authentication data. Asmentioned in the foregoing, use of the same transaction ID allows thecomparator of the authentication engine 215 to monitor and limit thenumber of authentication attempts for a particular transaction, therebycreating a more secure cryptographic system 100.

In addition, the authentication process 1000 may be advantageously beemployed to develop elegant single sign-on solutions, such as, unlockinga sensitive data vault. For example, successful or positiveauthentication may provide the authenticated user the ability toautomatically access any number of passwords for an almost limitlessnumber of systems and applications. For example, authentication of auser may provide the user access to password, login, financialcredentials, or the like, associated with multiple online vendors, alocal area network, various personal computing devices, Internet serviceproviders, auction providers, investment brokerages, or the like. Byemploying a sensitive data vault, users may choose truly large andrandom passwords because they no longer need to remember them throughassociation. Rather, the authentication process 1000 provides accessthereto. For example, a user may choose a random alphanumeric stringthat is twenty plus digits in length rather than something associatedwith a memorable data, name, etc.

According to one embodiment, a sensitive data vault associated with agiven user may advantageously be stored in the data storage facilitiesof the depository 210, or split and stored in the depository system 700.According to this embodiment, after positive user authentication, thetrust engine 110 serves the requested sensitive data, such as, forexample, to the appropriate password to the requesting application.According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 may include aseparate system for storing the sensitive data vault. For example, thetrust engine 110 may include a stand-alone software engine implementingthe data vault functionality and figuratively residing “behind” theforegoing front-end security system of the trust engine 110. Accordingto this embodiment, the software engine serves the requested sensitivedata after the software engine receives a signal indicating positiveuser authentication from the trust engine 110.

In yet another embodiment, the data vault may be implemented by athird-party system. Similar to the software engine embodiment, thethird-party system may advantageously serve the requested sensitive dataafter the third-party system receives a signal indicating positive userauthentication from the trust engine 110. According to yet anotherembodiment, the data vault may be implemented on the user system 105. Auser-side software engine may advantageously serve the foregoing dataafter receiving a signal indicating positive user authentication fromthe trust engine 110.

Although the foregoing data vaults are disclosed with reference toalternative embodiments, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein, a wide number of additional implementations thereof.For example, a particular data vault may include aspects from some orall of the foregoing embodiments. In addition, any of the foregoing datavaults may employ one or more authentication requests at varying times.For example, any of the data vaults may require authentication every oneor more transactions, periodically, every one or more sessions, everyaccess to one or more Webpages or Websites, at one or more otherspecified intervals, or the like.

FIG. 11 illustrates a data flow of a signing process 1100 according toaspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG. 11, thesigning process 1100 includes steps similar to those of theauthentication process 1000 described in the foregoing with reference toFIG. 10. According to one embodiment of the invention, the signingprocess 1100 first authenticates the user and then performs one or moreof several digital signing functions as will be discussed in furtherdetail below. According to another embodiment, the signing process 1100may advantageously store data related thereto, such as hashes ofmessages or documents, or the like. This data may advantageously be usedin an audit or any other event, such as for example, when aparticipating party attempts to repudiate a transaction.

As shown in FIG. 11, during the authentication steps, the user andvendor may advantageously agree on a message, such as, for example, acontract. During signing, the signing process 1100 advantageouslyensures that the contract signed by the user is identical to thecontract supplied by the vendor. Therefore, according to one embodiment,during authentication, the vendor and the user include a hash of theirrespective copies of the message or contract, in the data transmitted tothe authentication engine 215. By employing only a hash of a message orcontract, the trust engine 110 may advantageously store a significantlyreduced amount of data, providing for a more efficient and costeffective cryptographic system. In addition, the stored hash may beadvantageously compared to a hash of a document in question to determinewhether the document in question matches one signed by any of theparties. The ability to determine whether the document is identical toone relating to a transaction provides for additional evidence that canbe used against a claim for repudiation by a party to a transaction.

In step 1103, the authentication engine 215 assembles the enrollmentauthentication data and compares it to the current authentication dataprovided by the user. When the comparator of the authentication engine215 indicates that the enrollment authentication data matches thecurrent authentication data, the comparator of the authentication engine215 also compares the hash of the message supplied by the vendor to thehash of the message supplied by the user. Thus, the authenticationengine 215 advantageously ensures that the message agreed to by the useris identical to that agreed to by the vendor.

In step 1105, the authentication engine 215 transmits a digitalsignature request to the cryptographic engine 220. According to oneembodiment of the invention, the request includes a hash of the messageor contract. However, a skilled artisan will recognize from thedisclosure herein that the cryptographic engine 220 may encryptvirtually any type of data, including, but not limited to, video, audio,biometrics, images or text to form the desired digital signature.Returning to step 1105, the digital signature request preferablycomprises an XML document communicated through conventional SSLtechnologies.

In step 1110, the authentication engine 215 transmits a request to eachof the data storage facilities D1 through D4, such that each of the datastorage facilities D1 through D4 transmit their respective portion ofthe cryptographic key or keys corresponding to a signing party.According to another embodiment, the cryptographic engine 220 employssome or all of the steps of the interoperability process 970 discussedin the foregoing, such that the cryptographic engine 220 firstdetermines the appropriate key or keys to request from the depository210 or the depository system 700 for the signing party, and takesactions to provide appropriate matching keys. According to still anotherembodiment, the authentication engine 215 or the cryptographic engine220 may advantageously request one or more of the keys associated withthe signing party and stored in the depository 210 or depository system700.

According to one embodiment, the signing party includes one or both theuser and the vendor. In such case, the authentication engine 215advantageously requests the cryptographic keys corresponding to the userand/or the vendor. According to another embodiment, the signing partyincludes the trust engine 110. In this embodiment, the trust engine 110is certifying that the authentication process 1000 properlyauthenticated the user, vendor, or both. Therefore, the authenticationengine 215 requests the cryptographic key of the trust engine 110, suchas, for example, the key belonging to the cryptographic engine 220, toperform the digital signature. According to another embodiment, thetrust engine 110 performs a digital notary-like function. In thisembodiment, the signing party includes the user, vendor, or both, alongwith the trust engine 110. Thus, the trust engine 110 provides thedigital signature of the user and/or vendor, and then indicates with itsown digital signature that the user and/or vendor were properlyauthenticated. In this embodiment, the authentication engine 215 mayadvantageously request assembly of the cryptographic keys correspondingto the user, the vendor, or both. According to another embodiment, theauthentication engine 215 may advantageously request assembly of thecryptographic keys corresponding to the trust engine 110.

According to another embodiment, the trust engine 110 performs power ofattorney-like functions. For example, the trust engine 110 may digitallysign the message on behalf of a third party. In such case, theauthentication engine 215 requests the cryptographic keys associatedwith the third party. According to this embodiment, the signing process1100 may advantageously include authentication of the third party,before allowing power of attorney-like functions. In addition, theauthentication process 1000 may include a check for third partyconstraints, such as, for example, business logic or the like dictatingwhen and in what circumstances a particular third-party's signature maybe used.

Based on the foregoing, in step 1110, the authentication enginerequested the cryptographic keys from the data storage facilities D1through D4 corresponding to the signing party. In step 1115, the datastorage facilities D1 through D4 transmit their respective portions ofthe cryptographic key corresponding to the signing party to thecryptographic engine 220. According to one embodiment, the foregoingtransmissions include SSL technologies. According to another embodiment,the foregoing transmissions may advantageously be super-encrypted withthe public key of the cryptographic engine 220.

In step 1120, the cryptographic engine 220 assembles the foregoingcryptographic keys of the signing party and encrypts the messagetherewith, thereby forming the digital signature(s). In step 1125 of thesigning process 1100, the cryptographic engine 220 transmits the digitalsignature(s) to the authentication engine 215. In step 1130, theauthentication engine 215 transmits the filled-in authentication requestalong with a copy of the hashed message and the digital signature(s) tothe transaction engine 205. In step 1135, the transaction engine 205transmits a receipt comprising the transaction ID, an indication ofwhether the authentication was successful, and the digital signature(s),to the vendor. According to one embodiment, the foregoing transmissionmay advantageously include the digital signature of the trust engine110. For example, the trust engine 110 may encrypt the hash of thereceipt with its private key, thereby forming a digital signature to beattached to the transmission to the vendor.

According to one embodiment, the transaction engine 205 also transmits aconfirmation message to the user. Although the signing process 1100 isdisclosed with reference to its preferred and alternative embodiments,the invention is not intended to be limited thereby. Rather, a skilledartisan will recognize from the disclosure herein, a wide number ofalternatives for the signing process 1100. For example, the vendor maybe replaced with a user application, such as an email application. Forexample, the user may wish to digitally sign a particular email with hisor her digital signature. In such an embodiment, the transmissionthroughout the signing process 1100 may advantageously include only onecopy of a hash of the message. Moreover, a skilled artisan willrecognize from the disclosure herein that a wide number of clientapplications may request digital signatures. For example, the clientapplications may comprise word processors, spreadsheets, emails,voicemail, access to restricted system areas, or the like.

In addition, a skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure hereinthat steps 1105 through 1120 of the signing process 1100 mayadvantageously employ some or all of the steps of the interoperabilityprocess 970 of FIG. 9B, thereby providing interoperability betweendiffering cryptographic systems that may, for example, need to processthe digital signature under differing signature types.

FIG. 12 illustrates a data flow of an encryption/decryption process 1200according to aspects of an embodiment of the invention. As shown in FIG.12, the decryption process 1200 begins by authenticating the user usingthe authentication process 1000. According to one embodiment, theauthentication process 1000 includes in the authentication request, asynchronous session key. For example, in conventional PKI technologies,it is understood by skilled artisans that encrypting or decrypting datausing public and private keys is mathematically intensive and mayrequire significant system resources. However, in symmetric keycryptographic systems, or systems where the sender and receiver of amessage share a single common key that is used to encrypt and decrypt amessage, the mathematical operations are significantly simpler andfaster. Thus, in the conventional PKI technologies, the sender of amessage will generate synchronous session key, and encrypt the messageusing the simpler, faster symmetric key system. Then, the sender willencrypt the session key with the public key of the receiver. Theencrypted session key will be attached to the synchronously encryptedmessage and both data are sent to the receiver. The receiver uses his orher private key to decrypt the session key, and then uses the sessionkey to decrypt the message. Based on the foregoing, the simpler andfaster symmetric key system is used for the majority of theencryption/decryption processing. Thus, in the decryption process 1200,the decryption advantageously assumes that a synchronous key has beenencrypted with the public key of the user. Thus, as mentioned in theforegoing, the encrypted session key is included in the authenticationrequest.

Returning to the decryption process 1200, after the user has beenauthenticated in step 1205, the authentication engine 215 forwards theencrypted session key to the cryptographic engine 220. In step 1210, theauthentication engine 215 forwards a request to each of the data storagefacilities, D1 through D4, requesting the cryptographic key data of theuser. In step 1215, each data storage facility, D1 through D4, transmitstheir respective portion of the cryptographic key to the cryptographicengine 220. According to one embodiment, the foregoing transmission isencrypted with the public key of the cryptographic engine 220.

In step 1220 of the decryption process 1200, the cryptographic engine220 assembles the cryptographic key and decrypts the session keytherewith. In step 1225, the cryptographic engine forwards the sessionkey to the authentication engine 215. In step 1227, the authenticationengine 215 fills in the authentication request including the decryptedsession key, and transmits the filled-in authentication request to thetransaction engine 205. In step 1230, the transaction engine 205forwards the authentication request along with the session key to therequesting application or vendor. Then, according to one embodiment, therequesting application or vendor uses the session key to decrypt theencrypted message.

Although the decryption process 1200 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred and alternative embodiments, a skilled artisan will recognizefrom the disclosure herein, a wide number of alternatives for thedecryption process 1200. For example, the decryption process 1200 mayforego synchronous key encryption and rely on full public-keytechnology. In such an embodiment, the requesting application maytransmit the entire message to the cryptographic engine 220, or, mayemploy some type of compression or reversible hash in order to transmitthe message to the cryptographic engine 220. A skilled artisan will alsorecognize from the disclosure herein that the foregoing communicationsmay advantageously include XML documents wrapped in SSL technology.

The encryption/decryption process 1200 also provides for encryption ofdocuments or other data. Thus, in step 1235, a requesting application orvendor may advantageously transmit to the transaction engine 205 of thetrust engine 110, a request for the public key of the user. Therequesting application or vendor makes this request because therequesting application or vendor uses the public key of the user, forexample, to encrypt the session key that will be used to encrypt thedocument or message. As mentioned in the enrollment process 900, thetransaction engine 205 stores a copy of the digital certificate of theuser, for example, in the mass storage 225. Thus, in step 1240 of theencryption process 1200, the transaction engine 205 requests the digitalcertificate of the user from the mass storage 225. In step 1245, themass storage 225 transmits the digital certificate corresponding to theuser, to the transaction engine 205. In step 1250, the transactionengine 205 transmits the digital certificate to the requestingapplication or vendor. According to one embodiment, the encryptionportion of the encryption process 1200 does not include theauthentication of a user. This is because the requesting vendor needsonly the public key of the user, and is not requesting any sensitivedata.

A skilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that if aparticular user does not have a digital certificate, the trust engine110 may employ some or all of the enrollment process 900 in order togenerate a digital certificate for that particular user. Then, the trustengine 110 may initiate the encryption/decryption process 1200 andthereby provide the appropriate digital certificate. In addition, askilled artisan will recognize from the disclosure herein that steps1220 and 1235 through 1250 of the encryption/decryption process 1200 mayadvantageously employ some or all of the steps of the interoperabilityprocess of FIG. 9B, thereby providing interoperability between differingcryptographic systems that may, for example, need to process theencryption.

FIG. 13 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust engine system1300 according to aspects of yet another embodiment of the invention. Asshown in FIG. 13, the trust engine system 1300 comprises a plurality ofdistinct trust engines 1305, 1310, 1315, and 1320, respectively. Tofacilitate a more complete understanding of the invention, FIG. 13illustrates each trust engine, 1305, 1310, 1315, and 1320 as having atransaction engine, a depository, and an authentication engine. However,a skilled artisan will recognize that each transaction engine mayadvantageously comprise some, a combination, or all of the elements andcommunication channels disclosed with reference to FIGS. 1-8. Forexample, one embodiment may advantageously include trust engines havingone or more transaction engines, depositories, and cryptographic serversor any combinations thereof.

According to one embodiment of the invention, each of the trust engines1305, 1310, 1315 and 1320 are geographically separated, such that, forexample, the trust engine 1305 may reside in a first location, the trustengine 1310 may reside in a second location, the trust engine 1315 mayreside in a third location, and the trust engine 1320 may reside in afourth location. The foregoing geographic separation advantageouslydecreases system response time while increasing the security of theoverall trust engine system 1300.

For example, when a user logs onto the cryptographic system 100, theuser may be nearest the first location and may desire to beauthenticated. As described with reference to FIG. 10, to beauthenticated, the user provides current authentication data, such as abiometric or the like, and the current authentication data is comparedto that user's enrollment authentication data. Therefore, according toone example, the user advantageously provides current authenticationdata to the geographically nearest trust engine 1305. The transactionengine 1321 of the trust engine 1305 then forwards the currentauthentication data to the authentication engine 1322 also residing atthe first location. According to another embodiment, the transactionengine 1321 forwards the current authentication data to one or more ofthe authentication engines of the trust engines 1310, 1315, or 1320.

The transaction engine 1321 also requests the assembly of the enrollmentauthentication data from the depositories of, for example, each of thetrust engines, 1305 through 1320. According to this embodiment, eachdepository provides its portion of the enrollment authentication data tothe authentication engine 1322 of the trust engine 1305. Theauthentication engine 1322 then employs the encrypted data portionsfrom, for example, the first two depositories to respond, and assemblesthe enrollment authentication data into deciphered form. Theauthentication engine 1322 compares the enrollment authentication datawith the current authentication data and returns an authenticationresult to the transaction engine 1321 of the trust engine 1305.

Based on the above, the trust engine system 1300 employs the nearest oneof a plurality of geographically separated trust engines, 1305 through1320, to perform the authentication process. According to one embodimentof the invention, the routing of information to the nearest transactionengine may advantageously be performed at client-side applets executingon one or more of the user system 105, vendor system 120, or certificateauthority 115. According to an alternative embodiment, a moresophisticated decision process may be employed to select from the trustengines 1305 through 1320. For example, the decision may be based on theavailability, operability, speed of connections, load, performance,geographic proximity, or a combination thereof, of a given trust engine.

In this way, the trust engine system 1300 lowers its response time whilemaintaining the security advantages associated with geographicallyremote data storage facilities, such as those discussed with referenceto FIG. 7 where each data storage facility stores randomized portions ofsensitive data. For example, a security compromise at, for example, thedepository 1325 of the trust engine 1315 does not necessarily compromisethe sensitive data of the trust engine system 1300. This is because thedepository 1325 contains only non-decipherable randomized data that,without more, is entirely useless.

According to another embodiment, the trust engine system 1300 mayadvantageously include multiple cryptographic engines arranged similarto the authentication engines. The cryptographic engines mayadvantageously perform cryptographic functions such as those disclosedwith reference to FIGS. 1-8. According to yet another embodiment, thetrust engine system 1300 may advantageously replace the multipleauthentication engines with multiple cryptographic engines, therebyperforming cryptographic functions such as those disclosed withreference to FIGS. 1-8. According to yet another embodiment of theinvention, the trust engine system 1300 may replace each multipleauthentication engine with an engine having some or all of thefunctionality of the authentication engines, cryptographic engines, orboth, as disclosed in the foregoing,

Although the trust engine system 1300 is disclosed with reference to itspreferred and alternative embodiments, a skilled artisan will recognizethat the trust engine system 1300 may comprise portions of trust engines1305 through 1320. For example, the trust engine system 1300 may includeone or more transaction engines, one or more depositories, one or moreauthentication engines, or one or more cryptographic engines orcombinations thereof.

FIG. 14 illustrates a simplified block diagram of a trust engine System1400 according to aspects of yet another embodiment of the invention. Asshown in FIG. 14, the trust engine system 1400 includes multiple trustengines 1405, 1410, 1415 and 1420. According to one embodiment, each ofthe trust engines 1405, 1410, 1415 and 1420, comprise some or all of theelements of trust engine 110 disclosed with reference to FIGS. 1-8.According to this embodiment, when the client side applets of the usersystem 105, the vendor system 120, or the certificate authority 115,communicate with the trust engine system 1400, those communications aresent to the IP address of each of the trust engines 1405 through 1420.Further, each transaction engine of each of the trust engines, 1405,1410, 1415, and 1420, behaves similar to the transaction engine 1321 ofthe trust engine 1305 disclosed with reference to FIG. 13. For example,during an authentication process, each transaction engine of each of thetrust engines 1405, 1410, 1415, and 1420 transmits the currentauthentication data to their respective authentication engines andtransmits a request to assemble the randomized data stored in each ofthe depositories of each of the trust engines 1405 through 1420. FIG. 14does not illustrate all of these communications; as such illustrationwould become overly complex. Continuing with the authentication process,each of the depositories then communicates its portion of the randomizeddata to each of the authentication engines of the each of the trustengines 1405 through 1420. Each of the authentication engines of theeach of the trust engines employs its comparator to determine whetherthe current authentication data matches the enrollment authenticationdata provided by the depositories of each of the trust engines 1405through 1420. According to this embodiment, the result of the comparisonby each of the authentication engines is then transmitted to aredundancy module of the other three trust engines. For example, theresult of the authentication engine from the trust engine 1405 istransmitted to the redundancy modules of the trust engines 1410, 1415,and 1420. Thus, the redundancy module of the trust engine 1405 likewisereceives the result of the authentication engines from the trust engines1410, 1415, and 1420.

FIG. 15 illustrates a block diagram of the redundancy module of FIG. 14.The redundancy module comprises a comparator configured to receive theauthentication result from three authentication engines and transmitthat result to the transaction engine of the fourth trust engine. Thecomparator compares the authentication result form the threeauthentication engines, and if two of the results agree, the comparatorconcludes that the authentication result should match that of the twoagreeing authentication engines. This result is then transmitted back tothe transaction engine corresponding to the trust engine not associatedwith the three authentication engines.

Based on the foregoing, the redundancy module determines anauthentication result from data received from authentication enginesthat are preferably geographically remote from the trust engine of thatthe redundancy module. By providing such redundancy functionality, thetrust engine system 1400 ensures that a compromise of the authenticationengine of one of the trust engines 1405 through 1420, is insufficient tocompromise the authentication result of the redundancy module of thatparticular trust engine. A skilled artisan will recognize thatredundancy module functionality of the trust engine system 1400 may alsobe applied to the cryptographic engine of each of the trust engines 1405through 1420. However, such cryptographic engine communication was notshown in FIG. 14 to avoid complexity. Moreover, a skilled artisan willrecognize a wide number of alternative authentication result conflictresolution algorithms for the comparator of FIG. 15 are suitable for usein the present invention.

According to yet another embodiment of the invention, the trust enginesystem 1400 may advantageously employ the redundancy module duringcryptographic comparison steps. For example, some or all of theforegoing redundancy module disclosure with reference to FIGS. 14 and 15may advantageously be implemented during a hash comparison of documentsprovided by one or more parties during a particular transaction.

Although the foregoing invention has been described in terms of certainpreferred and alternative embodiments, other embodiments will beapparent to those of ordinary skill in the art from the disclosureherein. For example, the trust engine 110 may issue short-termcertificates, where the private cryptographic key is released to theuser for a predetermined period of time. For example, currentcertificate standards include a validity field that can be set to expireafter a predetermined amount of time. Thus, the trust engine 110 mayrelease a private key to a user where the private key would be validfor, for example, 24 hours. According to such an embodiment, the trustengine 110 may advantageously issue a new cryptographic key pair to beassociated with a particular user and then release the private key ofthe new cryptographic key pair. Then, once the private cryptographic keyis released, the trust engine 110 immediately expires any internal validuse of such private key, as it is no longer securable by the trustengine 110.

In addition, a skilled artisan will recognize that the cryptographicsystem 100 or the trust engine 110 may include the ability to recognizeany type of devices, such as, but not limited to, a laptop, a cellphone, a network, a biometric device or the like. According to oneembodiment, such recognition may come from data supplied in the requestfor a particular service, such as, a request for authentication leadingto access or use, a request for cryptographic functionality, or thelike. According to one embodiment, the foregoing request may include aunique device identifier, such as, for example, a processor ID.Alternatively, the request may include data in a particular recognizabledata format. For example, mobile and satellite phones often do notinclude the processing power for full X509.v3 heavy encryptioncertificates, and therefore do not request them. According to thisembodiment, the trust engine 110 may recognize the type of data formatpresented, and respond only in kind.

In an additional aspect of the system described above, context sensitiveauthentication can be provided using various techniques as will bedescribed below. Context sensitive authentication, for example as shownin FIG. 16, provides the possibility of evaluating not only the actualdata which is sent by the user when attempting to authenticate himself,but also the circumstances surrounding the generation and delivery ofthat data. Such techniques may also support transaction specific trustarbitrage between the user and trust engine 110 or between the vendorand trust engine 110, as will be described below.

As discussed above, authentication is the process of proving that a useris who he says he is. Generally, authentication requires demonstratingsome fact to an authentication authority. The trust engine 110 of thepresent invention represents the authority to which a user mustauthenticate himself. The user must demonstrate to the trust engine 110that he is who he says he is by either: knowing something that only theuser should know (knowledge-based authentication), having something thatonly the user should have (token-based authentication), or by beingsomething that only the user should be (biometric-based authentication).

Examples of knowledge-based authentication include without limitation apassword, PIN number, or lock combination. Examples of token-basedauthentication include without limitation a house key, a physical creditcard, a driver's license, or a particular phone number. Examples ofbiometric-based authentication include without limitation a fingerprint,handwriting analysis, facial scan, hand scan, ear scan, iris scan,vascular pattern, DNA, a voice analysis, or a retinal scan.

Each type of authentication has particular advantages and disadvantages,and each provides a different level of security. For example, it isgenerally harder to create a false fingerprint that matches someoneelse's than it is to overhear someone's password and repeat it. Eachtype of authentication also requires a different type of data to beknown to the authenticating authority in order to verify someone usingthat form of authentication.

As used herein, “authentication” will refer broadly to the overallprocess of verifying someone's identity to be who he says he is. An“authentication technique” will refer to a particular type ofauthentication based upon a particular piece of knowledge, physicaltoken, or biometric reading. “Authentication data” refers to informationwhich is sent to or otherwise demonstrated to an authenticationauthority in order to establish identity. “Enrollment data” will referto the data which is initially submitted to an authentication authorityin order to establish a baseline for comparison with authenticationdata. An “authentication instance” will refer to the data associatedwith an attempt to authenticate by an authentication technique.

The internal protocols and communications involved in the process ofauthenticating a user is described with reference to FIG. 10 above. Thepart of this process within which the context sensitive authenticationtakes place occurs within the comparison step shown as step 1045 of FIG.10. This step takes place within the authentication engine 215 andinvolves assembling the enrollment data 410 retrieved from thedepository 210 and comparing the authentication data provided by theuser to it. One particular embodiment of this process is shown in FIG.16 and described below.

The current authentication data provided by the user and the enrollmentdata retrieved from the depository 210 are received by theauthentication engine 215 in step 1600 of FIG. 16. Both of these sets ofdata may contain data which is related to separate techniques ofauthentication. The authentication engine 215 separates theauthentication data associated with each individual authenticationinstance in step 1605. This is necessary so that the authentication datais compared with the appropriate subset of the enrollment data for theuser (e.g. fingerprint authentication data should be compared withfingerprint enrollment data, rather than password enrollment data).

Generally, authenticating a user involves one or more individualauthentication instances, depending on which authentication techniquesare available to the user. These methods are limited by the enrollmentdata which were provided by the user during his enrollment process (ifthe user did not provide a retinal scan when enrolling, he will not beable to authenticate himself using a retinal scan), as well as the meanswhich may be currently available to the user (e.g. if the user does nothave a fingerprint reader at his current location, fingerprintauthentication will not be practical). In some cases, a singleauthentication instance may be sufficient to authenticate a user;however, in certain circumstances a combination of multipleauthentication instances may be used in order to more confidentlyauthenticate a user for a particular transaction.

Each authentication instance consists of data related to a particularauthentication technique (e.g. fingerprint, password, smart card, etc.)and the circumstances which surround the capture and delivery of thedata for that particular technique. For example, a particular instanceof attempting to authenticate via password will generate not only thedata related to the password itself, but also circumstantial data, knownas “metadata”, related to that password attempt. This circumstantialdata includes information such as: the time at which the particularauthentication instance took place, the network address from which theauthentication information was delivered, as well as any otherinformation as is known to those of skill in the art which may bedetermined about the origin of the authentication data (the type ofconnection, the processor serial number, etc.).

In many cases, only a small amount of circumstantial metadata will beavailable. For example, if the user is located on a network which usesproxies or network address translation or another technique which masksthe address of the originating computer, only the address of the proxyor router may be determined. Similarly, in many cases information suchas the processor serial number will not be available because of eitherlimitations of the hardware or operating system being used, disabling ofsuch features by the operator of the system, or other limitations of theconnection between the user's system and the trust engine 110.

As shown in FIG. 16, once the individual authentication instancesrepresented within the authentication data are extracted and separatedin step 1605, the authentication engine 215 evaluates each instance forits reliability in indicating that the user is who he claims to be. Thereliability for a single authentication instance will generally bedetermined based on several factors. These may be grouped as factorsrelating to the reliability associated with the authenticationtechnique, which are evaluated in step 1610, and factors relating to thereliability of the particular authentication data provided, which areevaluated in step 1815. The first group includes without limitation theinherent reliability of the authentication technique being used, and thereliability of the enrollment data being used with that method. Thesecond group includes without limitation the degree of match between theenrollment data and the data provided with the authentication instance,and the metadata associated with that authentication instance. Each ofthese factors may vary independently of the others.

The inherent reliability of an authentication technique is based on howhard it is for an imposter to provide someone else's correct data, aswell as the overall error rates for the authentication technique. Forpasswords and knowledge based authentication methods, this reliabilityis often fairly low because there is nothing that prevents someone fromrevealing their password to another person and for that second person touse that password. Even a more complex knowledge based system may haveonly moderate reliability since knowledge may be transferred from personto person fairly easily. Token based authentication, such as having aproper smart card or using a particular terminal to perform theauthentication, is similarly of low reliability used by itself, sincethere is no guarantee that the right person is in possession of theproper token.

However, biometric techniques are more inherently reliable because it isgenerally difficult to provide someone else with the ability to use yourfingerprints in a convenient manner, even intentionally. Becausesubverting biometric authentication techniques is more difficult, theinherent reliability of biometric methods is generally higher than thatof purely knowledge or token based authentication techniques. However,even biometric techniques may have some occasions in which a falseacceptance or false rejection is generated. These occurrences may bereflected by differing reliabilities for different implementations ofthe same biometric technique. For example, a fingerprint matching systemprovided by one company may provide a higher reliability than oneprovided by a different company because one uses higher quality opticsor a better scanning resolution or some other improvement which reducesthe occurrence of false acceptances or false rejections.

Note that this reliability may be expressed in different manners. Thereliability is desirably expressed in some metric which can be used bythe heuristics 530 and algorithms of the authentication engine 215 tocalculate the confidence level of each authentication. One preferredmode of expressing these reliabilities is as a percentage or fraction.For instance, fingerprints might be assigned an inherent reliability of97%, while passwords might only be assigned an inherent reliability of50%. Those of skill in the art will recognize that these particularvalues are merely exemplary and may vary between specificimplementations.

The second factor for which reliability must be assessed is thereliability of the enrollment. This is part of the “graded enrollment”process referred to above. This reliability factor reflects thereliability of the identification provided during the initial enrollmentprocess. For instance, if the individual initially enrolls in a mannerwhere they physically produce evidence of their identity to a notary orother public official, and enrollment data is recorded at that time andnotarized, the data will be more reliable than data which is providedover a network during enrollment and only vouched for by a digitalsignature or other information which is not truly tied to theindividual.

Other enrollment techniques with varying levels of reliability includewithout limitation: enrollment at a physical office of the trust engine110 operator; enrollment at a user's place of employment; enrollment ata post office or passport office; enrollment through an affiliated ortrusted party to the trust engine 110 operator; anonymous orpseudonymous enrollment in which the enrolled identity is not yetidentified with a particular real individual, as well as such othermeans as are known in the art.

These factors reflect the trust between the trust engine 110 and thesource of identification provided during the enrollment process. Forinstance, if enrollment is performed in association with an employerduring the initial process of providing evidence of identity, thisinformation may be considered extremely reliable for purposes within thecompany, but may be trusted to a lesser degree by a government agency,or by a competitor. Therefore, trust engines operated by each of theseother organizations may assign different levels of reliability to thisenrollment.

Similarly, additional data which is submitted across a network, butwhich is authenticated by other trusted data provided during a previousenrollment with the same trust engine 110 may be considered as reliableas the original enrollment data was, even though the latter data weresubmitted across an open network. In such circumstances, a subsequentnotarization will effectively increase the level of reliabilityassociated with the original enrollment data. In this way for example,an anonymous or pseudonymous enrollment may then be raised to a fullenrollment by demonstrating to some enrollment official the identity ofthe individual matching the enrolled data.

The reliability factors discussed above are generally values which maybe determined in advance of any particular authentication instance. Thisis because they are based upon the enrollment and the technique, ratherthan the actual authentication. In one embodiment, the step ofgenerating reliability based upon these factors involves looking uppreviously determined values for this particular authenticationtechnique and the enrollment data of the user. In a further aspect of anadvantageous embodiment of the present invention, such reliabilities maybe included with the enrollment data itself. In this way, these factorsare automatically delivered to the authentication engine 215 along withthe enrollment data sent from the depository 210.

While these factors may generally be determined in advance of anyindividual authentication instance, they still have an effect on eachauthentication instance which uses that particular technique ofauthentication for that user. Furthermore, although the values maychange over time (e.g. if the user re-enrolls in a more reliablefashion), they are not dependent on the authentication data itself. Bycontrast, the reliability factors associated with a single specificinstance's data may vary on each occasion. These factors, as discussedbelow, must be evaluated for each new authentication in order togenerate reliability scores in step 1815.

The reliability of the authentication data reflects the match betweenthe data provided by the user in a particular authentication instanceand the data provided during the authentication enrollment. This is thefundamental question of whether the authentication data matches theenrollment data for the individual the user is claiming to be. Normally,when the data do not match, the user is considered to not besuccessfully authenticated, and the authentication fails. The manner inwhich this is evaluated may change depending on the authenticationtechnique used. The comparison of such data is performed by thecomparator 515 function of the authentication engine 215 as shown inFIG. 5.

For instance, matches of passwords are generally evaluated in a binaryfashion. In other words, a password is either a perfect match, or afailed match. It is usually not desirable to accept as even a partialmatch a password which is close to the correct password if it is notexactly correct. Therefore, when evaluating a password authentication,the reliability of the authentication returned by the comparator 515 istypically either 100% (correct) or 0% (wrong), with no possibility ofintermediate values.

Similar rules to those for passwords are generally applied to tokenbased authentication methods, such as smart cards. This is becausehaving a smart card which has a similar identifier or which is similarto the correct one, is still just as wrong as having any other incorrecttoken. Therefore tokens tend also to be binary authenticators: a usereither has the right token, or he doesn't.

However, certain types of authentication data, such as questionnairesand biometrics, are generally not binary authenticators. For example, afingerprint may match a reference fingerprint to varying degrees. Tosome extent, this may be due to variations in the quality of the datacaptured either during the initial enrollment or in subsequentauthentications. (A fingerprint may be smudged or a person may have astill healing scar or burn on a particular finger.) In other instancesthe data may match less than perfectly because the information itself issomewhat variable and based upon pattern matching. (A voice analysis mayseem close but not quite right because of background noise, or theacoustics of the environment in which the voice is recorded, or becausethe person has a cold.) Finally, in situations where large amounts ofdata are being compared, it may simply be the case that much of the datamatches well, but some doesn't. (A ten-question questionnaire may haveresulted in eight correct answers to personal questions, but twoincorrect answers.) For any of these reasons, the match between theenrollment data and the data for a particular authentication instancemay be desirably assigned a partial match value by the comparator 515.In this way, the fingerprint might be said to be a 85% match, the voiceprint a 65% match, and the questionnaire an 80% match, for example.

This measure (degree of match) produced by the comparator 515 is thefactor representing the basic issue of whether an authentication iscorrect or not. However, as discussed above, this is only one of thefactors which may be used in determining the reliability of a givenauthentication instance. Note also that even though a match to somepartial degree may be determined, that ultimately, it may be desirableto provide a binary result based upon a partial match. In an alternatemode of operation, it is also possible to treat partial matches asbinary, i.e. either perfect (100%) or failed (0%) matches, based uponwhether or not the degree of match passes a particular threshold levelof match. Such a process may be used to provide a simple pass/fail levelof matching for systems which would otherwise produce partial matches.

Another factor to be considered in evaluating the reliability of a givenauthentication instance concerns the circumstances under which theauthentication data for this particular instance are provided. Asdiscussed above, the circumstances refer to the metadata associated witha particular authentication instance. This may include withoutlimitation such information as: the network address of theauthenticator, to the extent that it can be determined; the time of theauthentication; the mode of transmission of the authentication data(phone line, cellular, network, etc.); and the serial number of thesystem of the authenticator.

These factors can be used to produce a profile of the type ofauthentication that is normally requested by the user. Then, thisinformation can be used to assess reliability in at least two manners.One manner is to consider whether the user is requesting authenticationin a manner which is consistent with the normal profile ofauthentication by this user. If the user normally makes authenticationrequests from one network address during business days (when she is atwork) and from a different network address during evenings or weekends(when she is at home), an authentication which occurs from the homeaddress during the business day is less reliable because it is outsidethe normal authentication profile. Similarly, if the user normallyauthenticates using a fingerprint biometric and in the evenings, anauthentication which originates during the day using only a password isless reliable.

An additional way in which the circumstantial metadata can be used toevaluate the reliability of an instance of authentication is todetermine how much corroboration the circumstance provides that theauthenticator is the individual he claims to be. For instance, if theauthentication comes from a system with a serial number known to beassociated with the user, this is a good circumstantial indicator thatthe user is who they claim to be. Conversely, if the authentication iscoming from a network address which is known to be in Los Angeles whenthe user is known to reside in London, this is an indication that thisauthentication is less reliable based on its circumstances.

It is also possible that a cookie or other electronic data may be placedupon the system being used by a user when they interact with a vendorsystem or with the trust engine 110. This data is written to the storageof the system of the user and may contain an identification which may beread by a Web browser or other software on the user system. If this datais allowed to reside on the user system between sessions (a “persistentcookie”), it may be sent with the authentication data as furtherevidence of the past use of this system during authentication of aparticular user. In effect, the metadata of a given instance,particularly a persistent cookie, may form a sort of token basedauthenticator itself.

Once the appropriate reliability factors based on the technique and dataof the authentication instance are generated as described above in steps1610 and 1615 respectively, they are used to produce an overallreliability for the authentication instance provided in step 1620. Onemeans of doing this is simply to express each reliability as apercentage and then to multiply them together.

For example, suppose the authentication data is being sent in from anetwork address known to be the user's home computer completely inaccordance with the user's past authentication profile (100%), and thetechnique being used is fingerprint identification (97%), and theinitial finger print data was roistered through the user's employer withthe trust engine 110 (90%), and the match between the authenticationdata and the original fingerprint template in the enrollment data isvery good (99%). The overall reliability of this authentication instancecould then be calculated as the product of these reliabilities:100%*97%*90%*99%−86.4% reliability.

This calculated reliability represents the reliability of one singleinstance of authentication. The overall reliability of a singleauthentication instance may also be calculated using techniques whichtreat the different reliability factors differently, for example byusing formulas where different weights are assigned to each reliabilityfactor. Furthermore, those of skill in the art will recognize that theactual values used may represent values other than percentages and mayuse non-arithmetic systems. One embodiment may include a module used byan authentication requestor to set the weights for each factor and thealgorithms used in establishing the overall reliability of theauthentication instance.

The authentication engine 215 may use the above techniques andvariations thereof to determine the reliability of a singleauthentication instance, indicated as step 1620. However, it may beuseful in many authentication situations for multiple authenticationinstances to be provided at the same time. For example, while attemptingto authenticate himself using the system of the present invention, auser may provide a user identification, fingerprint authentication data,a smart card, and a password. In such a case, three independentauthentication instances are being provided to the trust engine 110 forevaluation. Proceeding to step 1625, if the authentication engine 215determines that the data provided by the user includes more than oneauthentication instance, then each instance in turn will be selected asshown in step 1630 and evaluated as described above in steps 1610, 1615and 1620.

Note that many of the reliability factors discussed may vary from one ofthese instances to another. For instance, the inherent reliability ofthese techniques is likely to be different, as well as the degree ofmatch provided between the authentication data and the enrollment data.Furthermore, the user may have provided enrollment data at differenttimes and under different circumstances for each of these techniques,providing different enrollment reliabilities for each of these instancesas well. Finally, even though the circumstances under which the data foreach of these instances is being submitted is the same, the use of suchtechniques may each fit the profile of the user differently, and so maybe assigned different circumstantial reliabilities. (For example, theuser may normally use their password and fingerprint, but not theirsmart card.)

As a result, the final reliability for each of these authenticationinstances may be different from One another. However, by using multipleinstances together, the overall confidence level for the authenticationwill tend to increase.

Once the authentication engine has performed steps 1610 through 1620 forall of the authentication instances provided in the authentication data,the reliability of each instance is used in step 1635 to evaluate theoverall authentication confidence level. This process of combining theindividual authentication instance reliabilities into the authenticationconfidence level may be modeled by various methods relating theindividual reliabilities produced, and may also address the particularinteraction between some of these authentication techniques. (Forexample, multiple knowledge-based systems such as passwords may produceless confidence than a single password and even a fairly weak biometric,such as a basic voice analysis.)

One means in which the authentication engine 215 may combine thereliabilities of multiple concurrent authentication instances togenerate a final confidence level is to multiply the unreliability ofeach instance to arrive at a total unreliability. The unreliability isgenerally the complementary percentage of the reliability. For example,a technique which is 84% reliable is 16% unreliable. The threeauthentication instances described above (fingerprint, smart card,password) which produce reliabilities of 86%, 75%, and 72% would havecorresponding unreliabilities of (100−86) %, (100−75) % and (100−72) %,or 14%, 25%, and 28%, respectively. By multiplying theseunreliabilities, we get a cumulative unreliability of 14%*25%*28%−0.98%unreliability, which corresponds to a reliability of 99.02%.

In an additional mode of operation, additional factors and heuristics530 may be applied within the authentication engine 215 to account forthe interdependence of various authentication techniques. For example,if someone has unauthorized access to a particular home computer, theyprobably have access to the phone line at that address as well.Therefore, authenticating based on an originating phone number as wellas upon the serial number of the authenticating system does not add muchto the overall confidence in the authentication. However, knowledgebased authentication is largely independent of token basedauthentication (i.e. if someone steals your cellular phone or keys, theyare no more likely to know your PIN or password than if they hadn't).

Furthermore, different vendors or other authentication requestors maywish to weigh different aspects of the authentication differently. Thismay include the use of separate weighing factors or algorithms used incalculating the reliability of individual instances as well as the useof different means to evaluate authentication events with multipleinstances.

For instance, vendors for certain types of transactions, for instancecorporate email systems, may desire to authenticate primarily based uponheuristics and other circumstantial data by default. Therefore, they mayapply high weights to factors related to the metadata and other profilerelated information associated with the circumstances surroundingauthentication events. This arrangement could be used to ease the burdenon users during normal operating hours, by not requiring more from theuser than that he be logged on to the correct machine during businesshours. However, another vendor may weigh authentications coming from aparticular technique most heavily, for instance fingerprint matching,because of a policy decision that such a technique is most suited toauthentication for the particular vendor's purposes.

Such varying weights may be defined by the authentication requestor ingenerating the authentication request and sent to the trust engine 110with the authentication request in one mode of operation. Such optionscould also be set as preferences during an initial enrollment processfor the authentication requestor and stored within the authenticationengine in another mode of operation.

Once the authentication engine 215 produces an authentication confidencelevel for the authentication data provided, this confidence level isused to complete the authentication request in step 1640, and thisinformation is forwarded from the authentication engine 215 to thetransaction engine 205 for inclusion in a message to the authenticationrequestor.

The process described above is merely exemplary, and those of skill inthe art will recognize that the steps need not be performed in the ordershown or that only certain of the steps are desired to be performed, orthat a variety of combinations of steps may be desired. Furthermore,certain steps, such as the evaluation of the reliability of eachauthentication instance provided, may be carried out in parallel withone another if circumstances permit.

In a further aspect of this invention, a method is provided toaccommodate conditions when the authentication confidence level producedby the process described above fails to meet the required trust level ofthe vendor or other party requiring the authentication. In circumstancessuch as these where a gap exists between the level of confidenceprovided and the level of trust desired, the operator of the trustengine 110 is in a position to provide opportunities for one or bothparties to provide alternate data or requirements in order to close thistrust gap. This process will be referred to as “trust arbitrage” herein.

Trust arbitrage may take place within a framework of cryptographicauthentication as described above with reference to FIGS. 10 and 11. Asshown therein, a vendor or other party will request authentication of aparticular user in association with a particular transaction. In onecircumstance, the vendor simply requests an authentication, eitherpositive or negative, and after receiving appropriate data from theuser, the trust engine 110 will provide such a binary authentication. Incircumstances such as these, the degree of confidence required in orderto secure a positive authentication is determined based upon preferencesset within the trust engine 110.

However, it is also possible that the vendor may request a particularlevel of trust in order to complete a particular transaction. Thisrequired level may be included with the authentication request (e.g.authenticate this user to 98% confidence) or may be determined by thetrust engine 110 based on other factors associated with the transaction(i.e. authenticate this user as appropriate for this transaction). Onesuch factor might be the economic value of the transaction. Fortransactions which have greater economic value, a higher degree of trustmay be required. Similarly, for transactions with high degrees of risk ahigh degree of trust may be required. Conversely, for transactions whichare either of low risk or of low value, lower trust levels may berequired by the vendor or other authentication requestor.

The process of trust arbitrage occurs between the steps of the trustengine 110 receiving the authentication data in step 1050 of FIG. 10 andthe return of an authentication result to the vendor in step 1055 ofFIG. 10. Between these steps, the process which leads to the evaluationof trust levels and the potential trust arbitrage occurs as shown inFIG. 17. In circumstances where simple binary authentication isperformed, the process shown in FIG. 17 reduces to having thetransaction engine 205 directly compare the authentication data providedwith the enrollment data for the identified user as discussed above withreference to FIG. 10, flagging any difference as a negativeauthentication.

As shown in FIG. 17, the first step after receiving the data in step1050 is for the transaction engine 205 to determine the trust levelwhich is required for a positive authentication for this particulartransaction in step 1710. This step may be performed by one of severaldifferent methods. The required trust level may be specified to thetrust engine 110 by the authentication requestor at the time when theauthentication request is made. The authentication requestor may alsoset a preference in advance which is stored within the depository 210 orother storage which is accessible by the transaction engine 205. Thispreference may then be read and used each time an authentication requestis made by this authentication requestor. The preference may also beassociated with a particular user as a security measure such that aparticular level of trust is always required in order to authenticatethat user, the user preference being stored in the depository 210 orother storage media accessible by the transaction engine 205. Therequired level may also be derived by the transaction engine 205 orauthentication engine 215 based upon information provided in theauthentication request, such as the value and risk level of thetransaction to be authenticated.

In one mode of operation, a policy management module or other softwarewhich is used when generating the authentication request is used tospecify the required degree of trust for the authentication of thetransaction. This may be used to provide a series of rules to followwhen assigning the required level of trust based upon the policies whichare specified within the policy management module. One advantageous modeof operation is for such a module to be incorporated with the web serverof a vendor in order to appropriately determine required level of trustfor transactions initiated with the vendor's web server. In this way,transaction requests from users may be assigned a required trust levelin accordance with the policies of the vendor and such information maybe forwarded to the trust engine 110 along with the authenticationrequest.

This required trust level correlates with the degree of certainty thatthe vendor wants to have that the individual authenticating is in factwho he identifies himself as. For example, if the transaction is onewhere the vendor wants a fair degree of certainty because goods arechanging hands, the vendor may require a trust level of 85%. Forsituation where the vendor is merely authenticating the user to allowhim to view members only content or exercise privileges on a chat room,the downside risk may be small enough that the vendor requires only a60% trust level. However, to enter into a production contract with avalue of tens of thousands of dollars, the vendor may require a trustlevel of 99% or more.

This required trust level represents a metric to which the user mustauthenticate himself in order to complete the transaction. If therequired trust level is 85% for example, the user must provideauthentication to the trust engine 110 sufficient for the trust engine110 to say with 85% confidence that the user is who they say they are.It is the balance between this required trust level and theauthentication confidence level which produces either a positiveauthentication (to the satisfaction of the vendor) or a possibility oftrust arbitrage.

As shown in FIG. 17, after the transaction engine 205 receives therequired trust level, it compares in step 1720 the required trust levelto the authentication confidence level which the authentication engine215 calculated for the current authentication (as discussed withreference to FIG. 16). If the authentication confidence level is higherthan the required trust level for the transaction in step 1730, then theprocess moves to step 1740 where a positive authentication for thistransaction is produced by the transaction engine 205. A message to thiseffect will then be inserted into the authentication results andreturned to the vendor by the transaction engine 205 as shown in step1055 (see FIG. 10).

However, if the authentication confidence level does not fulfill therequired trust level in step 1730, then a confidence gap exists for thecurrent authentication, and trust arbitrage is conducted in step 1750.Trust arbitrage is described more completely with reference to FIG. 18below. This process as described below takes place within thetransaction engine 205 of the trust engine 110. Because noauthentication or other cryptographic operations are needed to executetrust arbitrage (other than those required for the SSL communicationbetween the transaction engine 205 and other components), the processmay be performed outside the authentication engine 215. However, as willbe discussed below, any reevaluation of authentication data or othercryptographic or authentication events will require the transactionengine 205 to resubmit the appropriate data to the authentication engine215. Those of skill in the art will recognize that the trust arbitrageprocess could alternately be structured to take place partially orentirely within the authentication engine 215 itself.

As mentioned above, trust arbitrage is a process where the trust engine110 mediates a negotiation between the vendor and user in an attempt tosecure a positive authentication where appropriate. As shown in step1805, the transaction engine 205 first determines whether or not thecurrent situation is appropriate for trust arbitrage. This may bedetermined based upon the circumstances of the authentication, e.g.whether this authentication has already been through multiple cycles ofarbitrage, as well as upon the preferences of either the vendor or user,as will be discussed further below.

In such circumstances where arbitrage is not possible, the processproceeds to step 1810 where the transaction engine 205 generates anegative authentication and then inserts it into the authenticationresults which are sent to the vendor in step 1055 (see FIG. 10). Onelimit which may be advantageously used to prevent authentications frompending indefinitely is to set a time-out period from the initialauthentication request. In this way, any transaction which is notpositively authenticated within the time limit is denied furtherarbitrage and negatively authenticated. Those of skill in the art willrecognize that such a time limit may vary depending upon thecircumstances of the transaction and the desires of the user and vendor.Limitations may also be placed upon the number of attempts that may bemade at providing a successful authentication. Such limitations may behandled by an attempt limiter 535 as shown in FIG. 5.

If arbitrage is not prohibited in step 1805, the transaction engine 205will then engage in negotiation with one or both of the transactingparties. The transaction engine 205 may send a message to the userrequesting some form of additional authentication in order to boost theauthentication confidence level produced as shown in step 1820. In thesimplest form, this may simply indicates that authentication wasinsufficient. A request to produce one or more additional authenticationinstances to improve the overall confidence level of the authenticationmay also be sent.

If the user provides some additional authentication instances in step1825, then the transaction engine 205 adds these authenticationinstances to the authentication data for the transaction and forwards itto the authentication engine 215 as shown in step 1015 (see FIG. 10),and the authentication is reevaluated based upon both the pre-existingauthentication instances for this transaction and the newly providedauthentication instances.

An additional type of authentication may be a request from the trustengine 110 to make some form of person-to-person contact between thetrust engine 110 operator (or a trusted associate) and the user, forexample, by phone call. This phone call or other non-computerauthentication can be used to provide personal contact with theindividual and also to conduct some form of questionnaire basedauthentication. This also may give the opportunity to verify anoriginating telephone number and potentially a voice analysis of theuser when he calls in. Even if no additional authentication data can beprovided, the additional context associated with the user's phone numbermay improve the reliability of the authentication context. Any reviseddata or circumstances based upon this phone call are fed into the trustengine 110 for use in consideration of the authentication request.

Additionally, in step 1820 the trust engine 110 may provide anopportunity for the user to purchase insurance, effectively buying amore confident authentication. The operator of the trust engine 110 may,at times, only want to make such an option available if the confidencelevel of the authentication is above a certain threshold to begin with.In effect, this user side insurance is a way for the trust engine 110 tovouch for the user when the authentication meets the normal requiredtrust level of the trust engine 110 for authentication, but does notmeet the required trust level of the vendor for this transaction. Inthis way, the user may still successfully authenticate to a very highlevel as may be required by the vendor, even though he only hasauthentication instances which produce confidence sufficient for thetrust engine 110.

This function of the trust engine 110 allows the trust engine 110 tovouch for someone who is authenticated to the satisfaction of the trustengine 110, but not of the vendor. This is analogous to the functionperformed by a notary in adding his signature to a document in order toindicate to someone reading the document at a later time that the personwhose signature appears on the document is in fact the person who signedit. The signature of the notary testifies to the act of signing by theuser. In the same way, the trust engine is providing an indication thatthe person transacting is who they say they are.

However, because the trust engine 110 is artificially boosting the levelof confidence provided by the user, there is a greater risk to the trustengine 110 operator, since the user is not actually meeting the requiredtrust level of the vendor. The cost of the insurance is designed tooffset the risk of a false positive authentication to the trust engine110 (who may be effectively notarizing the authentications of the user).The user pays the trust engine 110 operator to take the risk ofauthenticating to a higher level of confidence than has actually beenprovided.

Because such an insurance system allows someone to effectively buy ahigher confidence rating from the trust engine 110, both vendors andusers may wish to prevent the use of user side insurance in certaintransactions. Vendors may wish to limit positive authentications tocircumstances where they know that actual authentication data supportsthe degree of confidence which they require and so may indicate to thetrust engine 110 that user side insurance is not to be allowed.Similarly, to protect his online identity, a user may wish to preventthe use of user side insurance on his account, or may wish to limit itsuse to situations where the authentication confidence level without theinsurance is higher than a certain limit. This may be used as a securitymeasure to prevent someone from overhearing a password or stealing asmart card and using them to falsely authenticate to a low level ofconfidence, and then purchasing insurance to produce a very high levelof (false) confidence. These factors may be evaluated in determiningwhether user side insurance is allowed.

If user purchases insurance in step 1840, then the authenticationconfidence level is adjusted based upon the insurance purchased in step1845, and the authentication confidence level and required trust levelare again compared in step 1730 (see FIG. 17). The process continuesfrom there, and may lead to either a positive authentication in step1740 (see FIG. 17), or back into the trust arbitrage process in step1750 for either further arbitrage (if allowed) or a negativeauthentication in step 1810 if further arbitrage is prohibited.

In addition to sending a message to the user in step 1820, thetransaction engine 205 may also send a message to the vendor in step1830 which indicates that a pending authentication is currently belowthe required trust level. The message may also offer various options onhow to proceed to the vendor. One of these Options is to simply informthe vendor of what the current authentication confidence level is andask if the vendor wishes to maintain their current unfulfilled requiredtrust level. This may be beneficial because in some cases, the vendormay have independent means for authenticating the transaction or mayhave been using a default set of requirements which generally result ina higher required level being initially specified than is actuallyneeded for the particular transaction at hand.

For instance, it may be standard practice that all incoming purchaseorder transactions with the vendor are expected to meet a 98% trustlevel. However, if an order was recently discussed by phone between thevendor and a long-standing customer, and immediately thereafter thetransaction is authenticated, but only to a 93% confidence level, thevendor may wish to simply lower the acceptance threshold for thistransaction, because the phone call effectively provides additionalauthentication to the vendor. In certain circumstances, the vendor maybe willing to lower their required trust level, but not all the way tothe level of the current authentication confidence. For instance, thevendor in the above example might consider that the phone call prior tothe order might merit a 4% reduction in the degree of trust needed;however, this is still greater than the 93% confidence produced by theuser.

If the vendor does adjust their required trust level in step 1835, thenthe authentication confidence level produced by the authentication andthe required trust level are compared in step 1730 (see FIG. 17). If theconfidence level now exceeds the required trust level, a positiveauthentication may be generated in the transaction engine 205 in step1740 (see FIG. 17). If not, further arbitrage may be attempted asdiscussed above if it is permitted.

In addition to requesting an adjustment to the required trust level, thetransaction engine 205 may also offer vendor side insurance to thevendor requesting the authentication. This insurance serves a similarpurpose to that described above for the user side insurance. Here,however, rather than the cost corresponding to the risk being taken bythe trust engine 110 in authenticating above the actual authenticationconfidence level produced, the cost of the insurance corresponds to therisk being taken by the vendor in accepting a lower trust level in theauthentication.

Instead of just lowering their actual required trust level, the vendorhas the option of purchasing insurance to protect itself from theadditional risk associated with a lower level of trust in theauthentication of the user. As described above, it may be advantageousfor the vendor to only consider purchasing such insurance to cover thetrust gap in conditions where the existing authentication is alreadyabove a certain threshold.

The availability of such vendor side insurance allows the vendor theoption to either: lower his trust requirement directly at no additionalcost to himself, bearing the risk of a false authentication himself(based on the lower trust level required); or, buying insurance for thetrust gap between the authentication confidence level and hisrequirement, with the trust engine 110 operator bearing the risk of thelower confidence level which has been provided. By purchasing theinsurance, the vendor effectively keeps his high trust levelrequirement; because the risk of a false authentication is shifted tothe trust engine 110 operator.

If the vendor purchases insurance in step 1840, the authenticationconfidence level and required trust levels are compared in step 1730(see FIG. 17), and the process continues as described above.

Note that it is also possible that both the user and the vendor respondto messages from the trust engine 110. Those of skill in the art willrecognize that there are multiple ways in which such situations can behandled. One advantageous mode of handling the possibility of multipleresponses is simply to treat the responses in a first-come, first-servedmanner. For example, if the vendor responds with a lowered requiredtrust level and immediately thereafter the user also purchases insuranceto raise his authentication level, the authentication is firstreevaluated based upon the lowered trust requirement from the vendor. Ifthe authentication is now positive, the user's insurance purchase isignored. In another advantageous mode of operation, the user might onlybe charged for the level of insurance required to meet the new, loweredtrust requirement of the vendor (if a trust gap remained even with thelowered vendor trust requirement).

If no response from either party is received during the trust arbitrageprocess at step 1850 within the time limit set for the authentication,the arbitrage is reevaluated in step 1805. This effectively begins thearbitrage process again. If the time limit was final or othercircumstances prevent further arbitrage in step 1805, a negativeauthentication is generated by the transaction engine 205 in step 1810and returned to the vendor in step 1055 (see FIG. 10). If not, newmessages may be sent to the user and vendor, and the process may berepeated as desired.

Note that for certain types of transactions, for instance, digitallysigning documents which are not part of a transaction, there may notnecessarily be a vendor or other third party; therefore the transactionis primarily between the user and the trust engine 110. In circumstancessuch as these, the trust engine 110 will have its own required trustlevel which must be satisfied in order to generate a positiveauthentication. However, in such circumstances, it will often not bedesirable for the trust engine 110 to offer insurance to the user inorder for him to raise the confidence of his own signature.

The process described above and shown in FIGS. 16-18 may be carried outusing various communications modes as described above with reference tothe trust engine 110. For instance, the messages may be web-based andsent using SSL connections between the trust engine 110 and appletsdownloaded in real time to browsers running on the user or vendorsystems. In an alternate mode of operation, certain dedicatedapplications may be in use by the user and vendor which facilitate sucharbitrage and insurance transactions. In another alternate mode ofoperation, secure email operations may be used to mediate the arbitragedescribed above, thereby allowing deferred evaluations and batchprocessing of authentications. Those of skill in the art will recognizethat different communications modes may be used as are appropriate forthe circumstances and authentication requirements of the vendor.

The following description with reference to FIG. 19 describes a sampletransaction which integrates the various aspects of the presentinvention as described above. This example illustrates the overallprocess between a user and a vendor as mediates by the trust engine 110.Although the various steps and components as described in detail abovemay be used to carry out the following transaction, the processillustrated focuses on the interaction between the trust engine 110,user and vendor.

The transaction begins when the user, while viewing web pages online,fills out an order form on the web site of the vendor in step 1900. Theuser wishes to submit this order form to the vendor, signed with hisdigital signature. In order to do this, the user submits the order formwith his request for a signature to the trust engine 110 in step 1905.The user will also provide authentication data which will be used asdescribed above to authenticate his identity.

In step 1910 the authentication data is compared to the enrollment databy the trust engine 110 as discussed above, and if a positiveauthentication is produced, the hash of the order form, signed with theprivate key of the user, is forwarded to the vendor along with the orderform itself.

The vendor receives the signed form in step 1915, and then the vendorwill generate an invoice or other contract related to the purchase to bemade in step 1920. This contract is sent back to the user with a requestfor a signature in step 1925. The vendor also sends an authenticationrequest for this contract transaction to the trust engine 110 in step1930 including a hash of the contract which will be signed by bothparties. To allow the contract to be digitally signed by both parties,the vendor also includes authentication data for itself so that thevendor's signature upon the contract can later be verified if necessary.

As discussed above, the trust engine 110 then verifies theauthentication data provided by the vendor to confirm the vendor'sidentity, and if the data produces a positive authentication in step1935, continues with step 1955 when the data is received from the user.If the vendor's authentication data does not match the enrollment dataof the vendor to the desired degree, a message is returned to the vendorrequesting further authentication. Trust arbitrage may be performed hereif necessary, as described above, in order for the vendor tosuccessfully authenticate itself to the trust engine 110.

When the user receives the contract in step 1940, he reviews it,generates authentication data to sign it if it is acceptable in step1945, and then sends a hash of the contract and his authentication datato the trust engine 110 in step 1950. The trust engine 110 verifies theauthentication data in step 1955 and if the authentication is good,proceeds to process the contract as described below. As discussed abovewith reference to FIGS. 17 and 18, trust arbitrage may be performed asappropriate to close any trust gap which exists between theauthentication confidence level and the required authentication levelfor the transaction.

The trust engine 110 signs the hash of the contract with the user'sprivate key, and sends this signed hash to the vendor in step 1960,signing the complete message on its own behalf, i.e., including a hashof the complete message (including the user's signature) encrypted withthe private key 510 of the trust engine 110. This message is received bythe vendor in step 1965. The message represents a signed contract (hashof contract encrypted using user's private key) and a receipt from thetrust engine 110 (the hash of the message including the signed contract,encrypted using the trust engine 110's private key).

The trust engine 110 similarly prepares a hash of the contract with thevendor's private key in step 1970, and forwards this to the user, signedby the trust engine 110. In this way, the user also receives a copy ofthe contract, signed by the vendor, as well as a receipt, signed by thetrust engine 110, for delivery of the signed contract in step 1975.

In addition to the foregoing, an additional aspect of the inventionprovides a cryptographic Service Provider Module (SPM) which may beavailable to a client side application as a means to access functionsprovided by the trust engine 110 described above. One advantageous wayto provide such a service is for the cryptographic SPM is to mediatecommunications between a third party Application Programming Interface(API) and a trust engine 110 which is accessible via a network or otherremote connection. A sample cryptographic SPM is described below withreference to FIG. 20.

For example, on a typical system, a number of API's are available toprogrammers. Each API provides a set of function calls which may be madeby an application 2000 running upon the system. Examples of API's whichprovide programming interfaces suitable for cryptographic functions,authentication functions, and other security function include theCryptographic API (CAPI) 2010 provided by Microsoft with its Windowsoperating systems, and the Common Data Security Architecture (CDSA),sponsored by IBM, Intel and other members of the Open Group. CAPI willbe used as an exemplary security API in the discussion that follows.However, the cryptographic SPM described could be used with CDSA orother security API's as are known in the art.

This API is used by a user system 105 or vendor system 120 when a callis made for a cryptographic function. Included among these functions maybe requests associated with performing various cryptographic operations,such as encrypting a document with a particular key, signing a document,requesting a digital certificate, verifying a signature upon a signeddocument, and such other cryptographic functions as are described hereinor known to those of skill in the art.

Such cryptographic functions are normally performed locally to thesystem upon which CAPI 2010 is located. This is because generally thefunctions called require the use of either resources of the local usersystem 105, such as a fingerprint reader, or software functions whichare programmed using libraries which are executed on the local machine.Access to these local resources is normally provided by one or moreService Provider Modules (SPM's) 2015, 2020 as referred to above whichprovide resources with which the cryptographic functions are carriedout. Such SPM's may include software libraries 2015 to performencrypting or decrypting operations, or drivers and applications 2020which are capable of accessing specialized hardware 2025, such asbiometric scanning devices. In much the way that CAPI 2010 providesfunctions which may be used by an application 2000 of the system 105,the SPM's 2015, 2020 provide CAPI with access to the lower levelfunctions and resources associated with the available services upon thesystem.

In accordance with the invention, it is possible to provide acryptographic SPM 2030 which is capable of accessing the cryptographicfunctions provided by the trust engine 110 and making these functionsavailable to an application 2000 through CAPI 2010. Unlike embodimentswhere CAPI 2010 is only able to access resources which are locallyavailable through SPM's 2015, 2020, a cryptographic SPM 2030 asdescribed herein would be able to submit requests for cryptographicoperations to a remotely-located, network-accessible trust engine 110 inorder to perform the operations desired.

For instance, if an application 2000 has a need for a cryptographicoperation, such as signing a document, the application 2000 makes afunction call to the appropriate CAPI 2010 function. CAPI 2010 in turnwill execute this function, making use of the resources which are madeavailable to it by the SPM's 2015, 2020 and the cryptographic SPM 2030.In the case of a digital signature function, the cryptographic SPM 2030will generate an appropriate request which will be sent to the trustengine 110 across the communication link 125.

The operations which occur between the cryptographic SPM 2030 and thetrust engine 110 are the same operations that would be possible betweenany other system and the trust engine 110. However, these functions areeffectively made available to a user system 105 through CAPI 2010 suchthat they appear to be locally available upon the user system 105itself. However, unlike ordinary SPM's 2015, 2020, the functions arebeing carried out on the remote trust engine 110 and the results relayedto the cryptographic SPM 2030 in response to appropriate requests acrossthe communication link 125.

This cryptographic SPM 2030 makes a number of operations available tothe user system 105 or a vendor system 120 which might not otherwise beavailable. These functions include without limitation: encryption anddecryption of documents; issuance of digital certificates; digitalsigning of documents; verification of digital signatures; and such otheroperations as will be apparent to those of skill in the art.

In a separate embodiment, the present invention comprises a completesystem for performing the data securing methods of the present inventionon any data set. The computer system of this embodiment comprises a datasplitting module that comprises the functionality shown in FIG. 8 anddescribed herein. In one embodiment of the present invention, the datasplitting module, sometimes referred to herein as a secure data parser,comprises a parser program or software suite which comprises datasplitting, encryption and decryption, reconstitution or reassemblyfunctionality. This embodiment may further comprise a data storagefacility or multiple data storage facilities, as well. The datasplitting module, or secure data parser, comprises a cross-platformsoftware module suite which integrates within an electronicinfrastructure, or as an add-on to any application which requires theultimate security of its data elements. This parsing process operates onany type of data set, and on any and all file types, or in a database onany row, column or cell of data in that database.

The parsing process of the present invention may, in one embodiment, bedesigned in a modular tiered fashion, and any encryption process issuitable for use in the process of the present invention. The modulartiers of the parsing and splitting process of the present invention mayinclude, but are not limited to, 1) cryptographic split, dispersed andsecurely stored in multiple locations; 2) encrypt, cryptographicallysplit, dispersed and securely stored in multiple locations; 3) encrypt,cryptographically split, encrypt each share, then dispersed and securelystored in multiple locations; and 4) encrypt, cryptographically split,encrypt each share with a different type of encryption than was used inthe first step, then dispersed and securely stored in multiplelocations.

The process comprises, in one embodiment, splitting of the dataaccording to the contents of a generated random number, or key andperforming the same cryptographic splitting of the key used in theencryption of splitting of the data to be secured into two or moreportions, or shares, of parsed and split data, and in one embodiment,preferably into four or more portions of parsed and split data,encrypting all of the portions, then scattering and storing theseportions back into the database, or relocating them to any named device,fixed or removable, depending on the requestor's need for privacy andsecurity. Alternatively, in another embodiment, encryption may occurprior to the splitting of the data set by the splitting module or securedata parser. The original data processed as described in this embodimentis encrypted and obfuscated and is secured. The dispersion of theencrypted elements, if desired, can be virtually anywhere, including,but not limited to, a single server or data storage device, or amongseparate data storage facilities or devices. Encryption key managementin one embodiment may be included within the software suite, or inanother embodiment may be integrated into an existing infrastructure orany other desired location.

A cryptographic split (cryptosplit) partitions the data into N number ofshares. The partitioning can be on any size unit of data, including anindividual bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes, or larger units, aswell as any pattern or combination of data unit sizes whetherpredetermined or randomly generated. The units can also be of differentsized, based on either a random or predetermined set of values. Thismeans the data can be viewed as a sequence of these units. In thismanner the size of the data units themselves may render the data moresecure, for example by using one or more predetermined or randomlygenerated pattern, sequence or combination of data unit sizes. The unitsare then distributed (either randomly or by a predetermined set ofvalues) into the N shares. This distribution could also involve ashuffling of the order of the units in the shares. It is readilyapparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that the distribution ofthe data units into the shares may be performed according to a widevariety of possible selections, including but not limited to size-fixed,predetermined sizes, or one or more combination, pattern or sequence ofdata unit sizes that are predetermined or randomly generated.

In some embodiments of this cryptosplit split process, the data may beany suitable number of bytes in size, such as one, two, three, five,twenty, fifty, one hundred, more than one hundred, or N bytes in size.One particular example of this cryptographic split process, orcryptosplit, would be to consider the data to be 23 bytes in size, withthe data unit size chosen to be one byte, and with the number of sharesselected to be 4. Each byte would be distributed into one of the 4shares. Assuming a random distribution, a key would be obtained tocreate a sequence of 23 random numbers (r1, r2, r3 through r23), eachwith a value between 1 and 4 corresponding to the four shares. Each ofthe units of data (in this example 23 individual bytes of data) isassociated with one of the 23 random numbers corresponding to one of thefour shares. The distribution of the bytes of data into the four shareswould occur by placing the first byte of the data into share number r1,byte two into share r2, byte three into share r3, through the 23^(rd)byte of data into share r23. It is readily apparent to those of ordinaryskill in the art that a wide variety of other possible steps orcombination or sequence of steps, including the size of the data units,may be used in the cryptosplit process of the present invention, and theabove example is a non-limiting description of one process forcryptosplitting data. To recreate the original data, the reverseoperation would be performed.

In another embodiment of the cryptosplit process of the presentinvention, an option for the cryptosplitting process is to providesufficient redundancy in the shares such that only a subset of theshares are needed to reassemble or restore the data to its original oruseable form. As a non-limiting example, the cryptosplit may be done asa “3 of 4” cryptosplit such that only three of the four shares arenecessary to reassemble or restore the data to its original or useableform. This is also referred to as a “M of N cryptosplit” wherein N isthe total number of shares, and M is at least one less than N. It isreadily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that there aremany possibilities for creating this redundancy in the cryptosplittingprocess of the present invention.

In one embodiment of the cryptosplitting process of the presentinvention, each unit of data is stored in two shares, the primary shareand the backup share. Using the “3 of 4” cryptosplitting processdescribed above, any one share can be missing, and this is sufficient toreassemble or restore the original data with no missing data units sinceonly three of the total four shares are required. As described herein, arandom number is generated that corresponds to one of the shares. Therandom number is associated with a data unit, and stored in thecorresponding share, based on a key. One key is used, in thisembodiment, to generate the primary and backup share random number. Asdescribed herein for the cryptosplitting process of the presentinvention, a set of random numbers (also referred to as primary sharenumbers) from 0 to 3 are generated equal to the number of data units.Then another set of random numbers is generated (also referred to asbackup share numbers) from 1 to 3 equal to the number of data units.Each unit of data is then associated with a primary share number and abackup share number. Alternatively, a set of random numbers may begenerated that is fewer than the number of data units, and repeating therandom number set, but this may reduce the security of the sensitivedata. The primary share number is used to determine into which share thedata unit is stored. The backup share number is combined with theprimary share number to create a third share number between 0 and 3, andthis number is used to determine into which share the data unit isstored. In this example, the equation to determine the third sharenumber is:

(primary share number+backup share number)MOD 4=third share number.

In the embodiment described above where the primary share number isbetween 0 and 3, and the backup share number is between 1 and 3 ensuresthat the third share number is different from the primary share number.This results in the data unit being stored in two different shares. Itis readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that there aremany ways of performing redundant cryptosplitting and non-redundantcryptosplitting in addition to the embodiments disclosed herein. Forexample, the data units in each share could be shuffled utilizing adifferent algorithm. This data unit shuffling may be performed as theoriginal data is split into the data units, or after the data units areplaced into the shares, or after the share is full, for example.

The various cryptosplitting processes and data shuffling processesdescribed herein, and all other embodiments of the cryptosplitting anddata shuffling methods of the present invention may be performed on dataunits of any size, including but not limited to, as small as anindividual bit, bits, bytes, kilobytes, megabytes or larger.

An example of one embodiment of source code that would perform thecryptosplitting process described herein is:

  DATA [1:24] - array of bytes with the data to be split SHARES[0:3;1:24] - 2-dimensionalarray with each row representing one of the sharesRANDOM[1:24] - array random numbers in the range of 0..3 S1 = 1; S2 = 1;S3 = 1; S4 = 1; For J = 1 to 24 do  Begin  IF RANDOM[J[ ==0 then   Begin  SHARES[1,S1] = DATA [J];   S1 = S1 + 1;   End  ELSE IF RANDOM[J[ ==1then   Begin   SHARES[2,S2] = DATA [J];   S2 = S2 + 1;   END  ELSE IFRANDOM[J[ ==2 then   Begin   Shares[3,S3] = data [J];   S3 = S3 + 1;  End  Else begin   Shares[4,S4] = data [J];   S4 = S4 + 1;   End;  END;

An example of one embodiment of source code that would perform thecryptosplitting RAID process described herein is:

Generate two sets of numbers, PrimaryShare is 0 to 3, BackupShare is 1to 3. Then put each data unit into share[primaryshare[1]] andshare[(primaryshare[1]+backupshare[1]) mod 4, with the same process asin cryptosplitting described above. This method will be scalable to anysize N, where only N−1 shares are necessary to restore the data.

The retrieval, recombining, reassembly or reconstituting of theencrypted data elements may utilize any number of authenticationtechniques, including, but not limited to, biometrics, such asfingerprint recognition, facial scan, hand scan, iris scan, retinalscan, ear scan, vascular pattern recognition or DNA analysis. The datasplitting and/or parser modules of the present invention may beintegrated into a wide variety of infrastructure products orapplications as desired.

Traditional encryption technologies known in the art rely on one or morekey used to encrypt the data and render it unusable without the key. Thedata, however, remains whole and intact and subject to attack. Thesecure data parser of the present invention, in one embodiment,addresses this problem by performing a cryptographic parsing andsplitting of the encrypted file into two or more portions or shares, andin another embodiment, preferably four or more shares, adding anotherlayer of encryption to each share of the data, then storing the sharesin different physical and/or logical locations. When one or more datashares are physically removed from the system, either by using aremovable device, such as a data storage device, or by placing the shareunder another party's control, any possibility of compromise of secureddata is effectively removed.

An example of one embodiment of the secure data parser of the presentinvention and an example of how it may be utilized is shown in FIG. 21and described below. However, it is readily apparent to those ofordinary skill in the art that the secure data parser of the presentinvention may be utilized in a wide variety of ways in addition to thenon-limiting example below. As a deployment option, and in oneembodiment, the secure data parser may be implemented with externalsession key management or secure internal storage of session keys. Uponimplementation, a Parser Master Key will be generated which will be usedfor securing the application and for encryption purposes. It should bealso noted that the incorporation of the Parser Master key in theresulting secured data allows for a flexibility of sharing of secureddata by individuals within a workgroup, enterprise or extended audience.

As shown in FIG. 21, this embodiment of the present invention shows thesteps of the process performed by the secure data parser on data tostore the session master key with the parsed data:

1. Generating a session master key and encrypt the data using RS1 streamcipher.

2. Separating the resulting encrypted data into four shares or portionsof parsed data according to the pattern of the session master key.

3. In this embodiment of the method, the session master key will bestored along with the secured data shares in a data depository.Separating the session master key according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the key data to the encrypted parsed data.

4. The resulting four shares of data will contain encrypted portions ofthe original data and portions of the session master key. Generate astream cipher key for each of the four data shares.

5. Encrypting each share, then store the encryption keys in differentlocations from the encrypted data portions or shares: Share 1 gets Key4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key 3.

To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the methods described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleparsing steps may be performed on only one portion of the parsed data.Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in any desirable wayprovided only that the data may be reassembled, reconstituted, reformed,decrypted or restored to its original or other usable form.

As shown in FIG. 22 and described herein, another embodiment of thepresent invention comprises the steps of the process performed by thesecure data parser on data to store the session master key data in oneor more separate key management table:

1. Generating a session master key and encrypt the data using RS1 streamcipher.

2. Separating the resulting encrypted data into four shares or portionsof parsed data according to the pattern of the session master key.

3. In this embodiment of the method of the present invention, thesession master key will be stored in a separate key management table ina data depository. Generating a unique transaction ID for thistransaction. Storing the transaction ID and session master key in aseparate key management table. Separating the transaction ID accordingto the pattern of the Parser Master Key and append the data to theencrypted parsed or separated data.

4. The resulting four shares of data will contain encrypted portions ofthe original data and portions of the transaction ID.

5. Generating a stream cipher key for each of the four data shares.

6. Encrypting each share, then store the encryption keys in differentlocations from the encrypted data portions or shares: Share 1 gets Key4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key 3.

To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the method described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleseparating or parsing steps may be performed on only one portion of theparsed data. Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in anydesirable way provided only that the data may be reassembled,reconstituted, reformed, decrypted or restored to its original or otherusable form.

As shown in FIG. 23, this embodiment of the present invention shows thesteps of the process performed by the secure data parser on data tostore the session master key with the parsed data:

1. Accessing the parser master key associated with the authenticateduser

2. Generating a unique Session Master key

3. Derive an Intermediary Key from an exclusive OR function of theParser Master Key and Session Master key

4. Optional encryption of the data using an existing or new encryptionalgorithm keyed with the Intermediary Key.

5. Separating the resulting optionally encrypted data into four sharesor portions of parsed data according to the pattern of the Intermediarykey.

6. In this embodiment of the method, the session master key will bestored along with the secured data shares in a data depository.Separating the session master key according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the key data to the optionally encrypted parseddata shares.

7. The resulting multiple shares of data will contain optionallyencrypted portions of the original data and portions of the sessionmaster key.

8. Optionally generate an encryption key for each of the four datashares.

9. Optionally encrypting each share with an existing or new encryptionalgorithm, then store the encryption keys in different locations fromthe encrypted data portions or shares: for example, Share 1 gets Key 4,Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2, Share 4 gets Key 3.

To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the methods described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleparsing steps may be performed on only one portion of the parsed data.Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in any desirable wayprovided only that the data may be reassembled, reconstituted, reformed,decrypted or restored to its original or other usable form.

As shown in FIG. 24 and described herein, another embodiment of thepresent invention comprises the steps of the process performed by thesecure data parser on data to store the session master key data in oneor more separate key management table:

1. Accessing the Parser Master Key associated with the authenticateduser

2. Generating a unique Session Master Key

3. Derive an Intermediary Key from an exclusive OR function of theParser Master Key and Session Master key

4. Optionally encrypt the data using an existing or new encryptionalgorithm keyed with the Intermediary Key.

5. Separating the resulting optionally encrypted data into four sharesor portions of parsed data according to the pattern of the IntermediaryKey.

6. In this embodiment of the method of the present invention, thesession master key will be stored in a separate key management table ina data depository. Generating a unique transaction ID for thistransaction. Storing the transaction ID and session master key in aseparate key management table or passing the Session Master Key andtransaction ID back to the calling program for external management.Separating the transaction ID according to the pattern of the ParserMaster Key and append the data to the optionally encrypted parsed orseparated data.

7. The resulting four shares of data will contain optionally encryptedportions of the original data and portions of the transaction ID.

8. Optionally generate an encryption key for each of the four datashares.

9. Optionally encrypting each share, then store the encryption keys indifferent locations from the encrypted data portions or shares. Forexample: Share 1 gets Key 4, Share 2 gets Key 1, Share 3 gets Key 2,Share 4 gets Key 3.

To restore the original data format, the steps are reversed.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art thatcertain steps of the method described herein may be performed indifferent order, or repeated multiple times, as desired. It is alsoreadily apparent to those skilled in the art that the portions of thedata may be handled differently from one another. For example, multipleseparating or parsing steps may be performed on only one portion of theparsed data. Each portion of parsed data may be uniquely secured in anydesirable way provided only that the data may be reassembled,reconstituted, reformed, decrypted or restored to its original or otherusable form.

A wide variety of encryption methodologies are suitable for use in themethods of the present invention, as is readily apparent to thoseskilled in the art. The One Time Pad algorithm, is often considered oneof the most secure encryption methods, and is suitable for use in themethod of the present invention. Using the One Time Pad algorithmrequires that a key be generated which is as long as the data to besecured. The use of this method may be less desirable in certaincircumstances such as those resulting in the generation and managementof very long keys because of the size of the data set to be secured. Inthe One-Time Pad (OTP) algorithm, the simple exclusive-or function, XOR,is used. For two binary streams x and y of the same length, x XOR ymeans the bitwise exclusive-or of x and y.

At the bit level is generated:

0 XOR 0=0

0 XOR 1=1

1 XOR 0=1

1 XOR 1=0

An example of this process is described herein for an n-byte secret, s,(or data set) to be split. The process will generate an n-byte randomvalue, a, and then set:

b=a XOR s.

Note that one can derive “s” via the equation:

s=a XOR b.

The values a and b are referred to as shares or portions and are placedin separate depositories. Once the secret s is split into two or moreshares, it is discarded in a secure manner

The secure data parser of the present invention may utilize thisfunction, performing multiple XOR functions incorporating multipledistinct secret key values: K1, K2, K3, Kn, K5. At the beginning of theoperation, the data to be secured is passed through the first encryptionoperation, secure data=data XOR secret key 5:

S=D XOR K5

In order to securely store the resulting encrypted data in, for example,four shares, S1, S2, S3, Sn, the data is parsed and split into “n”segments, or shares, according to the value of K5. This operationresults in “n” pseudorandom shares of the original encrypted data.Subsequent XOR functions may then be performed on each share with theremaining secret key values, for example: Secure data segment1=encrypted data share 1 XOR secret key 1:

SD1=S1 XOR K1

SD2=S2 XOR K2

SD3=S3 XOR K3

SDn=Sn XOR Kn.

In one embodiment, it may not be desired to have any one depositorycontain enough information to decrypt the information held there, so thekey required to decrypt the share is stored in a different datadepository:

Depository 1: SD1, Kn Depository 2: SD2, K1 Depository 3: SD3, K2Depository n: SDn, K3.

Additionally, appended to each share may be the information required toretrieve the original session encryption key, K5. Therefore, in the keymanagement example described herein, the original session master key isreferenced by a transaction ID split into “n” shares according to thecontents of the installation dependant Parser Master Key (TID1, TID2,TID3, TIDn):

Depository 1: SD1, Kn, TID1 Depository 2: SD2, K1, TID2 Depository 3:SD3, K2, TID3 Depository n: SDn, K3, TIDn.

In the incorporated session key example described herein, the sessionmaster key is split into “n” shares according to the contents of theinstallation dependant Parser Master Key (SK1, SK2, SK3, SKn):

Depository 1: SD1, Kn, SK1 Depository 2: SD2, K1, SK2 Depository 3: SD3,K2, SK3 Depository n: SDn, K3, SKn.

Unless all four shares are retrieved, the data cannot be reassembledaccording to this example. Even if all four shares are captured, thereis no possibility of reassembling or restoring the original informationwithout access to the session master key and the Parser Master Key.

This example has described an embodiment of the method of the presentinvention, and also describes, in another embodiment, the algorithm usedto place shares into depositories so that shares from all depositoriescan be combined to form the secret authentication material. Thecomputations needed are very simple and fast. However, with the One TimePad (OTP) algorithm there may be circumstances that cause it to be lessdesirable, such as a large data set to be secured, because the key sizeis the same size as the data to be stored. Therefore, there would be aneed to store and transmit about twice the amount of the original datawhich may be less desirable under certain circumstances.

Stream Cipher RS1

The stream cipher RS1 splitting technique is very similar to the OTPsplitting technique described herein. Instead of an n-byte random value,an n′=min(n, 16)-byte random value is generated and used to key the RS1Stream Cipher algorithm. The advantage of the RS1 Stream Cipheralgorithm is that a pseudorandom key is generated from a much smallerseed number. The speed of execution of the RS1 Stream Cipher encryptionis also rated at approximately 10 times the speed of the well known inthe art Triple DES encryption without compromising security. The RS1Stream Cipher algorithm is well known in the art, and may be used togenerate the keys used in the XOR function. The RS1 Stream Cipheralgorithm is interoperable with other commercially available streamcipher algorithms, such as the RC4™ stream cipher algorithm of RSASecurity, Inc and is suitable for use in the methods of the presentinvention.

Using the key notation above, K1 thru K5 are now an n′ byte randomvalues and we set:

SD1=S1XORE(K1)

SD2=S2XORE(K2)

SD3=S3XORE(K3)

SDn=Sn XORE(Kn)

where E(K1) thru E(Kn) are the first n′ bytes of output from the RS1Stream Cipher algorithm keyed by K1 thru Kn. The shares are now placedinto data depositories as described herein.

In this stream cipher RS1 algorithm, the required computations neededare nearly as simple and fast as the OTP algorithm. The benefit in thisexample using the RS1 Stream Cipher is that the system needs to storeand transmit on average only about 16 bytes more than the size of theoriginal data to be secured per share. When the size of the originaldata is more than 16 bytes, this RS1 algorithm is more efficient thanthe OTP algorithm because it is simply shorter. It is readily apparentto those of ordinary skill in the art that a wide variety of encryptionmethods or algorithms are suitable for use in the present invention,including, but not limited to RS1, OTP, RC4™, Triple DES and AES.

There are major advantages provided by the data security methods andcomputer systems of the present invention over traditional encryptionmethods. One advantage is the security gained from moving shares of thedata to different locations on one or more data depositories or storagedevices, that may be in different logical, physical or geographicallocations. When the shares of data are split physically and under thecontrol of different personnel, for example, the possibility ofcompromising the data is greatly reduced.

Another advantage provided by the methods and system of the presentinvention is the combination of the steps of the method of the presentinvention for securing data to provide a comprehensive process ofmaintaining security of sensitive data. The data is encrypted with asecure key and split into one or more shares, and in one embodiment,four shares, according to the secure key. The secure key is storedsafely with a reference pointer which is secured into four sharesaccording to a secure key. The data shares are then encryptedindividually and the keys are stored safely with different encryptedshares. When combined, the entire process for securing data according tothe methods disclosed herein becomes a comprehensive package for datasecurity.

The data secured according to the methods of the present invention isreadily retrievable and restored, reconstituted, reassembled, decrypted,or otherwise returned into its original or other suitable form for use.In order to restore the original data, the following items may beutilized:

1. All shares or portions of the data set.

2. Knowledge of and ability to reproduce the process flow of the methodused to secure the data.

3. Access to the session master key.

4. Access to the Parser Master Key.

Therefore, it may be desirable to plan a secure installation wherein atleast one of the above elements may be physically separated from theremaining components of the system (under the control of a differentsystem administrator for example).

Protection against a rogue application invoking the data securingmethods application may be enforced by use of the Parser Master Key. Amutual authentication handshake between the secure data parser and theapplication may be required in this embodiment of the present inventionprior to any action taken.

The security of the system dictates that there be no “backdoor” methodfor recreation of the original data. For installations where datarecovery issues may arise, the secure data parser can be enhanced toprovide a mirror of the four shares and session master key depository.Hardware options such as RAID (redundant array of inexpensive disks,used to spread information over several disks) and software options suchas replication can assist as well in the data recovery planning.

Key Management

In one embodiment of the present invention, the data securing methoduses three sets of keys for an encryption operation. Each set of keysmay have individual key storage, retrieval, security and recoveryoptions, based on the installation. The keys that may be used, include,but are not limited to:

The Parser Master Key

This key is an individual key associated with the installation of thesecure data parser. It is installed on the server on which the securedata parser has been deployed. There are a variety of options suitablefor securing this key including, but not limited to, a smart card,separate hardware key store, standard key stores, custom key stores orwithin a secured database table, for example.

The Session Master Key

A Session Master Key may be generated each time data is secured. TheSession Master Key is used to encrypt the data prior to the parsing andsplitting operations. It may also be incorporated (if the Session MasterKey is not integrated into the parsed data) as a means of parsing theencrypted data. The Session Master Key may be secured in a variety ofmanners, including, but not limited to, a standard key store, custom keystore, separate database table, or secured within the encrypted shares,for example.

The Share Encryption Keys

For each share or portions of a data set that is created, an individualShare Encryption Key may be generated to further encrypt the shares. TheShare Encryption Keys may be stored in different shares than the sharethat was encrypted.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that thedata securing methods and computer system of the present invention arewidely applicable to any type of data in any setting or environment. Inaddition to commercial applications conducted over the Internet orbetween customers and vendors, the data securing methods and computersystems of the present invention are highly applicable to non-commercialor private settings or environments. Any data set that is desired to bekept secure from any unauthorized user may be secured using the methodsand systems described herein. For example, access to a particulardatabase within a company or organization may be advantageouslyrestricted to only selected users by employing the methods and systemsof the present invention for securing data. Another example is thegeneration, modification or access to documents wherein it is desired torestrict access or prevent unauthorized or accidental access ordisclosure outside a group of selected individuals, computers orworkstations. These and other examples of the ways in which the methodsand systems of data securing of the present invention are applicable toany non-commercial or commercial environment or setting for any setting,including, but not limited to any organization, government agency orcorporation.

In another embodiment of the present invention, the data securing methoduses three sets of keys for an encryption operation. Each set of keysmay have individual key storage, retrieval, security and recoveryoptions, based on the installation. The keys that may be used, include,but are not limited to:

1. The Parser Master Key

This key is an individual key associated with the installation of thesecure data parser. It is installed on the server on which the securedata parser has been deployed. There are a variety of options suitablefor securing this key including, but not limited to, a smart card,separate hardware key store, standard key stores, custom key stores orwithin a secured database table, for example.

2. The Session Master Key

A Session Master Key may be generated each time data is secured. TheSession Master Key is used in conjunction with the Parser Master key toderive the Intermediary Key. The Session Master Key may be secured in avariety of manners, including, but not limited to, a standard key store,custom key store, separate database table, or secured within theencrypted shares, for example.

3. The Intermediary Key

An Intermediary Key may be generated each time data is secured. TheIntermediary Key is used to encrypt the data prior to the parsing andsplitting operation. It may also be incorporated as a means of parsingthe encrypted data.

4. The Share Encryption Keys

For each share or portions of a data set that is created, an individualShare Encryption Key may be generated to further encrypt the shares. TheShare Encryption Keys may be stored in different shares than the sharethat was encrypted.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that thedata securing methods and computer system of the present invention arewidely applicable to any type of data in any setting or environment. Inaddition to commercial applications conducted over the Internet orbetween customers and vendors, the data securing methods and computersystems of the present invention are highly applicable to non-commercialor private settings or environments. Any data set that is desired to bekept secure from any unauthorized user may be secured using the methodsand systems described herein. For example, access to a particulardatabase within a company or organization may be advantageouslyrestricted to only selected users by employing the methods and systemsof the present invention for securing data. Another example is thegeneration, modification or access to documents wherein it is desired torestrict access or prevent unauthorized or accidental access ordisclosure outside a group of selected individuals, computers orworkstations. These and other examples of the ways in which the methodsand systems of data securing of the present invention are applicable toany non-commercial or commercial environment or setting for any setting,including, but not limited to any organization, government agency orcorporation.

Workgroup, Project, Individual PC/Laptop or Cross Platform Data Security

The data securing methods and computer systems of the present inventionare also useful in securing data by workgroup, project, individualPC/Laptop and any other platform that is in use in, for example,businesses, offices, government agencies, or any setting in whichsensitive data is created, handled or stored. The present inventionprovides methods and computer systems to secure data that is known to besought after by organizations, such as the U.S. Government, forimplementation across the entire government organization or betweengovernments at a state or federal level.

The data securing methods and computer systems of the present inventionprovide the ability to not only parse and split flat files but also datafields, sets and or table of any type. Additionally, all forms of dataare capable of being secured under this process, including, but notlimited to, text, video, images, biometrics and voice data. Scalability,speed and data throughput of the methods of securing data of the presentinvention are only limited to the hardware the user has at theirdisposal.

In one embodiment of the present invention, the data securing methodsare utilized as described below in a workgroup environment. In oneembodiment, as shown in FIG. 23 and described below, the Workgroup Scaledata securing method of the present invention uses the private keymanagement functionality of the TrustEngine to store the user/grouprelationships and the associated private keys (Parser Group Master Keys)necessary for a group of users to share secure data. The method of thepresent invention has the capability to secure data for an enterprise,workgroup, or individual user, depending on how the Parser Master Keywas deployed.

In one embodiment, additional key management and user/group managementprograms may be provided, enabling wide scale workgroup implementationwith a single point of administration and key management. Keygeneration, management and revocation are handled by the singlemaintenance program, which all become especially important as the numberof users increase. In another embodiment, key management may also be setup across one or several different system administrators, which may notallow any one person or group to control data as needed. This allows forthe management of secured data to be obtained by roles,responsibilities, membership, rights, etc., as defined by anorganization, and the access to secured data can be limited to justthose who are permitted or required to have access only to the portionthey are working on, while others, such as managers or executives, mayhave access to all of the secured data. This embodiment allows for thesharing of secured data among different groups within a company ororganization while at the same time only allowing certain selectedindividuals, such as those with the authorized and predetermined rolesand responsibilities, to observe the data as a whole. In addition, thisembodiment of the methods and systems of the present invention alsoallows for the sharing of data among, for example, separate companies,or separate departments or divisions of companies, or any separateorganization departments, groups, agencies, or offices, or the like, ofany government or organization or any kind, where some sharing isrequired, but not any one party may be permitted to have access to allthe data. Particularly apparent examples of the need and utility forsuch a method and system of the present invention are to allow sharing,but maintain security, in between government areas, agencies andoffices, and between different divisions, departments or offices of alarge company, or any other organization, for example.

An example of the applicability of the methods of the present inventionon a smaller scale is as follows. A Parser Master key is used as aserialization or branding of the secure data parser to an organization.As the scale of use of the Parser Master key is reduced from the wholeenterprise to a smaller workgroup, the data securing methods describedherein are used to share files within groups of users.

In the example shown in FIG. 25 and described below, there are six usersdefined along with their title or role within the organization. The sidebar represents five possible groups that the users can belong toaccording to their role. The arrow represents membership by the user inone or more of the groups.

When configuring the secure data parser for use in this example, thesystem administrator accesses the user and group information from theoperating system by a maintenance program. This maintenance programgenerates and assigns Parser Group Master Keys to users based on theirmembership in groups.

In this example, there are three members in the Senior Staff group. Forthis group, the actions would be:

1. Access Parser Group Master Key for the Senior Staff group (generate akey if not available);

2. Generate a digital certificate associating CEO with the Senior Staffgroup;

3. Generate a digital certificate associating CFO with the Senior Staffgroup;

4. Generate a digital certificate associating Vice President, Marketingwith the Senior Staff group.

The same set of actions would be done for each group, and each memberwithin each group. When the maintenance program is complete, the ParserGroup Master Key becomes a shared credential for each member of thegroup. Revocation of the assigned digital certificate may be doneautomatically when a user is removed from a group through themaintenance program without affecting the remaining members of thegroup.

Once the shared credentials have been defined, the parsing and splittingprocess remains the same. When a file, document or data element is to besecured, the user is prompted for the target group to be used whensecuring the data. The resulting secured data is only accessible byother members of the target group. This functionality of the methods andsystems of the present invention may be used with any other computersystem or software platform, any may be, for example, integrated intoexisting application programs or used standalone for file security.

It is readily apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art that anyone or combination of encryption algorithms are suitable for use in themethods and systems of the present invention. For example, theencryption steps may, in one embodiment, be repeated to produce amulti-layered encryption scheme. In addition, a different encryptionalgorithm, or combination of encryption algorithms, may be used inrepeat encryption steps such that different encryption algorithms areapplied to the different layers of the multi-layered encryption scheme.As such, the encryption scheme itself may become a component of themethods of the present invention for securing sensitive data fromunauthorized use or access.

The secure data parser may include as an internal component, as anexternal component, or as both an error-checking component. For example,in one suitable approach, as portions of data are created using thesecure data parser in accordance with the present invention, to assurethe integrity of the data within a portion, a hash value is taken atpreset intervals within the portion and is appended to the end of theinterval. The hash value is a predictable and reproducible numericrepresentation of the data. If any bit within the data changes, the hashvalue would be different. A scanning module (either as a stand-alonecomponent external to the secure data parser or as an internalcomponent) may then scan the portions of data generated by the securedata parser. Each portion of data (or alternatively, less than allportions of data according to some interval or by a random orpseudo-random sampling) is compared to the appended hash value or valuesand an action may be taken. This action may include a report of valuesthat match and do not match, an alert for values that do not match, orinvoking of some external or internal program to trigger a recovery ofthe data. For example, recovery of the data could be performed byinvoking a recovery module based on the concept that fewer than allportions may be needed to generate original data in accordance with thepresent invention.

Any other suitable integrity checking may be implemented using anysuitable integrity information appended anywhere in all or a subset ofdata portions. Integrity information may include any suitableinformation that can be used to determine the integrity of dataportions. Examples of integrity information may include hash valuescomputed based on any suitable parameter (e.g., based on respective dataportions), digital signature information, message authentication code(MAC) information, any other suitable information, or any combinationthereof.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be used in anysuitable application. Namely, the secure data parser described hereinhas a variety of applications in different areas of computing andtechnology. Several such areas are discussed below. It will beunderstood that these are merely illustrative in nature and that anyother suitable applications may make use of the secure data parser. Itwill further be understood that the examples described are merelyillustrative embodiments that may be modified in any suitable way inorder to satisfy any suitable desires. For example, parsing andsplitting may be based on any suitable units, such as by bits, by bytes,by kilobytes, by megabytes, by any combination thereof, or by any othersuitable unit.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be used to implementsecure physical tokens, whereby data stored in a physical token may berequired in order to access additional data stored in another storagearea. In one suitable approach, a physical token, such as a compact USBflash drive, a floppy disk, an optical disk, a smart card, or any othersuitable physical token, may be used to store one of at least twoportions of parsed data in accordance with the present invention. Inorder to access the original data, the USB flash drive would need to beaccessed. Thus, a personal computer holding one portion of parsed datawould need to have the USB flash drive, having the other portion ofparsed data, attached before the original data can be accessed. FIG. 26illustrates this application. Storage area 2500 includes a portion ofparsed data 2502. Physical token 2504, having a portion of parsed data2506 would need to be coupled to storage area 2500 using any suitablecommunications interface 2508 (e.g., USB, serial, parallel, Bluetooth,IR, IEEE 1394, Ethernet, or any other suitable communications interface)in order to access the original data. This is useful in a situationwhere, for example, sensitive data on a computer is left alone andsubject to unauthorized access attempts. By removing the physical token(e.g., the USB flash drive), the sensitive data is inaccessible. It willbe understood that any other suitable approach for using physical tokensmay be used.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be used to implementa secure authentication system whereby user enrollment data (e.g.,passwords, private encryption keys, fingerprint templates, biometricdata or any other suitable user enrollment data) is parsed and splitusing the secure data parser. The user enrollment data may be parsed andsplit whereby one or more portions are stored on a smart card, agovernment Common Access Card, any suitable physical storage device(e.g., magnetic or optical disk, USB key drive, etc.), or any othersuitable device. One or more other portions of the parsed userenrollment data may be stored in the system performing theauthentication. This provides an added level of security to theauthentication process (e.g., in addition to the biometricauthentication information obtained from the biometric source, the userenrollment data must also be obtained via the appropriate parsed andsplit data portion).

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated intoany suitable existing system in order to provide the use of itsfunctionality in each system's respective environment. FIG. 27 shows ablock diagram of an illustrative system 2600, which may includesoftware, hardware, or both for implementing any suitable application.System 2600 may be an existing system in which secure data parser 2602may be retrofitted as an integrated component. Alternatively, securedata parser 2602 may be integrated into any suitable system 2600 from,for example, its earliest design stage. Secure data parser 2600 may beintegrated at any suitable level of system 2600. For example, securedata parser 2602 may be integrated into system 2600 at a sufficientlyback-end level such that the presence of secure data parser 2602 may besubstantially transparent to an end user of system 2600. Secure dataparser 2602 may be used for parsing and splitting data among one or morestorage devices 2604 in accordance with the present invention. Someillustrative examples of systems having the secure data parserintegrated therein are discussed below.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated intoan operating system kernel (e.g., Linux, Unix, or any other suitablecommercial or proprietary operating system). This integration may beused to protect data at the device level whereby, for example, data thatwould ordinarily be stored in one or more devices is separated into acertain number of portions by the secure data parser integrated into theoperating system and stored among the one or more devices. When originaldata is attempted to be accessed, the appropriate software, alsointegrated into the operating system, may recombine the parsed dataportions into the original data in a way that may be transparent to theend user.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated into avolume manager or any other suitable component of a storage system toprotect local and networked data storage across any or all supportedplatforms. For example, with the secure data parser integrated, astorage system may make use of the redundancy offered by the secure dataparser (i.e., which is used to implement the feature of needing fewerthan all separated portions of data in order to reconstruct the originaldata) to protect against data loss. The secure data parser also allowsall data written to storage devices, whether using redundancy or not, tobe in the form of multiple portions that are generated according to theparsing of the present invention. When original data is attempted to beaccessed, the appropriate software, also integrated into the volumemanager or other suitable component of the storage system, may recombinethe parsed data portions into the original data in a way that may betransparent to the end user.

In one suitable approach, the secure data parser of the presentinvention may be integrated into a RAID controller (as either hardwareor software). This allows for the secure storage of data to multipledrives while maintaining fault tolerance in case of drive failure.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated into adatabase in order to, for example, protect sensitive table information.For example, in one suitable approach, data associated with particularcells of a database table (e.g., individual cells, one or moreparticular columns, one or more particular rows, any combinationthereof, or an entire database table) may be parsed and separatedaccording to the present invention (e.g., where the different portionsare stored on one or more storage devices at one or more locations or ona single storage device). Access to recombine the portions in order toview the original data may be granted by traditional authenticationmethods (e.g., username and password query).

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated in anysuitable system that involves data in motion (i.e., transfer of datafrom one location to another). Such systems include, for example, email,streaming data broadcasts, and wireless (e.g., WiFi) communications.With respect to email, in one suitable approach, the secure data parsermay be used to parse outgoing messages (i.e., containing text, binarydata, or both (e.g., files attached to an email message)) and sendingthe different portions of the parsed data along different paths thuscreating multiple streams of data. If any one of these streams of datais compromised, the original message remains secure because the systemmay require that more than one of the portions be combined, inaccordance with the present invention, in order to generate the originaldata. In another suitable approach, the different portions of data maybe communicated along one path sequentially so that if one portion isobtained, it may not be sufficient to generate the original data. Thedifferent portions arrive at the intended recipient's location and maybe combined to generate the original data in accordance with the presentinvention.

FIGS. 28 and 29 are illustrative block diagrams of such email systems.FIG. 28 shows a sender system 2700, which may include any suitablehardware, such as a computer terminal, personal computer, handhelddevice (e.g., PDA, Blackberry), cellular telephone, computer network,any other suitable hardware, or any combination thereof. Sender system2700 is used to generate and/or store a message 2704, which may be, forexample, an email message, a binary data file (e.g., graphics, voice,video, etc.), or both. Message 2704 is parsed and split by secure dataparser 2702 in accordance with the present invention. The resultant dataportions may be communicated across one or more separate communicationspaths 2706 over network 2708 (e.g., the Internet, an intranet, a LAN,WiFi, Bluetooth, any other suitable hard-wired or wirelesscommunications means, or any combination thereof) to recipient system2710. The data portions may be communicated parallel in time oralternatively, according to any suitable time delay between thecommunication of the different data portions. Recipient system 2710 maybe any suitable hardware as described above with respect to sendersystem 2700. The separate data portions carried along communicationspaths 2706 are recombined at recipient system 2710 to generate theoriginal message or data in accordance with the present invention.

FIG. 29 shows a sender system 2800, which may include any suitablehardware, such as a computer terminal, personal computer, handhelddevice (e.g., PDA), cellular telephone, computer network, any othersuitable hardware, or any combination thereof. Sender system 2800 isused to generate and/or store a message 2804, which may be, for example,an email message, a binary data file (e.g., graphics, voice, video,etc.), or both. Message 2804 is parsed and split by secure data parser2802 in accordance with the present invention. The resultant dataportions may be communicated across a single communications paths 2806over network 2808 (e.g., the Internet, an intranet, a LAN, WiFi,Bluetooth, any other suitable communications means, or any combinationthereof) to recipient system 2810. The data portions may be communicatedserially across communications path 2806 with respect to one another.Recipient system 2810 may be any suitable hardware as described abovewith respect to sender system 2800. The separate data portions carriedalong communications path 2806 are recombined at recipient system 2810to generate the original message or data in accordance with the presentinvention.

It will be understood that the arrangement of FIGS. 28 and 29 are merelyillustrative. Any other suitable arrangement may be used. For example,in another suitable approach, the features of the systems of FIGS. 28and 29 may be combined whereby the multi-path approach of FIG. 28 isused and in which one or more of communications paths 2706 are used tocarry more than one portion of data as communications path 2806 does inthe context of FIG. 29.

The secure data parser may be integrated at any suitable level of adata-in motion system. For example, in the context of an email system,the secure data parser may be integrated at the user-interface level(e.g., into Microsoft® Outlook), in which case the user may have controlover the use of the secure data parser features when using email.Alternatively, the secure data parser may be implemented in a back-endcomponent such as at the exchange server, in which case messages may beautomatically parsed, split, and communicated along different paths inaccordance with the present invention without any user intervention.

Similarly, in the case of streaming broadcasts of data (e.g., audio,video), the outgoing data may be parsed and separated into multiplestreams each containing a portion of the parsed data. The multiplestreams may be transmitted along one or more paths and recombined at therecipient's location in accordance with the present invention. One ofthe benefits of this approach is that it avoids the relatively largeoverhead associated with traditional encryption of data followed bytransmission of the encrypted data over a single communications channel.The secure data parser of the present invention allows data in motion tobe sent in multiple parallel streams, increasing speed and efficiency.

It will be understand that the secure data parser may be integrated forprotection of and fault tolerance of any type of data in motion throughany transport medium, including, for example, wired, wireless, orphysical. For example, voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) applicationsmay make use of the secure data parser of the present invention.Wireless or wired data transport from or to any suitable personaldigital assistant (PDA) devices such as Blackberries and SmartPhones maybe secured using the secure data parser of the present invention.Communications using wireless 802.11 protocols for peer to peer and hubbased wireless networks, satellite communications, point to pointwireless communications, Internet client/server communications, or anyother suitable communications may involve the data in motioncapabilities of the secure data parser in accordance with the presentinvention. Data communication between computer peripheral device (e.g.,printer, scanner, monitor, keyboard, network router, biometricauthentication device (e.g., fingerprint scanner), or any other suitableperipheral device) between a computer and a computer peripheral device,between a computer peripheral device and any other suitable device, orany combination thereof may make use of the data in motion features ofthe present invention.

The data in motion features of the present invention may also apply tophysical transportation of secure shares using for example, separateroutes, vehicles, methods, any other suitable physical transportation,or any combination thereof. For example, physical transportation of datamay take place on digital/magnetic tapes, floppy disks, optical disks,physical tokens, USB drives, removable hard drives, consumer electronicdevices with flash memory (e.g., Apple IPODs or other MP3 players),flash memory, any other suitable medium used for transporting data, orany combination thereof.

The secure data parser of the present invention may provide securitywith the ability for disaster recovery. According to the presentinvention, fewer than all portions of the separated data generated bythe secure data parser may be necessary in order to retrieve theoriginal data. That is, out of m portions stored, n may be the minimumnumber of these m portions necessary to retrieve the original data,where n<=m. For example, if each of four portions is stored in adifferent physical location relative to the other three portions, then,if n=2 in this example, two of the locations may be compromised wherebydata is destroyed or inaccessible, and the original data may still beretrieved from the portions in the other two locations. Any suitablevalue for n or m may be used.

In addition, the n of m feature of the present invention may be used tocreate a “two man rule” whereby in order to avoid entrusting a singleindividual or any other entity with full access to what may be sensitivedata, two or more distinct entities, each with a portion of theseparated data parsed by the secure data parser of the present inventionmay need to agree to put their portions together in order to retrievethe original data.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be used to provide agroup of entities with a group-wide key that allows the group members toaccess particular information authorized to be accessed by thatparticular group. The group key may be one of the data portionsgenerated by the secure data parser in accordance with the presentinvention that may be required to be combined with another portioncentrally stored, for example in order to retrieve the informationsought. This feature allows for, for example, secure collaboration amonga group. It may be applied in for example, dedicated networks, virtualprivate networks, intranets, or any other suitable network.

Specific applications of this use of the secure data parser include, forexample, coalition information sharing in which, for example,multi-national friendly government forces are given the capability tocommunicate operational and otherwise sensitive data on a security levelauthorized to each respective country over a single network or a dualnetwork (i.e., as compared to the many networks involving relativelysubstantial manual processes currently used). This capability is alsoapplicable for companies or other organizations in which informationneeded to be known by one or more specific individuals (within theorganization or without) may be communicated over a single networkwithout the need to worry about unauthorized individuals viewing theinformation.

Another specific application includes a multi-level security hierarchyfor government systems. That is, the secure data parser of the presentinvention may provide for the ability to operate a government system atdifferent levels of classified information (e.g., unclassified,classified, secret, top secret) using a single network. If desired, morenetworks may be used (e.g., a separate network for top secret), but thepresent invention allows for substantially fewer than currentarrangement in which a separate network is used for each level ofclassification.

It will be understood that any combination of the above describedapplications of the secure data parser of the present invention may beused. For example, the group key application can be used together withthe data in motion security application (i.e., whereby data that iscommunicated over a network can only be accessed by a member of therespective group and where, while the data is in motion, it is splitamong multiple paths (or sent in sequential portions) in accordance withthe present invention).

The secure data parser of the present invention may be integrated intoany middleware application to enable applications to securely store datato different database products or to different devices withoutmodification to either the applications or the database. Middleware is ageneral term for any product that allows two separate and alreadyexisting programs to communicate. For example, in one suitable approach,middleware having the secure data parser integrated, may be used toallow programs written for a particular database to communicate withother databases without custom coding.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be implementedhaving any combination of any suitable capabilities, such as thosediscussed herein. In some embodiments of the present invention, forexample, the secure data parser may be implemented having only certaincapabilities whereas other capabilities may be obtained through the useof external software, hardware, or both interfaced either directly orindirectly with the secure data parser.

FIG. 30, for example, shows an illustrative implementation of the securedata parser as secure data parser 3000. Secure data parser 3000 may beimplemented with very few built-in capabilities. As illustrated, securedata parser 3000 may include built-in capabilities for parsing andsplitting data into portions (also referred to herein as shares) of datausing module 3002 in accordance with the present invention. Secure dataparser 3000 may also include built in capabilities for performingredundancy in order to be able to implement, for example, the m of nfeature described above (i.e., recreating the original data using fewerthan all shares of parsed and split data) using module 3004. Secure dataparser 3000 may also include share distribution capabilities usingmodule 3006 for placing the shares of data into buffers from which theyare sent for communication to a remote location, for storage, etc. inaccordance with the present invention. It will be understood that anyother suitable capabilities may be built into secure data parser 3000.

Assembled data buffer 3008 may be any suitable memory used to store theoriginal data (although not necessarily in its original form) that willbe parsed and split by secure data parser 3000. In a splittingoperation, assembled data buffer 3008 provides input to secure dataparser 3008. In a restore operation, assembled data buffer 3008 may beused to store the output of secure data parser 3000.

Split shares buffers 3010 may be one or more memory modules that may beused to store the multiple shares of data that resulted from the parsingand splitting of original data. In a splitting operation, split sharesbuffers 3010 hold the output of the secure data parser. In a restoreoperation, split shares buffers hold the input to secure data parser3000.

It will be understood that any other suitable arrangement ofcapabilities may be built-in for secure data parser 3000. Any additionalfeatures may be built-in and any of the features illustrated may beremoved, made more robust, made less robust, or may otherwise bemodified in any suitable way. Buffers 3008 and 3010 are likewise merelyillustrative and may be modified, removed, or added to in any suitableway.

Any suitable modules implemented in software, hardware or both may becalled by or may call to secure data parser 3000. If desired, evencapabilities that are built into secure data parser 3000 may be replacedby one or more external modules. As illustrated, some external modulesinclude random number generator 3012, cipher feedback key generator3014, hash algorithm 3016, any one or more types of encryption 3018, andkey management 3020. It will be understood that these are merelyillustrative external modules. Any other suitable modules may be used inaddition to or in place of those illustrated.

Cipher feedback key generator 3014 may, externally to secure data parser3000, generate for each secure data parser operation, a unique key, orrandom number (using, for example, random number generator 3012), to beused as a seed value for an operation that extends an original sessionkey size (e.g., a value of 128, 256, 512, or 1024 bits) into a valueequal to the length of the data to be parsed and split. Any suitablealgorithm may be used for the cipher feedback key generation, including,for example, the AES cipher feedback key generation algorithm.

In order to facilitate integration of secure data parser 3000 and itsexternal modules (i.e., secure data parser layer 3026) into anapplication layer 3024 (e.g., email application, database application,etc.), a wrapping layer that may make use of, for example, API functioncalls may be used. Any other suitable arrangement for facilitatingintegration of secure data parser layer 3026 into application layer 3024may be used.

FIG. 31 illustratively shows how the arrangement of FIG. 30 may be usedwhen a write (e.g., to a storage device), insert (e.g., in a databasefield), or transmit (e.g., across a network) command is issued inapplication layer 3024. At step 3100 data to be secured is identifiedand a call is made to the secure data parser. The call is passed throughwrapper layer 3022 where at step 3102, wrapper layer 3022 streams theinput data identified at step 3100 into assembled data buffer 3008. Alsoat step 3102, any suitable share information, filenames, any othersuitable information, or any combination thereof may be stored (e.g., asinformation 3106 at wrapper layer 3022). Secure data processor 3000 thenparses and splits the data it takes as input from assembled data buffer3008 in accordance with the present invention. It outputs the datashares into split shares buffers 3010. At step 3104, wrapper layer 3022obtains from stored information 3106 any suitable share information(i.e., stored by wrapper 3022 at step 3102) and share location(s) (e.g.,from one or more configuration files). Wrapper layer 3022 then writesthe output shares (obtained from split shares buffers 3010)appropriately (e.g., written to one or more storage devices,communicated onto a network, etc.).

FIG. 32 illustratively shows how the arrangement of FIG. 30 may be usedwhen a read (e.g., from a storage device), select (e.g., from a databasefield), or receive (e.g., from a network) occurs. At step 3200, data tobe restored is identified and a call to secure data parser 3000 is madefrom application layer 3024. At step 3202, from wrapper layer 3022, anysuitable share information is obtained and share location is determined.Wrapper layer 3022 loads the portions of data identified at step 3200into split shares buffers 3010. Secure data parser 3000 then processesthese shares in accordance with the present invention (e.g., if onlythree of four shares are available, then the redundancy capabilities ofsecure data parser 3000 may be used to restore the original data usingonly the three shares). The restored data is then stored in assembleddata buffer 3008. At step 3204, application layer 3022 converts the datastored in assembled data buffer 3008 into its original data format (ifnecessary) and provides the original data in its original format toapplication layer 3024.

It will be understood that the parsing and splitting of original dataillustrated in FIG. 31 and the restoring of portions of data intooriginal data illustrated in FIG. 32 is merely illustrative. Any othersuitable processes, components, or both may be used in addition to or inplace of those illustrated.

FIG. 33 is a block diagram of an illustrative process flow for parsingand splitting original data into two or more portions of data inaccordance with one embodiment of the present invention. As illustrated,the original data desired to be parsed and split is plain text 3306(i.e., the word “SUMMIT” is used as an example). It will be understoodthat any other type of data may be parsed and split in accordance withthe present invention. A session key 3300 is generated. If the length ofsession key 3300 is not compatible with the length of original data3306, then cipher feedback session key 3304 may be generated.

In one suitable approach, original data 3306 may be encrypted prior toparsing, splitting, or both. For example, as FIG. 33 illustrates,original data 3306 may be XORed with any suitable value (e.g., withcipher feedback session key 3304, or with any other suitable value). Itwill be understood that any other suitable encryption technique may beused in place of or in addition to the XOR technique illustrate. It willfurther be understood that although FIG. 33 is illustrated in terms ofbyte by byte operations, the operation may take place at the bit levelor at any other suitable level. It will further be understood that, ifdesired, there need not be any encryption whatsoever of original data3306.

The resultant encrypted data (or original data if no encryption tookplace) is then hashed to determine how to split the encrypted (ororiginal) data among the output buckets (e.g., of which there are fourin the illustrated example). In the illustrated example, the hashingtakes place by bytes and is a function of cipher feedback session key3304. It will be understood that this is merely illustrative. Thehashing may be performed at the bit level, if desired. The hashing maybe a function of any other suitable value besides cipher feedbacksession key 3304. In another suitable approach, hashing need not beused. Rather, any other suitable technique for splitting data may beemployed.

FIG. 34 is a block diagram of an illustrative process flow for restoringoriginal data 3306 from two or more parsed and split portions oforiginal data 3306 in accordance with one embodiment of the presentinvention. The process involves hashing the portions in reverse (i.e.,to the process of FIG. 33) as a function of cipher feedback session key3304 to restore the encrypted original data (or original data if therewas no encryption prior to the parsing and splitting). The encryptionkey may then be used to restore the original data (i.e., in theillustrated example, cipher feedback session key 3304 is used to decryptthe XOR encryption by XORing it with the encrypted data). This therestores original data 3306.

FIG. 35 shows how bit-splitting may be implemented in the example ofFIGS. 33 and 34. A hash may be used (e.g., as a function of the cipherfeedback session key, as a function of any other suitable value) todetermine a bit value at which to split each byte of data. It will beunderstood that this is merely one illustrative way in which toimplement splitting at the bit level. Any other suitable technique maybe used.

It will be understood that any reference to hash functionality madeherein may be made with respect to any suitable hash algorithm. Theseinclude for example, MD5 and SHA-1. Different hash algorithms may beused at different times and by different components of the presentinvention.

After a split point has been determined in accordance with the aboveillustrative procedure or through any other procedure or algorithm, adetermination may be made with regard to which data portions to appendeach of the left and right segments. Any suitable algorithm may be usedfor making this determination. For example, in one suitable approach, atable of all possible distributions (e.g., in the form of pairings ofdestinations for the left segment and for the right segment) may becreated, whereby a destination share value for each of the left andright segment may be determined by using any suitable hash function oncorresponding data in the session key, cipher feedback session key, orany other suitable random or pseudo-random value, which may be generatedand extended to the size of the original data. For example, a hashfunction of a corresponding byte in the random or pseudo-random valuemay be made. The output of the hash function is used to determine whichpairing of destinations (i.e., one for the left segment and one for theright segment) to select from the table of all the destinationcombinations. Based on this result, each segment of the split data unitis appended to the respective two shares indicated by the table valueselected as a result of the hash function.

Redundancy information may be appended to the data portions inaccordance with the present invention to allow for the restoration ofthe original data using fewer than all the data portions. For example,if two out of four portions are desired to be sufficient for restorationof data, then additional data from the shares may be accordinglyappended to each share in, for example, a round-robin manner (e.g.,where the size of the original data is 4 MB, then share 1 gets its ownshares as well as those of shares 2 and 3; share 2 gets its own share aswell as those of shares 3 and 4; share 3 gets its own share as well asthose of shares 4 and 1; and share 4 gets its own shares as well asthose of shares 1 and 2). Any such suitable redundancy may be used inaccordance with the present invention.

It will be understood that any other suitable parsing and splittingapproach may be used to generate portions of data from an original dataset in accordance with the present invention. For example, parsing andsplitting may be randomly or pseudo-randomly processed on a bit by bitbasis. A random or pseudo-random value may be used (e.g., session key,cipher feedback session key, etc.) whereby for each bit in the originaldata, the result of a hash function on corresponding data in the randomor pseudo-random value may indicate to which share to append therespective bit. In one suitable approach the random or pseudo-randomvalue may be generated as, or extended to, 8 times the size of theoriginal data so that the hash function may be performed on acorresponding byte of the random or pseudo-random value with respect toeach bit of the original data. Any other suitable algorithm for parsingand splitting data on a bit by bit level may be used in accordance withthe present invention. It will further be appreciated that redundancydata may be appended to the data shares such as, for example, in themanner described immediately above in accordance with the presentinvention.

In one suitable approach, parsing and splitting need not be random orpseudo-random. Rather, any suitable deterministic algorithm for parsingand splitting data may be used. For example, breaking up the originaldata into sequential shares may be employed as a parsing and splittingalgorithm. Another example is to parse and split the original data bitby bit, appending each respective bit to the data shares sequentially ina round-robin manner. It will further be appreciated that redundancydata may be appended to the data shares such as, for example, in themanner described above in accordance with the present invention.

In one embodiment of the present invention, after the secure data parsergenerates a number of portions of original data, in order to restore theoriginal data, certain one or more of the generated portions may bemandatory. For example, if one of the portions is used as anauthentication share (e.g., saved on a physical token device), and ifthe fault tolerance feature of the secure data parser is being used(i.e., where fewer than all portions are necessary to restore theoriginal data), then even though the secure data parser may have accessto a sufficient number of portions of the original data in order torestore the original data, it may require the authentication sharestored on the physical token device before it restores the originaldata. It will be understood that any number and types of particularshares may be required based on, for example, application, type of data,user, any other suitable factors, or any combination thereof.

In one suitable approach, the secure data parser or some externalcomponent to the secure data parser may encrypt one or more portions ofthe original data. The encrypted portions may be required to be providedand decrypted in order to restore the original data. The differentencrypted portions may be encrypted with different encryption keys. Forexample, this feature may be used to implement a more secure “two manrule” whereby a first user would need to have a particular shareencrypted using a first encryption and a second user would need to havea particular share encrypted using a second encryption key. In order toaccess the original data, both users would need to have their respectiveencryption keys and provide their respective portions of the originaldata. In one suitable approach, a public key may be used to encrypt oneor more data portions that may be a mandatory share required to restorethe original data. A private key may then be used to decrypt the sharein order to be used to restore to the original data.

Any such suitable paradigm may be used that makes use of mandatoryshares where fewer than all shares are needed to restore original data.

In one suitable embodiment of the present invention, distribution ofdata into a finite number of shares of data may be processed randomly orpseudo-randomly such that from a statistical perspective, theprobability that any particular share of data receives a particular unitof data is equal to the probability that any one of the remaining shareswill receive the unit of data. As a result, each share of data will havean approximately equal amount of data bits.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, each of thefinite number of shares of data need not have an equal probability ofreceiving units of data from the parsing and splitting of the originaldata. Rather certain one or more shares may have a higher or lowerprobability than the remaining shares. As a result, certain shares maybe larger or smaller in terms of bit size relative to other shares. Forexample, in a two-share scenario, one share may have a 1% probability ofreceiving a unit of data whereas the second share has a 99% probability.It should follow, therefore that once the data units have beendistributed by the secure data parser among the two share, the firstshare should have approximately 1% of the data and the second share 99%.Any suitable probabilities may be used in accordance with the presentinvention.

It will be understood that the secure data parser may be programmed todistribute data to shares according to an exact (or near exact)percentage as well. For example, the secure data parser may beprogrammed to distribute 80% of data to a first share and the remaining20% of data to a second share.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, the securedata parser may generate data shares, one or more of which havepredefined sizes. For example, the secure data parser may split originaldata into data portions where one of the portions is exactly 256 bits.In one suitable approach, if it is not possible to generate a dataportion having the requisite size, then the secure data parser may padthe portion to make it the correct size. Any suitable size may be used.

In one suitable approach, the size of a data portion may be the size ofan encryption key, a splitting key, any other suitable key, or any othersuitable data element.

As previously discussed, the secure data parser may use keys in theparsing and splitting of data. For purposes of clarity and brevity,these keys shall be referred to herein as “splitting keys.” For example,the Session Master Key, previously introduced, is one type of splittingkey. Also, as previously discussed, splitting keys may be secured withinshares of data generated by the secure data parser. Any suitablealgorithms for securing splitting keys may be used to secure them amongthe shares of data. For example, the Shamir algorithm may be used tosecure the splitting keys whereby information that may be used toreconstruct a splitting key is generated and appended to the shares ofdata. Any other such suitable algorithm may be used in accordance withthe present invention.

Similarly, any suitable encryption keys may be secured within one ormore shares of data according to any suitable algorithm such as theShamir algorithm. For example, encryption keys used to encrypt a dataset prior to parsing and splitting, encryption keys used to encrypt adata portions after parsing and splitting, or both may be secured using,for example, the Shamir algorithm or any other suitable algorithm.

According to one embodiment of the present invention, an All or NothingTransform (AoNT), such as a Full Package Transform, may be used tofurther secure data by transforming splitting keys, encryption keys, anyother suitable data elements, or any combination thereof. For example,an encryption key used to encrypt a data set prior to parsing andsplitting in accordance with the present invention may be transformed byan AoNT algorithm. The transformed encryption key may then bedistributed among the data shares according to, for example, the Shamiralgorithm or any other suitable algorithm. In order to reconstruct theencryption key, the encrypted data set must be restored (e.g., notnecessarily using all the data shares if redundancy was used inaccordance with the present invention) in order to access the necessaryinformation regarding the transformation in accordance with AoNTs as iswell known by one skilled in the art. When the original encryption keyis retrieved, it may be used to decrypt the encrypted data set toretrieve the original data set. It will be understood that the faulttolerance features of the present invention may be used in conjunctionwith the AoNT feature. Namely, redundancy data may be included in thedata portions such that fewer than all data portions are necessary torestore the encrypted data set.

It will be understood that the AoNT may be applied to encryption keysused to encrypt the data portions following parsing and splitting eitherin place of or in addition to the encryption and AoNT of the respectiveencryption key corresponding to the data set prior to parsing andsplitting. Likewise, AoNT may be applied to splitting keys.

In one embodiment of the present invention, encryption keys, splittingkeys, or both as used in accordance with the present invention may befurther encrypted using, for example, a workgroup key in order toprovide an extra level of security to a secured data set.

In one embodiment of the present invention, an audit module may beprovided that tracks whenever the secure data parser is invoked to splitdata.

FIG. 36 illustrates possible options 3600 for using the components ofthe secure data parser in accordance with the invention. Eachcombination of options is outlined below and labeled with theappropriate step numbers from FIG. 36. The secure data parser may bemodular in nature, allowing for any known algorithm to be used withineach of the function blocks shown in FIG. 36. For example, other keysplitting (e.g., secret sharing) algorithms such as Blakely may be usedin place of Shamir, or the AES encryption could be replaced by otherknown encryption algorithms such as Triple DES. The labels shown in theexample of FIG. 36 merely depict one possible combination of algorithmsfor use in one embodiment of the invention. It should be understood thatany suitable algorithm or combination of algorithms may be used in placeof the labeled algorithms.

1) 3610, 3612, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619

Using previously encrypted data at step 3610, the data may be eventuallysplit into a predefined number of shares. If the split algorithmrequires a key, a split encryption key may be generated at step 3612using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator. Thesplit encryption key may optionally be transformed using an All orNothing Transform (AoNT) into a transform split key at step 3614 beforebeing key split to the predefined number of shares with fault toleranceat step 3615. The data may then be split into the predefined number ofshares at step 3616. A fault tolerant scheme may be used at step 3617 toallow for regeneration of the data from less than the total number ofshares. Once the shares are created, authentication/integrityinformation may be embedded into the shares at step 3618. Each share maybe optionally post-encrypted at step 3619.

2) 3111, 3612, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619

In some embodiments, the input data may be encrypted using an encryptionkey provided by a user or an external system. The external key isprovided at step 3611. For example, the key may be provided from anexternal key store. If the split algorithm requires a key, the splitencryption key may be generated using a cryptographically securepseudo-random number generator at step 3612. The split key mayoptionally be transformed using an All or Nothing Transform (AoNT) intoa transform split encryption key at step 3614 before being key split tothe predefined number of shares with fault tolerance at step 3615. Thedata is then split to a predefined number of shares at step 3616. Afault tolerant scheme may be used at step 3617 to allow for regenerationof the data from less than the total number of shares. Once the sharesare created, authentication/integrity information may be embedded intothe shares at step 3618. Each share may be optionally post-encrypted atstep 3619.

3) 3612, 3613, 3614, 3615, 3612, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619

In some embodiments, an encryption key may be generated using acryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator at step 3612 totransform the data. Encryption of the data using the generatedencryption key may occur at step 3613. The encryption key may optionallybe transformed using an All or Nothing Transform (AoNT) into a transformencryption key at step 3614. The transform encryption key and/orgenerated encryption key may then be split into the predefined number ofshares with fault tolerance at step 3615. If the split algorithmrequires a key, generation of the split encryption key using acryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator may occur atstep 3612. The split key may optionally be transformed using an All orNothing Transform (AoNT) into a transform split encryption key at step3614 before being key split to the predefined number of shares withfault tolerance at step 3615. The data may then be split into apredefined number of shares at step 3616. A fault tolerant scheme may beused at step 3617 to allow for regeneration of the data from less thanthe total number of shares. Once the shares are created,authentication/integrity information will be embedded into the shares atstep 3618. Each share may then be optionally post-encrypted at step3619.

4) 3612, 3614, 3615, 3616, 3617, 3618, 3619

In some embodiments, the data may be split into a predefined number ofshares. If the split algorithm requires a key, generation of the splitencryption key using a cryptographically secure pseudo-random numbergenerator may occur at step 3612. The split key may optionally betransformed using an All or Nothing Transform (AoNT) into a transformedsplit key at step 3614 before being key split into the predefined numberof shares with fault tolerance at step 3615. The data may then be splitat step 3616. A fault tolerant scheme may be used at step 3617 to allowfor regeneration of the data from less than the total number of shares.Once the shares are created, authentication/integrity information may beembedded into the shares at step 3618. Each share may be optionallypost-encrypted at step 3619.

Although the above four combinations of options are preferably used insome embodiments of the invention, any other suitable combinations offeatures, steps, or options may be used with the secure data parser inother embodiments.

The secure data parser may offer flexible data protection byfacilitating physical separation. Data may be first encrypted, thensplit into shares with “m of n” fault tolerance. This allows forregeneration of the original information when less than the total numberof shares is available. For example, some shares may be lost orcorrupted in transmission. The lost or corrupted shares may be recreatedfrom fault tolerance or integrity information appended to the shares, asdiscussed in more detail below.

In order to create the shares, a number of keys are optionally utilizedby the secure data parser. These keys may include one or more of thefollowing:

Pre-encryption key: When pre-encryption of the shares is selected, anexternal key may be passed to the secure data parser. This key may begenerated and stored externally in a key store (or other location) andmay be used to optionally encrypt data prior to data splitting.

Split encryption key: This key may be generated internally and used bythe secure data parser to encrypt the data prior to splitting. This keymay then be stored securely within the shares using a key splitalgorithm.

Split session key: This key is not used with an encryption algorithm;rather, it may be used to key the data partitioning algorithms whenrandom splitting is selected. When a random split is used, a splitsession key may be generated internally and used by the secure dataparser to partition the data into shares. This key may be storedsecurely within the shares using a key splitting algorithm.

Post encryption key: When post encryption of the shares is selected, anexternal key may be passed to the secure data parser and used to postencrypt the individual shares. This key may be generated and storedexternally in a key store or other suitable location.

In some embodiments, when data is secured using the secure data parserin this way, the information may only be reassembled provided that allof the required shares and external encryption keys are present.

FIG. 37 shows illustrative overview process 3700 for using the securedata parser of the present invention in some embodiments. As describedabove, two well-suited functions for secure data parser 3706 may includeencryption 3702 and backup 3704. As such, secure data parser 3706 may beintegrated with a RAID or backup system or a hardware or softwareencryption engine in some embodiments.

The primary key processes associated with secure data parser 3706 mayinclude one or more of pre-encryption process 3708, encrypt/transformprocess 3710, key secure process 3712, parse/distribute process 3714,fault tolerance process 3716, share authentication process 3716, andpost-encryption process 3720. These processes may be executed in severalsuitable orders or combinations, as detailed in FIG. 36. The combinationand order of processes used may depend on the particular application oruse, the level of security desired, whether optional pre-encryption,post-encryption, or both, are desired, the redundancy desired, thecapabilities or performance of an underlying or integrated system, orany other suitable factor or combination of factors.

The output of illustrative process 3700 may be two or more shares 3722.As described above, data may be distributed to each of these sharesrandomly (or pseudo-randomly) in some embodiments. In other embodiments,a deterministic algorithm (or some suitable combination of random,pseudo-random, and deterministic algorithms) may be used.

In addition to the individual protection of information assets, there issometimes a requirement to share information among different groups ofusers or communities of interest. It may then be necessary to eithercontrol access to the individual shares within that group of users or toshare credentials among those users that would only allow members of thegroup to reassemble the shares. To this end, a workgroup key may bedeployed to group members in some embodiments of the invention. Theworkgroup key should be protected and kept confidential, as compromiseof the workgroup key may potentially allow those outside the group toaccess information. Some systems and methods for workgroup keydeployment and protection are discussed below.

The workgroup key concept allows for enhanced protection of informationassets by encrypting key information stored within the shares. Once thisoperation is performed, even if all required shares and external keysare discovered, an attacker has no hope of recreating the informationwithout access to the workgroup key.

FIG. 38 shows illustrative block diagram 3800 for storing key and datacomponents within the shares. In the example of diagram 3800, theoptional pre-encrypt and post-encrypt steps are omitted, although thesesteps may be included in other embodiments.

The simplified process to split the data includes encrypting the datausing encryption key 3804 at encryption stage 3802. Portions ofencryption key 3804 may then be split and stored within shares 3810 inaccordance with the present invention. Portions of split encryption key3806 may also be stored within shares 3810. Using the split encryptionkey, data 3808 is then split and stored in shares 3810.

In order to restore the data, split encryption key 3806 may be retrievedand restored in accordance with the present invention. The splitoperation may then be reversed to restore the ciphertext. Encryption key3804 may also be retrieved and restored, and the ciphertext may then bedecrypted using the encryption key.

When a workgroup key is utilized, the above process may be changedslightly to protect the encryption key with the workgroup key. Theencryption key may then be encrypted with the workgroup key prior tobeing stored within the shares. The modified steps are shown inillustrative block diagram 3900 of FIG. 39.

The simplified process to split the data using a workgroup key includesfirst encrypting the data using the encryption key at stage 3902. Theencryption key may then be encrypted with the workgroup key at stage3904. The encryption key encrypted with the workgroup key may then besplit into portions and stored with shares 3912. Split key 3908 may alsobe split and stored in shares 3912. Finally, portions of data 3910 aresplit and stored in shares 3912 using split key 3908.

In order to restore the data, the split key may be retrieved andrestored in accordance with the present invention. The split operationmay then be reversed to restore the ciphertext in accordance with thepresent invention. The encryption key (which was encrypted with theworkgroup key) may be retrieved and restored. The encryption key maythen be decrypted using the workgroup key. Finally, the ciphertext maybe decrypted using the encryption key.

There are several secure methods for deploying and protecting workgroupkeys. The selection of which method to use for a particular applicationdepends on a number of factors. These factors may include security levelrequired, cost, convenience, and the number of users in the workgroup.Some commonly used techniques used in some embodiments are providedbelow:

Hardware-Based Key Storage

Hardware-based solutions generally provide the strongest guarantees forthe security of encryption/decryption keys in an encryption system.Examples of hardware-based storage solutions include tamper-resistantkey token devices which store keys in a portable device (e.g.,smartcard/dongle), or non-portable key storage peripherals. Thesedevices are designed to prevent easy duplication of key material byunauthorized parties. Keys may be generated by a trusted authority anddistributed to users, or generated within the hardware. Additionally,many key storage systems provide for multi-factor authentication, whereuse of the keys requires access both a physical object (token) and apassphrase or biometric.

Software-Based Key Storage

While dedicated hardware-based storage may be desirable forhigh-security deployments or applications, other deployments may electto store keys directly on local hardware (e.g., disks, RAM ornon-volatile RAM stores such as USB drives). This provides a lower levelof protection against insider attacks, or in instances where an attackeris able to directly access the encryption machine.

To secure keys on disk, software-based key management often protectskeys by storing them in encrypted form under a key derived from acombination of other authentication metrics, including: passwords andpassphrases, presence of other keys (e.g., from a hardware-basedsolution), biometrics, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Thelevel of security provided by such techniques may range from therelatively weak key protection mechanisms provided by some operatingsystems (e.g., MS Windows and Linux), to more robust solutionsimplemented using multi-factor authentication.

The secure data parser of the present invention may be advantageouslyused in a number of applications and technologies. For example, emailsystem, RAID systems, video broadcasting systems, database systems, tapebackup systems, or any other suitable system may have the secure dataparser integrated at any suitable level. As previously discussed, itwill be understand that the secure data parser may also be integratedfor protection and fault tolerance of any type of data in motion throughany transport medium, including, for example, wired, wireless, orphysical transport mediums. As one example, voice over Internet protocol(VoIP) applications may make use of the secure data parser of thepresent invention to solve problems relating to echoes and delays thatare commonly found in VoIP. The need for network retry on droppedpackets may be eliminated by using fault tolerance, which guaranteespacket delivery even with the loss of a predetermined number of shares.Packets of data (e.g., network packets) may also be efficiently splitand restored “on-the-fly” with minimal delay and buffering, resulting ina comprehensive solution for various types of data in motion. The securedata parser may act on network data packets, network voice packets, filesystem data blocks, or any other suitable unit of information. Inaddition to being integrated with a VoIP application, the secure dataparser may be integrated with a file-sharing application (e.g., apeer-to-peer file-sharing application), a video broadcastingapplication, an electronic voting or polling application (which mayimplement an electronic voting protocol and blind signatures, such asthe Sensus protocol), an email application, or any other networkapplication that may require or desire secure communication.

In some embodiments, support for network data in motion may be providedby the secure data parser of the present invention in two distinctphases—a header generation phase and a data partitioning phase.Simplified header generation process 4000 and simplified datapartitioning process 4010 are shown in FIGS. 40A and 40B, respectively.One or both of these processes may be performed on network packets, filesystem blocks, or any other suitable information.

In some embodiments, header generation process 4000 may be performed onetime at the initiation of a network packet stream. At step 4002, arandom (or pseudo-random) split encryption key, K, may be generated. Thesplit encryption key, K, may then be optionally encrypted (e.g., usingthe workgroup key described above) at AES key wrap step 4004. Althoughan AES key wrap may be used in some embodiments, any suitable keyencryption or key wrap algorithm may be used in other embodiments. AESkey wrap step 4004 may operate on the entire split encryption key, K, orthe split encryption key may be parsed into several blocks (e.g., 64-bitblocks). AES key wrap step 4004 may then operate on blocks of the splitencryption key, if desired.

At step 4006, a secret sharing algorithm (e.g., Shamir) may be used tosplit the split encryption key, K, into key shares. Each key share maythen be embedded into one of the output shares (e.g., in the shareheaders). Finally, a share integrity block and (optionally) apost-authentication tag (e.g., MAC) may be appended to the header blockof each share. Each header block may be designed to fit within a singledata packet.

After header generation is complete (e.g., using simplified headergeneration process 4000), the secure data parser may enter the datapartitioning phase using simplified data splitting process 4010. Eachincoming data packet or data block in the stream is encrypted using thesplit encryption key, K, at step 4012. At step 4014, share integrityinformation (e.g., a hash H) may be computed on the resulting ciphertextfrom step 4012. For example, a SHA-256 hash may be computed. At step4106, the data packet or data block may then be partitioned into two ormore data shares using one of the data splitting algorithms describedabove in accordance with the present invention. In some embodiments, thedata packet or data block may be split so that each data share containsa substantially random distribution of the encrypted data packet or datablock. The integrity information (e.g., hash H) may then be appended toeach data share. An optional post-authentication tag (e.g., MAC) mayalso be computed and appended to each data share in some embodiments.

Each data share may include metadata, which may be necessary to permitcorrect reconstruction of the data blocks or data packets. Thisinformation may be included in the share header. The metadata mayinclude such information as cryptographic key shares, key identities,share nonces, signatures/MAC values, and integrity blocks. In order tomaximize bandwidth efficiency, the metadata may be stored in a compactbinary format.

For example, in some embodiments, the share header includes a cleartextheader chunk, which is not encrypted and may include such elements asthe Shamir key share, per-session nonce, per-share nonce, keyidentifiers (e.g., a workgroup key identifier and a post-authenticationkey identifier). The share header may also include an encrypted headerchunk, which is encrypted with the split encryption key. An integrityheader chunk, which may include integrity checks for any number of theprevious blocks (e.g., the previous two blocks) may also be included inthe header. Any other suitable values or information may also beincluded in the share header.

As shown in illustrative share format 4100 of FIG. 41, header block 4102may be associated with two or more output blocks 4104. Each headerblock, such as header block 4102, may be designed to fit within a singlenetwork data packet. In some embodiments, after header block 4102 istransmitted from a first location to a second location, the outputblocks may then be transmitted. Alternatively, header block 4102 andoutput blocks 4104 may be transmitted at the same time in parallel. Thetransmission may occur over one or more similar or dissimilarcommunications paths.

Each output block may include data portion 4106 andintegrity/authenticity portion 4108. As described above, each data sharemay be secured using a share integrity portion including share integrityinformation (e.g., a SHA-256 hash) of the encrypted, pre-partitioneddata. To verify the integrity of the outputs blocks at recovery time,the secure data parser may compare the share integrity blocks of eachshare and then invert the split algorithm. The hash of the recovereddata may then be verified against the share hash.

As previously mentioned, in some embodiments of the present invention,the secure date parser may be used in conjunction with a tape backupsystem. For example, an individual tape may be used as a node (i.e.,portion/share) in accordance with the present invention. Any othersuitable arrangement may be used. For example, a tape library orsubsystem, which is made up of two or more tapes, may be treated as asingle node.

Redundancy may also be used with the tapes in accordance with thepresent invention. For example, if a data set is apportioned among fourtapes (i.e., portions/shares), then two of the four tapes may benecessary in order to restore the original data. It will be understoodthat any suitable number of nodes (i.e., less than the total number ofnodes) may be required to restore the original data in accordance withthe redundancy features of the present invention. This substantiallyincreases the probability for restoration when one or more tapes expire.

Each tape may also be digitally protected with a SHA-256, HMAC hashvalue, any other suitable value, or any combination thereof to insureagainst tampering. Should any data on the tape or the hash value change,that tape would not be a candidate for restoration and any minimumrequired number of tapes of the remaining tapes would be used to restorethe data.

In conventional tape backup systems, when a user calls for data to bewritten to or read from a tape, the tape management system (TMS)presents a number that corresponds to a physical tape mount. This tapemount points to a physical drive where the data will be mounted. Thetape is loaded either by a human tape operator or by a tape robot in atape silo.

Under the present invention, the physical tape mount may be considered alogical mount point that points to a number of physical tapes. This notonly increases the data capacity but also improves the performancebecause of the parallelism.

For increased performance the tape nodes may be or may include a RAIDarray of disks used for storing tape images. This allows for high-speedrestoration because the data may always be available in the protectedRAID.

In any of the foregoing embodiments, the data to be secured may bedistributed into a plurality of shares using deterministic,probabilistic, or both deterministic and probabilistic data distributiontechniques. In order to prevent an attacker from beginning a cryptoattack on any cipher block, the bits from cipher blocks may bedeterministically distributed to the shares. For example, thedistribution may be performed using the BitSegment routine, or theBlockSegment routine may be modified to allow for distribution ofportions of blocks to multiple shares. This strategy may defend againstan attacker who has accumulated less than “M” shares.

In some embodiments, a keyed secret sharing routine may be employedusing keyed information dispersal (e.g., through the use of a keyedinformation dispersal algorithm or “IDA”). The key for the keyed IDA mayalso be protected by one or more external workgroup keys, one or moreshared keys, or any combination of workgroup keys and shared keys. Inthis way, a multi-factor secret sharing scheme may be employed. Toreconstruct the data, at least “M” shares plus the workgroup key(s)(and/or shared key(s)) may be required in some embodiments. The IDA (orthe key for the IDA) may also be driven into the encryption process. Forexample, the transform may be driven into the clear text (e.g., duringthe pre-processing layer before encrypting) and may further protect theclear text before it is encrypted.

For example, in some embodiments, keyed information dispersal is used todistribute unique portions of data from a data set into two or moreshares. The keyed information dispersal may use a session key to firstencrypt the data set, to distribute unique portions of encrypted datafrom the data set into two or more encrypted data set shares, or bothencrypt the data set and distribute unique portions of encrypted datafrom the data set into the two or more encrypted data set shares. Forexample, to distribute unique portions of the data set or encrypted dataset, secret sharing (or the methods described above, such as BitSegmentor BlockSegment) may be used. The session key may then optionally betransformed (for example, using a full package transform or AoNT) andshared using, for example, secret sharing (or the keyed informationdispersal and session key).

In some embodiments, the session key may be encrypted using a shared key(e.g., a workgroup key) before unique portions of the key aredistributed or shared into two or more session key shares. Two or moreuser shares may then be formed by combining at least one encrypted dataset share and at least one session key share. In forming a user share,in some embodiments, the at least one session key share may beinterleaved into an encrypted data set share. In other embodiments, theat least one session key share may be inserted into an encrypted dataset share at a location based at least in part on the shared workgroupkey. For example, keyed information dispersal may be used to distributeeach session key share into a unique encrypted data set share to form auser share. Interleaving or inserting a session key share into anencrypted data set share at a location based at least in part on theshared workgroup may provide increased security in the face ofcryptographic attacks. In other embodiments, one or more session keyshares may be appended to the beginning or end of an encrypted data setshare to form a user share. The collection of user shares may then bestored separately on at least one data depository. The data depositoryor depositories may be located in the same physical location (forexample, on the same magnetic or tape storage device) or geographicallyseparated (for example, on physically separated servers in differentgeographic locations). To reconstruct the original data set, anauthorized set of user shares and the shared workgroup key may berequired.

Keyed information dispersal may be secure even in the face ofkey-retrieval oracles. For example, take a blockcipher E and akey-retrieval oracle for E that takes a list (X₁, Y₁), . . . , (X_(c),Y_(c)) of input/output pairs to the blockcipher, and returns a key Kthat is consistent with the input/output examples (e.g.,Y_(i)=E_(K)(X_(i)) for all i). The oracle may return the distinguishedvalue ⊥ if there is no consistent key. This oracle may model acryptanalytic attack that may recover a key from a list of input/outputexamples.

Standard blockcipher-based schemes may fail in the presence of akey-retrieval oracle. For example, CBC encryption or the CBC MAC maybecome completely insecure in the presence of a key-retrieval oracle.

If Π^(IDA) is an IDA scheme and Π^(Enc) is an encryption scheme given bya mode of operation of some blockcipher E, then (Π^(IDA), Π^(Enc))provides security in the face of a key-retrieval attack if the twoschemes, when combined with an arbitrary perfect secret-sharing scheme(PSS) as per HK1 or HK2, achieve the robust computational secret sharing(RCSS) goal, but in the model in which the adversary has a key-retrievaloracle.

If there exists an IDA scheme Π^(IDA) and an encryption scheme Π^(Enc)such that the pair of schemes provides security in the face ofkey-retrieval attacks, then one way to achieve this pair may be to havea “clever” IDA and a “dumb” encryption scheme. Another way to achievethis pair of schemes may be to have a “dumb” IDA and a “clever”encryption scheme.

To illustrate the use of a clever IDA and a dumb encryption scheme, insome embodiments, the encryption scheme may be CBC and the IDA may havea “weak privacy” property. The weak privacy property means, for example,that if the input to the IDA is a random sequence of blocks M=M₁ . . .M₁ and the adversary obtains shares from a non-authorized collection,then there is some block index i such that it is infeasible for theadversary to compute M_(i). Such a weakly-private IDA may be built byfirst applying to Man information-theoretic AoNT, such as Stinson'sAoNT, and then applying a simple IDA such as BlockSegment, or abit-efficient IDA like Rabin's scheme (e.g., Reed-Solomon encoding).

To illustrate the use of a dumb IDA and a clever encryption scheme, insome embodiments, one may use a CBC mode with double encryption insteadof single encryption. Now any IDA may be used, even replication. Havingthe key-retrieval oracle for the blockcipher would be useless to anadversary, as the adversary will be denied any singly-encipheredinput/output example.

While a clever IDA has value, it may also be inessential in somecontexts, in the sense that the “smarts” needed to provide security inthe face of a key-retrieval attack could have been “pushed” elsewhere.For example, in some embodiments, no matter how smart the IDA, and forwhatever goal is trying to be achieved with the IDA in the context ofHK1/HK2, the smarts may be pushed out of the IDA and into the encryptionscheme, being left with a fixed and dumb IDA.

Based on the above, in some embodiments, a “universally sound” cleverIDA Π^(IDA) may be used. For example, an IDA is provided such that, forall encryption schemes Π^(Enc), the pair (Π^(IDA), Π^(Enc)) universallyprovides security in the face of key-retrieval attacks.

In some embodiments, an encryption scheme is provided that is RCSSsecure in the face of a key-retrieval oracle. The scheme may beintegrated with HK1/HK2, with any IDA, to achieve security in the faceof key-retrieval. Using the new scheme may be particularly useful, forexample, for making symmetric encryption schemes more secure againstkey-retrieval attacks.

As mentioned above, classical secret-sharing notions are typicallyunkeyed. Thus, a secret is broken into shares, or reconstructed fromthem, in a way that requires neither the dealer nor the partyreconstructing the secret to hold any kind of symmetric or asymmetrickey. The secure data parser described herein, however, is optionallykeyed. The dealer may provide a symmetric key that, if used for datasharing, may be required for data recovery. The secure data parser mayuse the symmetric key to disperse or distribute unique portions of themessage to be secured into two or more shares.

The shared key may enable multi-factor or two-factor secret-sharing(2FSS). The adversary may then be required to navigate through twofundamentally different types of security in order to break the securitymechanism. For example, to violate the secret-sharing goals, theadversary (1) may need to obtain the shares of an authorized set ofplayers, and (2) may need to obtain a secret key that it should not beable to obtain (or break the cryptographic mechanism that is keyed bythat key).

In some embodiments, a new set of additional requirements is added tothe RCSS goal. The additional requirements may include the “secondfactor”—key possession. These additional requirements may be addedwithout diminishing the original set of requirements. One set ofrequirements may relate to the adversary's inability to break the schemeif it knows the secret key but does not obtain enough shares (e.g., theclassical or first-factor requirements) while the other set ofrequirements may relate to the adversary's inability to break the schemeif it does have the secret key but manages to get hold of all of theshares (e.g., the new or second-factor requirements).

In some embodiments, there may be two second-factor requirements: aprivacy requirement and an authenticity requirement. In the privacyrequirement, a game may be involved where a secret key K and a bit b areselected by the environment. The adversary now supplies a pair ofequal-length messages in the domain of the secret-sharing scheme, M₁ ⁰and M₁ ¹. The environment computes the shares of M₁ ^(b) to get a vectorof shares, S₁=(S₁ [1], . . . , S₁ [n]), and it gives the shares S₁ (allof them) to the adversary. The adversary may now choose another pair ofmessages (M₂ ⁰, M₂ ¹) and everything proceeds as before, using the samekey K and hidden bit b. The adversary's job is to output the bit b′ thatit believes to be b. The adversary privacy advantage is one less thantwice the probability that b=b′. This games captures the notion that,even learning all the shares, the adversary still cannot learn anythingabout the shared secret if it lacks the secret key.

In the authenticity requirement, a game may be involved where theenvironment chooses a secret key K and uses this in the subsequent callsto Share and Recover. Share and Recover may have their syntax modified,in some embodiments, to reflect the presence of this key. Then theadversary makes Share requests for whatever messages M₁, . . . , M_(q)it chooses in the domain of the secret-sharing scheme. In response toeach Share request it gets the corresponding n-vector of shares, S₁, . .. , S_(q). The adversary's aim is to forge a new plaintext; it wins ifit outputs a vector of shares S′ such that, when fed to the Recoveralgorithm, results in something not in {M₁, . . . , M_(q)}. This is an“integrity of plaintext” notion.

There are two approaches to achieve multi-factor secret-sharing. Thefirst is a generic approach—generic in the sense of using an underlying(R)CSS scheme in a black-box way. An authenticated-encryption scheme isused to encrypt the message that is to be CSS-shared, and then theresulting ciphertext may be shared out, for example, using a secretsharing algorithm, such as Blakely or Shamir.

A potentially more efficient approach is to allow the shared key to bethe workgroup key. Namely, (1) the randomly generated session key of the(R)CSS scheme may be encrypted using the shared key, and (2) theencryption scheme applied to the message (e.g., the file) may bereplaced by an authenticated-encryption scheme. This approach may entailonly a minimal degradation in performance.

Although some applications of the secure data parser are describedabove, it should be clearly understood that the present invention may beintegrated with any network application in order to increase security,fault-tolerance, anonymity, or any suitable combination of theforegoing.

FIG. 42 is an illustrative block diagram of a cloud computing securitysolution. System 4200, including secure data parser 4210, is coupled tocloud 4250 including cloud resources 4260. System 4200 may include anysuitable hardware, such as a computer terminal, personal computer,handheld device (e.g., PDA, Blackberry, smart phone, tablet device),cellular telephone, computer network, any other suitable hardware, orany combination thereof. Secure data parser 4210 may be integrated atany suitable level of system 4200. For example, secure data parser 4210may be integrated into the hardware and/or software of system 4200 at asufficiently back-end level such that the presence of secure data parser4210 may be substantially transparent to an end user of system 4200. Theintegration of the secure data parser within suitable systems isdescribed in greater detail above with respect to, for example, FIGS. 27and 28, and below with respect to, for example, FIGS. 57 and 58. Cloud4250 includes multiple illustrative cloud resources 4260 including, datastorage resources 4260 a and 4260 e, data service resources 4260 b and4260 g, network access control resources 4260 c and 4260 h, and highperforming computing resources 4260 d and 4260 f. Each of theseresources will be described in greater detail below with respect toFIGS. 43-47. These cloud computing resources are merely illustrative. Itshould be understood that any suitable number and type of cloudcomputing resources may be accessible from system 4200.

One advantage of cloud computing is that the user of system 4200 may beable to access multiple cloud computing resources without having toinvest in dedicated computer hardware. The user may have the ability todynamically control the number and type of cloud computing resourcesaccessible to system 4200. For example, system 4200 may be provided withon-demand storage resources in the cloud having capacities that aredynamically adjustable based on current needs. In some embodiments, oneor more software applications executed on system 4200 may couple system4200 to cloud resources 4260. For example, an Internet web browser maybe used to couple system 4200 to one or more cloud resources 4260 overthe Internet. In some embodiments, hardware integrated with or connectedto system 4200 may couple system 4200 to cloud resources 4260. In bothembodiments, secure data parser 4210 may secure communications withcloud resources 4260 and/or the data stored within cloud resources 4260.The coupling of cloud resources 4260 to system 4200 may be transparentto system 4200 or the users of system 4200 such that cloud resources4260 appear to system 4200 as local hardware resources. Furthermoreshared cloud resources 4260 may appear to system 4200 as dedicatedhardware resources.

Secure data parser 4210 may encrypt and split data such that noforensically discernable data will traverse or will be stored within thecloud. The underlying hardware components of the cloud (e.g., servers,storage devices, networks) may be geographically disbursed to ensurecontinuity of cloud resources in the event of a power grid failure,weather event or other man-made or natural event. As a result, even ifsome of the hardware components within the cloud suffer a catastrophicfailure, the cloud resources may still be accessible. Cloud resources4260 may be designed with redundancies to provide uninterrupted servicein spite of one or more hardware failures.

FIG. 43 is an illustrative block diagram of a cloud computing securitysolution for securing data in motion (i.e., during the transfer of datafrom one location to another) through the cloud. FIG. 43 shows a sendersystem 4300, which may include any suitable hardware, such as a computerterminal, personal computer, handheld device (e.g., PDA, Blackberry),cellular telephone, computer network, any other suitable hardware, orany combination thereof. Sender system 4300 is used to generate and/orstore data, which may be, for example, an email message, a binary datafile (e.g., graphics, voice, video, etc.), or both. The data is parsedand split by secure data parser 4310 in accordance with the presentinvention. The resultant data portions may be communicated over cloud4350 to recipient system 4370. Recipient system 4370 may be any suitablehardware as described above with respect to sender system 4300. Theseparate data portions may be recombined at recipient system 4370 togenerate the original data in accordance with the present invention.When traveling through cloud 4310 the data portions may be communicatedacross one or more communications paths including the Internet and/orone or more intranets, LANs, WiFi, Bluetooth, any other suitablehard-wired or wireless communications networks, or any combinationthereof. As described above with respect to FIGS. 28 and 29, theoriginal data is secured by the secure data parser even if some of thedata portions are compromised.

FIG. 44 is an illustrative block diagram of a cloud computing securitysolution for securing data services in the cloud. In this embodiment, auser 4400 may provide data services 4420 to an end user 4440 over cloud4430. Secure parser 4410 may secure the data services in accordance withthe disclosed embodiments. Data service 4420 may be any suitableapplication or software service that is accessible over cloud 4430. Forexample, data service 4420 may be a web-based application implemented aspart of a service-oriented architecture (SOA) system. Data service 4420may be stored and executed on one or more systems within cloud 4430. Theabstraction provided by this cloud computing implementation allows dataservice 4420 to appear as a virtualized resource to end user 4440irrespective of the underlying hardware resources. Secure parser 4410may secure data in motion between data service 4420 and end user 4440.Secure parser 4410 may also secure stored data associated with dataservice 4420. The stored data associated with data service 4420 may besecured within the system or systems implementing data service 4420and/or within separate secure cloud data storage devices, which will bedescribed in greater detail below. Although data service 4420 and otherportions of FIG. 44 are shown outside of cloud 4430, it should beunderstood that any of these elements may be incorporated within cloud4430.

FIG. 45 is an illustrative block diagram of a cloud computing securitysolution for securing data storage resources in the cloud. System 4500,including secure data parser 4510, is coupled to cloud 4550 whichincludes data storage resources 4560. Secure data parser 4510 may beused for parsing and splitting data among one or more data storageresources 4560. Each data storage resource 4560 may represent a one ormore networked storage devices. These storage devices may be assigned toa single user/system of may be shared by multiple users/systems. Thesecurity provided by secure data parser 4510 may allow data frommultiple users/systems to securely co-exist on the same storage devices.The abstraction provided by this cloud computing implementation allowsdata storage resources 4560 to appear as a single virtualized storageresource to system 4500 irrespective of the number and location of theunderlying data storage resources. When data is written to or read fromdata storage resources 4560, secure data parser 4510 may split andrecombine the data in a way that may be transparent to the end user. Inthis manner, an end user may be able to access to dynamically scalablestorage on demand

Data storage in the cloud using secure data parser 4510 is secure,resilient, persistent, and private. Secure data parser 4510 secures thedata by ensuring that no forensically discernable data traverses thecloud or is stored in a single storage device. The cloud storage systemis resilient because of the redundancy offered by the secure data parser(i.e., fewer than all separated portions of data are needed toreconstruct the original data). Storing the separated portions withinmultiple storage devices and/or within multiple data storage resources4560 ensures that the data may be reconstructed even if one or more ofthe storage devices fail or are inaccessible. The cloud storage systemis persistent because loss of a storage device within data storageresources 4560 has no impact on the end user. If one storage devicefails, the data portions that were stored within that storage device maybe rebuilt at another storage device without having to expose the data.Furthermore, the storage resources 4560 (or even the multiple networkedstorage devices that make up a data storage resource 4560) may begeographically dispersed to limit the risk of multiple failures.Finally, the data stored in the cloud may be kept private using one ormore keys. As described above, data may be assigned to a user or acommunity of interest by unique keys such that only that user orcommunity will have access to the data.

Data storage in the cloud using the secure data parser may also providea performance boost over traditional local or networked storage. Thethroughput of the system may be improved by writing and reading separateportions of data to multiple storage devices in parallel. This increasein throughput may allow slower, less expensive storage devices to beused without substantially affecting the overall speed of the storagesystem.

FIG. 46 is an illustrative block diagram for securing network accessusing a secure data parser in accordance with the disclosed embodiments.Secure data parser 4610 may be used with network access control block4620 to control access to network resources. As illustrated in FIG. 46,network access control block 4620 may be used to provide secure networkcommunications between user 4600 and end user 4640. In some embodiments,network access control block 4620 may provide secure network access forone or more network resources in the cloud (e.g., cloud 4250, FIG. 42).Authorized users (e.g., user 4600 and end user 4640) may be providedwith group-wide keys that provide the users with the ability to securelycommunicate over a network and/or to access secure network resources.The secured network resources will not respond unless the propercredentials (e.g., group keys) are presented. This may prevent commonnetworking attacks such as, for example, denial of service attacks, portscanning attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and playback attacks.

In addition to providing security for data at rest stored within acommunications network and security for data in motion through thecommunications network, network access control block 4620 may be usedwith secure data parser 4620 to share information among different groupsof users or communities of interest. Collaboration groups may be set upto participate as secure communities of interest on secure virtualnetworks. A workgroup key may be deployed to group members to providemembers of the group access to the network and networked resources.Systems and methods for workgroup key deployments have been discussedabove.

FIG. 47 is an illustrative block diagram for securing access to highperformance computing resources using a secure data parser in accordancewith the disclosed embodiments. Secure data parser 4710 may be used toprovide secure access to high performance computing resources 4720. Asillustrated in FIG. 47 end user 4740 may access high performancecomputing resources 4720. In some embodiments, secure data parser 4710may provide secure access to high performance resources in the cloud(e.g., cloud 4250, FIG. 42). High performance computing resources may belarge computer servers or server farms. These high performance computingresources may provide flexible, scalable, and configurable data servicesand data storage services to users.

In accordance with another embodiment, a secure data parser may be usedto secure data access using virtual machines. A hypervisor, alsoreferred to as a virtual machine monitor (VMM) is a computer system thatallows multiple virtual machines to run on a single host computer. FIG.48 shows an illustrative block diagram including hypervisor 4800 and aseries of virtual machines 4810 running on hypervisor 4800. Hypervisor4800 runs a fundamental operating system (e.g., Microsoft Windows® andLinux). Virtual machines 4810 may be firewalled off from the fundamentaloperating system such that attacks (e.g., viruses, worms, hacks, etc.)on the fundamental operating system do not affect virtual machines 4810.One or more secure data parsers may be integrated with hypervisor 4800to secure virtual machines 4810. In particular, using the secure dataparser, virtual machines 4810 may securely communicate with one or moreservers or end users. In accordance with this embodiment, secure dataaccess may be deployed to users by providing the users with securevirtual machine images. This embodiment may allow for on demandinformation sharing while assuring confidentiality and integrity of thedata.

FIGS. 49 and 50 show alternative embodiments for integrating a securedata parser with a hypervisor. In FIG. 49, secure data parser 4930 isimplemented above hypervisor 4920. For example, secure data parser 4930may be implemented as a software application or module operating onhypervisor 4920. In some embodiments, secure data parser 4930 may beimplemented by a virtual machine running on hypervisor 4920. A virtualmachine running on hypervisor 4920 may securely couple to server 4940and end users 4950 using secure data parser 4930. In FIG. 50, securedata parser 5030 is implemented below hypervisor 5020. For example,secure data parser 5030 may be implemented within the hardware ofhypervisor 5020. The virtual machine running on hypervisor 5020 maysecurely communicate with server 5040 and end users 5050 using securedata parser 5030.

In accordance with another embodiment, the secure data parser may beused to secure orthogonal division multiplexing (OFDM) communicationschannels. OFDM is a multiplexing scheme that is used for widebanddigital communication. Broadband wireless standards (e.g., WiMAX andLTE) and broadband over power line (BPL) use OFDM. OFDM is uniquebecause all adjacent channels are truly orthogonal. This eliminatescrosstalk, cancellation, and induction of noise. Currently, in theseOFDM standards, data is transmitted across a single OFDM communicationschannel. The secure data parser may secure OFDM communications bysplitting data amongst multiple OFDM communications channels. Asdescribed above, splitting data amongst multiple data channels using thesecure data parser secures the data because only a portion of the datais transmitted over each channel. As an additional benefit, the securedata parser may simultaneously transmit multiple data portions onmultiple data channels. These simultaneous transmissions may increasethe effective bandwidth of the data transmission. Additionally oralternatively, the secure data parser may transmit the same dataportions on multiple data channels. This redundant transmissiontechnique may increase transmission reliability. FIG. 51 is anillustrative block diagram for securing an OFDM communications network.As illustrated in FIG. 51 end user 5110 may use secure data parser 5120to send data over OFDM network 5140 to end user 5150. OFDM network 5140may be a broadband over wireless network, a broadband over power linenetwork, or any other suitable OFDM network.

In accordance with some other embodiments, the secure data parser may beused to protect critical infrastructure controls including, for example,the power grid. Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) is thenext-generation Internet Protocol. IPv6 has a larger address space thanthe current Internet Protocol. When implemented, IPv6 will allow moredevices to be directly accessed over the Internet. It is important thatthe controls of critical infrastructure be restricted to limit access toauthorized individuals. As described above, the secure data parser maylimit access to network resources to authorized users and groups.Critical systems may be protected using the “two man rule” whereby atleast two users would need to provide their respective keys to accessthe critical systems. FIG. 52 is an illustrative block diagram forsecuring the power grid. As illustrated in FIG. 52 user 5210 may usesecure data parser 5220 to provide secure access to power grid 5240 forend user end user 5250.

In some embodiments, power grid systems may be coupled to the Internetusing broadband over power line networks to eliminate network cablingand associated equipment of typical communications networks. Couplingpower grid systems to the Internet may enable smart grid technologiesthat allow for more efficient use of power by reporting usage in realtime. As another benefit, high powered computing resources and/or datastorage facilities may be installed at Internet connected powermonitoring facilities. These resources may provide reliable storage andprocessing nodes for protecting data in the cloud.

FIG. 53 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a hostsystem 5300. Host system 5300 includes motherboard 5310 having adaughter card 5301. Daughter card 5301 may have an interface connector5302 for coupling to motherboard 5310 via socket 5303. So even thoughdaughter card 5301 is not illustratively depicted as socketed, it shouldbe understood that for operation of daughter card 5301, interfaceconnector 5302 may be slotted in socket 5303.

Motherboard 5310 may have a central processing unit (“CPU”) 5315, whichmay include one or more processor cores. Additionally, it should beunderstood that a motherboard may have more than one CPU, as well aschipset chips among other components not illustratively depicted forpurposes of clarity and not limitation. Additionally, motherboard 5310may have a socket 5317 to which a memory module 5316 may be inserted.For purposes of clarity by way of example and not limitation, it shallbe assumed that memory module 5316 is system memory coupled to CPU 5315by one or more buses, including a system bus not illustratively shownfor purposes of clarity and not limitation. In other embodiments, systemmemory may be directly attached to motherboard 5310.

Daughter card 5301 may include a reconfigurable processor unit (“RPU”)5320 in order to provide acceleration for processing data in comparisonto processing data in software. RPUs are described in additional detailin U.S. Pat. Nos. 7,856,545 and 7,856,546, each of which is incorporatedby reference herein in its entirety.

Data may be provided as input as generally indicated by arrow 5304 frommotherboard 5310. More particularly, data may be read from memory module5316, used for system memory, for input to RPU 5320. After such data isprocessed by RPU 5320, such processed data may be provided as outputfrom daughter card 5301 to system memory 5316 as generally indicated byoutput arrow 5305. However, this may impose a burden on resources ofmotherboard 5310 not imposed in a host system 5400 illustrativelydepicted in FIG. 54.

FIG. 54 is a block diagram depicting another exemplary embodiment of ahost system 5400. Host system 5400 includes computer motherboard 5310having a daughter card 5401. As motherboard 5310 is the same in bothFIGS. 53 and 54, the above description of motherboard 5310 is notrepeated for purposes of clarity.

Daughter card 5401 likewise has an RPU 5320 and an interface connector5302. However, rather than unidirectional input and output traffic asillustratively depicted in FIG. 53 with arrows 5304 and 5305,respectively, traffic to and from daughter card 5401 may bebidirectional as generally indicated by arrow 5304, as there is lesstraffic between motherboard 5310 and daughter card 5401 in host system5400 than in host system 5300. However, it should be understood thateither bidirectional or unidirectional traffic as described herein maybe used in host system 5400.

Additionally, daughter card 5401 includes a switch 5402, a networkinterface 5410, and transceiver modules 5420. Even though fourtransceiver modules 5420 are illustratively depicted, it should beunderstood that fewer or more transceivers may be used. Transceivermodules 5420 are for bidirectional traffic as generally indicated witharrows 5315. Furthermore, even though transceivers are described, itshould be understood that separate receivers and transmitters may beused.

An accelerator system is described below in terms of daughter card 5401,for reasons that will become more apparent from the followingdescription.

An accelerator system described below is employed for networking and/orstorage applications. For purposes of clarity by way of example notlimitation, a secure data storage application is described. However, itwill be appreciated that other uses of daughter card 5401 may beemployed. For example, daughter card 5401 may be utilized to implement asecure network, functions such as data compression, and/or viruschecking, in addition to or apart from secure data storage. In anembodiment, daughter card 5401 provides secure data parser-enabledcommunications for applications over a network. In such embodiments,daughter card 5401 may be included in cryptographic system 100 (FIG. 1).For example, daughter card 5401 may be installed in user system 105,vendor system 120, or any suitable combination thereof to enable securecommunication between user system 105 and vendor system 120. In anotherembodiment, daughter card 5401 provides secure data parser-enabled cloudstorage. In such embodiments, daughter card 5401 may be included insystem 4200 (FIG. 42), system 4300 (FIG. 43), system 4500 (FIG. 45), thecloud computing security solutions illustrated in FIG. 44, the systemfor securing network access using a secure data parser illustrated inFIG. 46, the system for securing access to high performance computingresources illustrated in FIG. 47, the systems that integrate a securedata parser with a hypervisor illustrated in FIG. 49 and FIG. 50, thesystem for securing OFDM communications channels illustrated in FIG. 51,and the system for securing the power grid illustrated in FIG. 52. Forexample, daughter card 5401 may provide functionality of secure dataparser 4210, secure data parser 4310, secure data parser 4410, securedata parser 4510, secure data parser 4610, secure data parser 4710,secure data parser 4930, secure data parser 5030, secure data parser5120, secure data parser 5220, hypervisor 4920, hypervisor 5020, or anysuitable functionality as described herein. Other uses should beapparent from the following description.

As described below in additional detail, for secure data storage,relatively large amounts of data may be processed before transferringover a link, whether a network link and/or a storage link. Suchprocessing may include functions such as encryption, decryption,authentication, error-checking, addition of an error code, data parsing,and/or addition of redundancy, among other types of data processing. Inan embodiment, these functions may include one or more types ofencryption 3018 that may provide encryption of data at the secure dataparser layer 3026 of FIG. 30. In an embodiment, these functions mayinclude one or more of the processes associated with secure data parser3706 as illustrated in FIG. 37. For example, these functions may includeone or more of pre-encryption process 3708, encrypt/transform process3710, key secure process 3712, or parser/distribute process 3714associated with secure data parser 3706. In an embodiment, thesefunctions may include one or more of the processes associated with cloudcomputing described with respect to FIGS. 42-52. For example, thesefunctions may include one or more of the processes associated withsecure data parser 4210, secure data parser 4310, secure data parser4410, secure data parser 4510, secure data parser 4610, secure dataparser 4710, secure data parser 4930, secure data parser 5030, securedata parser 5120, secure data parser 5220, hypervisor 4920, hypervisor5020, or any suitable combination thereof. Such data processing may becomputationally or otherwise motherboard resource intensive, and thusoffloading such processing to other hardware, such as an RPU 5320, maycause a host system, such as host system 5400, to operate faster. Forexample, it should be appreciated that by not tying up a general-purposeCPU 5315 by attempting to do such data processing entirely in software,use of an RPU 5320 may accelerate not only such data processing, butalso may free up motherboard resources for other tasks.

As described below in additional detail, embodiments of acceleratorsystems are provided in order to enhance throughput while reducing loadon one or more motherboard resources. Again, for purposes of clarity byway of example not limitation, it shall be assumed that the dataprocessing operations are performed for a secure data storageapplication. Such secure data storage application may includeencrypting, decrypting, data parsing, and data concatenating. However,it should be understood that the described embodiments of acceleratorsystems may be used for applications other than secure data storage, aswell as other forms of secure data storage.

In an embodiment, daughter card 5401 may be a Peripheral ComponentInterconnect Express (“PCIe”) card that interfaces via a PCIe bus to aCPU 5315 of a motherboard 5310, or more particularly a main CPU of amotherboard 5310. In an embodiment, a 16-lane PCIe bus is used; however,other sizes and types of busing may be used.

Motherboard 5310 may be a server or workstation motherboard having aSouthbridge chip (“Southbridge”) interconnected to a PCIe bus. SuchSouthbridge may be interconnected to a Northbridge chip (“Northbridge”),where such Northbridge is interconnected to a main CPU and systemmemory. In other server or workstation motherboards, the Northbridge maybe eliminated, and the Southbridge may communicate directly with themain CPU. Furthermore, a motherboard may include more than oneNorthbridge and/or Southbridge, as well as more than one CPU.

It should be appreciated that there is a limited amount of bandwidth ina Northbridge and/or Southbridge in any of these system architectures.Furthermore, there is limited bandwidth of one or more buses, includinga system bus, interconnecting for example a main CPU with a Northbridgeand/or Southbridge. Bandwidth of a PCIe bus interfacing daughter card5401 to CPU 5315 is also a limited resource.

Use of daughter card 5401, as described below in additional detail, maykeep a significant amount of high-bandwidth data traffic local to suchcard so as to reduce load, for example, on a main CPU, a Southbridge, aNorthbridge, and/or other motherboard system resources. Additionally, itshould be appreciated that daughter card 5401 may use a readilyavailable interface, such as PCIe or any other readily availableinterface, so as to be used with a readily available server orworkstation motherboard.

FIG. 55 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of anaccelerator system 5500. Accelerator system 5500 is a data processingsystem. With simultaneous reference to FIGS. 54 and 55, acceleratorsystem 5500 is further described.

Accelerator system 5500 may be located on daughter card 5401, aspreviously described. Accelerator system 5500 includes RPU 5320, switch5402, network interface 5410, and transceiver modules 5420. For purposesof clarity by way of example and not limitation, an exemplary embodimentof each of these components of accelerator system 5500 is describedbelow. However, it will be appreciated that these and/or othercomponents may be used in accordance with the following description.

Even though a daughter card 5401 is described as having RPU 5320, switch5402, network interface 5410, and transceiver modules 5420, it should beunderstood that in other embodiments a System-on-Chip (“SoC”) may beused, as for example an FPGA may include many or all of the resources ofdaughter card 5401. Thus, the number of chips on daughter card 5401 maybe significantly reduced. Furthermore, in still other embodiments,daughter card 5401 may be socketed to a CPU socket or bus socket otherthan a peripheral socket, such as a PCIe socket, or accelerator system5500 may be directly mounted on motherboard 5310. However, for purposesof clarity and not limitation, a daughter card 5401 embodiment isdescribed below, even though other embodiments may be used.

Switch 5402 may be a PCIe switch having multiple ports. These ports maybe configured with any of a variety of different data widths and may beused to move data from any port to any other port without interventionby a main CPU 5315 of a motherboard 5310. One of such ports of such PCIeswitch may be interconnected to a connector, such as socket 5303, whichattaches to a PCIe bus on a motherboard 5310 when daughter card 5401 isplugged in. Such a port may be referred to as an upstream port in a bushierarchy, because such port is for coupling to a main CPU 5315controlling such PCIe bus, namely such port or bus associated therewithis on a host-system side.

In FIG. 55, a block labeled 5511 illustratively depicts such an upstreamport. In an embodiment, upstream port 5511 may be a PCIe Generation 2(“Gen2”) by 16 lane port. Other PCIe ports 5512 of switch 5402 may bereferred to as downstream ports, because such other ports 5512interconnect to devices farther away from such main CPU 5315 in a bushierarchy than such upstream port 5511.

In an embodiment, such downstream ports 5512 may each be PCIe Gen2 by 8lane ports. In this exemplary embodiment, four PCIe ports of switch 5402are illustratively depicted; however, it should be understood that aminimum of three ports may be used in another embodiment, where there isonly one PCIe downstream port 5512 for communication with PLD 5501. PLD5501 may include hard macros or soft cores of PCIe interface portscoupled to downstream PCIe ports 5512 of switch 5402. It should beunderstood that even though the terms “upstream” port and “downstream”port are used herein, it should be understood that both types of suchports are bidirectional. The term “hard macro” generally refers todedicated circuitry, and the term “soft core” generally refers to acircuit instantiated in programmable logic through use of aconfiguration bitstream.

The main CPU, such as CPU 5315, of motherboard 5310, may enumerate aPCIe bus, namely determine all devices connected to such PCIe bus andsome characteristics thereof. After CPU 5315 has acquired suchinformation, other information, including commands and/or data, may betransferred to or from any of such devices connected to such PCIe bus.Additionally, switch 5402 may include peer-to-peer routing, for examplerouting data from one downstream device to another downstream devicethrough switch 5402 without having to go through CPU 5315. In anembodiment, a PEX8648 switch device from PLX Technology, Inc., ofSunnyvale, Calif., is used as PCIe switch 5402; however, it should beappreciated that this or another similar device may likewise be used.

An accelerator, such as RPU 5320, may include a Programmable LogicDevice 5501, such as a Field Programmable Gate Array (“FPGA”) or otherintegrated circuit having field programmable logic for instantiation ofcircuitry by programming with a configuration bitstream. Suchconfiguration bitstream may be packet-based or frame-based for example.However, in other embodiments, an Application-Specific StandardProcessor (“ASSP”), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (“ASIC”),or any other integrated circuit (“IC”) having programmable logic may beused to provide an accelerator. For purposes of clarity by way ofexample and not limitation, it shall be assumed that programmable logicdevice 5501 is an FPGA; however, in other embodiments other integratedcircuits may be used as indicated.

Use of PLD 5501 allows one or more algorithms, such as for example anencryption algorithm, a decryption algorithm, a data parsing algorithm,and/or a data concatenation algorithm such as for a secure data storageapplication, to be instantiated as hardware circuitry via fieldprogrammable logic as an application function block. The ability to haveany or all of these tasks performed in hardware rather than softwareaccelerates (i.e., speeds up) data processing, such as for secure datastorage for example. However, it should be appreciated that these orother algorithms may be instantiated in whole or part in programmablelogic fabric of PLD 5501, such as an FPGA for example, in otherembodiments, such as for other applications. In an embodiment, thesealgorithms may include one or more types of encryption 3018 that mayprovide secure encryption of data at the secure data parser layer 3026of FIG. 30. In an embodiment, these algorithms may include one or moreof the processes associated with secure data parser 3706 as illustratedin FIG. 37. For example, these algorithms may include one or more ofpre-encryption process 3708, encrypt/transform process 3710, key secureprocess 3712, or parser/distribute process 3714 associated with securedata parser 3706. In an embodiment, these algorithms may include one ormore of the processes associated with cloud computing described withrespect to FIGS. 42-52. For example, these algorithms may include one ormore of the processes associated with secure data parser 4210, securedata parser 4310, secure data parser 4410, secure data parser 4510,secure data parser 4610, secure data parser 4710, secure data parser4930, secure data parser 5030, secure data parser 5120, secure dataparser 5220, hypervisor 4920, hypervisor 5020, or any suitablecombination thereof.

Additionally, PLD 5501 may have expansion ports 5502. In an embodiment,each of expansion ports 5502 has four lanes. Expansion ports 5502 may beused to allow RPU 5320 to connect to one or more other RPUs 5320 so thatthey can share large processing tasks. Additionally or optionally,expansion ports 5502 may be used as a way to add additional functions toRPU 5320.

RPU 5320 may further include storage memory 5503, nonvolatile storagememory 5504, code executable memory 5505, and a controller 5506.Controller 5506 may be a Complex Programmable Logic Device (“CPLD”).Nonvolatile storage memory 5504 may be a form of flash memory or a formof EPROM for example. Code executable memory 5505 may be NOR flash orSRAM for example. Storage memory 5503 may be SRAM, DRAM or NAND flashfor example. Other details regarding RPU 5320 may be found in U.S. Pat.Nos. 7,856,545 and 7,856,546.

For purposes of clarity and not limitation, it shall be assumed thatstorage memory 5503 is DRAM which is externally coupled to a memoryinterface implemented in the form of programmable logic in PLD 5501. Useof DRAM for a secure data storage application allows any data therein tobe generally erased once power is removed from such DRAM, as DRAM is avolatile form of memory.

DRAM 5503 may be any of a variety of types of DRAM including withoutlimitation DDR, DDR2 or DDR3 DRAM. In an embodiment, RPU 5320 has DDR3DRAM for DRAM 5503; however, other types of DDR DRAM, as well as othertypes of DRAM, may be used.

In an embodiment, a Stratus IV EP4SGX230 FPGA from Altera Corporation ofSan Jose, Calif. is used for PLD 5501. However, it should be understoodthat other FPGAs, such as FPGAs from Xilinx, Inc. of San Jose, Calif.,may be used. Moreover, it should be understood that PCIe daughtercard5401 includes RPU 5320 with DRAM interconnected to an FPGA via a memorycontroller/interface (“memory interface”) of such PLD 5501. Thus, DRAM5503 is “local” or “subsystem” memory of daughter card 5401 or PLD 5501.The term “local” or “subsystem” memory is used to differentiate betweenmemory on daughtercard 5401 or directly coupled to PLD 5501 in contrastto memory elsewhere in a host system, including without limitationsystem memory 5316.

Network interface 5310 of accelerator system 5500 is coupled to anotherdownstream PCIe port 5512 of switch 5402. Network interface 5310 may bea network interface chip, which may be referred to as a “NIC” though notto be confused with a network interface card. However, in otherembodiments, a network interface card may be used instead of a networkinterface chip.

Network interface 5310 may include ports 5516. For purposes of clarityand not limitation, it shall be assumed that ports 5516 arebidirectional high-speed serial I/O ports. Serial I/O ports 5516 allowfor transfer of data to or from devices or systems coupled via a networkto daughtercard 5401. Such other devices or systems may be remotelylocated from host system 5400 associated with daughtercard 5401.

Network interface 5310 may include one or more physical devices. Inparticular, a Media Access Control (“MAC”) and Physical Layer (“PHY”)functions of network interface 5410 may reside in separate physicaldevices. Optionally, network interface 5410 may be implemented usingprogrammable logic of PLD 5501. Such a programmable logic implementationof network interface 5410, however, uses a substantial portion of theprogrammable resources of PLD 5501.

Network interface 5310 may be used to offload processing associated withnetwork protocols, such as Transmission Control Protocol/InternetProtocol (“TCP/IP”), Internet Small Computer System Interface (“iSCSI”),or Fibre Channel over Ethernet (“FCoE”), among others, from a main CPU5315 of a host system. In an embodiment, a Terminator 4 ASIC fromChelsio of Sunnyvale, Calif., is used for a network interface chip.However, in other embodiments, other similar network interface chips maylikewise be used. For example other network interface chips may beobtained from Broadcom Corporation.

Coupled to serial I/O ports 5516 of network interface 5410 aretransceiver modules 5420. In this exemplary embodiment, there are fourtransceiver modules 5420; however, fewer or more than four transceivermodules 5420 may be used in other embodiments. In other embodiments,transceiver modules 5420 may be omitted with respect to communicationwith one or more proximal devices, as network interface 5410 maycommunicate directly with one or more proximal devices coupled via anetwork; particularly if such one or more proximal devices coupled via anetwork are relatively close to daughter card 5401. In this embodiment,enhanced Small Form-factor Pluggable (“SFP+”) transceivers are used.SFP+transceivers are available for many different speeds, protocols, andtypes of physical connections. In this embodiment, ports 5515 of atransceiver modules 5420 are 10 Gb/s ports, which may be used for 10Gigabit Ethernet or 8 Gb/s Fibre Channel connectivity; however, othertypes of transceivers with other bandwidths may be used in otherembodiments. Transceiver modules 5420 and network interface 5410 maysupport metal wire or optical cabling for interconnectivity viahigh-speed serial ports 5515. Numerous other components of daughtercard5401, such as power supplies, connectors, capacitors, and resistors,among others, are not described herein for purposes of clarity.

FIG. 56 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of controlflow for accelerator system 5500 of FIG. 55. In FIG. 56, a host system5600 includes motherboard 5310 coupled to daughtercard 5401 via PCIe bus5611. Arrows 5601 and 5602 illustratively depict direction of controlflow for setting up communication between devices as described below inadditional detail.

Motherboard 5310 may include system memory 5316, a main CPU 5315, and aSouthbridge (“SB”) 5605, such as of a CPU or motherboard chipset. PCIebus 5611 interconnects switch 5402 to Southbridge 5605. PCIe buses 5612interconnect switch 5402 to PLD 5501. PCIe bus 5613 interconnects switch5402 to network interface 5410. Thus, PLD 5501 and network interface5410, as well as switch 5402, are discoverable by CPU 5315.

Switch 5402, PLD 5501, and network interface 5410 appear as threeseparate PCIe devices to CPU 5315. More particularly, responsive to CPU5315 enumerating PCIe buses 5611 through 5613, CPU 5315 discovers PCIeswitch 5402 and what appears as three downstream devices. Two of thesethree downstream devices are associated with two PCIe ports in PLD 5501,and the other of these three downstream devices is associated with aPCIe port of network interface 5410.

By discovering such downstream devices, CPU 5315 may initiate datatransfers to or from PLD 5501 and/or network interface 5410. Moreparticularly, by discovering PCIe ports of switch 5402, PLD 5501, andnetwork interface 5410, CPU 5315 may configure such devices and allocateaddress spaces, such as physical address spaces for example,respectively to each of such devices. Allocation of such address spacesallows CPU 5315 to communicate with switch 5402, PLD 5501, and networkinterface 5410, and additionally may allow switch 5402, PLD 5501, andnetwork interface 5410 to communicate with each other withoutintervention from CPU 5315 or other motherboard system resources.

FIG. 57 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of dataflow in a “write” direction for accelerator system 5500 of FIG. 55. InFIG. 57, CPU 5315 may cause a data unit of any size stored in systemmemory 5316 to flow via PCIe bus 5611 for receipt by switch 5402, andthen such data unit may be passed from switch 5402 for receipt by PLD5501 via a PCIe bus 5612, as generally indicated by arrow 5701. Itshould be appreciated that data need not initially be accessed or readfrom system memory 5316, but may be read from other memory or storage ofor accessible by host system 5600 in accordance with the descriptionherein. However, for purposes of clarity by way of example notlimitation, it shall be assumed that an initial data unit is read fromsystem memory 5316. Furthermore, for purposes of clarity and notlimitation, it may be assumed that such data unit is accessed as a datablock, even though other sizes may be used.

Such data unit may be processed by a compute function of PLD 5501. Inthis exemplary embodiment for secure data storage, a secure parser 5700may be used as such compute function. More particularly, such secureparser 5700 may include a parse block 5710 and a restore block 5715.Parse block 5710 may encrypt, parse, and/or split data for example, toprovide outbound traffic. It is understood that the components of thepresent invention that are described herein as providing parsing andsplitting functionality may modularly provide parsing functionality,splitting functionality, or any suitable combination of parsing andsplitting functionalities. Shares of information may be produced usingthe dispersing functions of the secure data parser according to any ofthe techniques described with respect to FIG. 33, FIG. 35, and FIG. 36.In an embodiment, parse block 5710 may compute any of the functionsassociated with the algorithms discussed with respect to PLD 5501.Similar to secure data parser 4210 (FIG. 42), parse block 5710 mayencrypt and split data such that no forensically discernable data willtraverse or be stored within memory or storage of or accessible by hostsystem 5600. The underlying hardware components accessible by hostsystem 5600 (e.g., servers, storage devices, networks) may begeographically disbursed to ensure continuity of hardware resources inthe event of a power grid failure, weather event, or any other man-madeor natural event. As a result, even if some of the hardware componentsaccessible by host system 5600 suffer a catastrophic failure, the dataprocessed by parse block 5710 may still be accessible. Restore block5715 may restore inbound traffic, such as restoring data using therestore functions of secure parser 5700 for example, to provide data inits original form. In an embodiment, two or more parsed and splitportions of original data may be restored according to any of thetechniques described with respect to FIG. 34.

Secure parser 5700 may be instantiated in whole or in part using fieldprogrammable logic of PLD 5501. Algorithmic operations performed bysecure parser 5700 may include one or more arithmetic operations orother data processing operations. Thus for example, such data unit orother information may be cryptographically split into any size units ofdata. Such cryptographically split units of data for example may then bestored in DRAM 5503, or other subsystem or local memory, coupled to PLD5501, as generally indicated by arrow 5702.

It should be understood that PLD 5501 may have a memory interface,whether a hard macro or a soft core, for writing data to or reading datafrom DRAM 5503, where such memory interface is accessible by secureparser 5700. PLD 5501 may have internal memory which may be used insteadof DRAM 5503, provided however, the amount of such internal memory issufficient for an application, such as secure data storage for example.

For network interface 5410 to transmit encrypted data units stored inDRAM 5503, a Direct Memory Access (“DMA”) operation may be initiated bynetwork interface 5410 using a DMA controller 5750 thereof. In otherwords, DMA controller 5750 of network interface 5410 may provide one ormore pointers or addresses to read out encrypted data units from DRAM5503, as described below in additional detail. It should be understoodthat DMA controller 5750 is effectively coupled to DRAM 5503 via amemory interface of PLD 5501 through PCIe bussing and peer-to-peerrouting of switch 5402.

In order to obtain access to DRAM 5503 via a memory interface of PLD5501, such DMA access may use addresses allocated by CPU 5315, forexample, as previously described, to provide a read request that passesthrough switch 5402 to PLD 5501 using PCIe bussing 5613 and 5612 andpeer-to-peer routing of PCIe switch 5402. Such read request is processedby PLD 5501, including a memory interface thereof, to read encrypteddata units out of DRAM 5503. Such read encrypted data units are passedback to network interface 5410 using the reverse of the above-describedpath, as generally indicated by arrow 503. Such read data units may thenbe transmitted via one or more of transceiver modules 5420.

Accordingly, it should be appreciated that once an initial data unit ispassed from motherboard 5310 to daughtercard 5401, processed data fromsuch data unit need not be routed back over a host system bus, such asPCIe bus 5611. Thus, such processed data does not have to encumber CPU5315 or other motherboard system resources. In other words, dataprocessing of such data unit is offloaded from CPU 5315, and subsequentmovement of such processed data units does not have to pass over asystem bus or otherwise encumber performance of other operations onmotherboard 5310. In particular, this avoids burdening a system PCIe bus5611, Southbridge 5605, a Northbridge, and/or a main CPU 5315.

In an embodiment, RPU 5320 may add redundancy as part of a parsefunction, namely parse block 5710. In such an embodiment, an amount ofdata passing between RPU 5320 and network interface 5410 may besubstantially greater due to addition of redundant data to an amount ofdata originally passed from system memory 5316 to RPU 5320 for suchprocessing by parse block 5710. It should be appreciated that in such anembodiment, motherboard resources are not burned with having to handlesuch added redundant data, as well as any information associatedtherewith for such redundancy.

FIG. 58 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of dataflow in a “read” direction for accelerator system 5500 of FIG. 55. InFIG. 58, data generally flows from network interface 5410 to PLD 5501through switch 5402 for processing by an application function block ofPLD 5501. More particularly, data blocks may be received by networkinterface 5410 via one or more of transceiver modules 5420, such as forreverse processing for example.

Secure parser 5700 is the same block in FIGS. 57 and 58. However, inFIG. 58, secure parser 5700 may be thought of as a secure “restorer”when in a restore mode. Restoration may vary fromapplication-to-application. Accordingly, for the above-mentioned securedata storage restoration may generally be thought of as providing a dataunit or units representing an original data unit or units, respectively.

Responsive to a DMA initiated write by DMA controller 5750 of networkinterface 5410, such data blocks may be written to DRAM 5503. Such a DMAinitiated write command as well as received data blocks follow adirection as generally indicated by arrow 5801. For example, data blocksmay go from network interface 5410 to switch 5402 via PCIe bus 5613, andfrom switch 5402, such data blocks may be routed to PLD 5501 for DRAM5503 via a PCIe bus 5612. Again, addressing and peer-to-peer routing aspreviously described, though in a reverse data flow direction, may beused. Such data blocks may be written to DRAM 5503, and from DRAM 5503,such data blocks may be read out to a restore function block, such asrestore block 5715, as generally indicated by arrow 5802.

Restore block 5715 may be instantiated in whole or in part in fieldprogrammable logic of PLD 5501. In an embodiment, assuming data blocksobtained by network interface are encrypted, data read from memory 5503into restore block 5715 may be decrypted by restore block 5715, asdescribed elsewhere herein. For example, two or more parsed and splitportions of original data may be read from memory 5503 into restoreblock 5715 and restored according to any of the techniques describedwith respect to FIG. 34.

The resulting data unit or units may be provided to system memory 5316in a data flow direction as generally indicated by arrow 5803. Moreparticularly, such data unit or units may be provided from PLD 5501 toswitch 5402 via a PCIe bus 5612, and then from switch 5402 toSouthbridge 5605 via PCIe bus 5611. Such data unit or units may beprovided from Southbridge 5605 to system memory 5316. It should beunderstood that such a data block or blocks transferred via PCIe bus5611 may already be completely processed with respect to a secure datastorage application. Accordingly, such PCIe bus 5611, as well as CPU5315 among other resources of motherboard 5310 is not burdened with theprocessing of such data unit or units received by network interface5410. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that each such data unit maybe an exact copy of the data unit originally sent from system memory5316, as previously described with reference to FIG. 57.

FIG. 59 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional storage driver architecture 5900. For purposes of clarityby way of example and not limitation, the following description is basedon an NT-based operating system, namely a Microsoft Windows operatingsystem; however, it should be appreciated that other types of operatingsystems may be used. Moreover, for purposes of clarity by way of examplenot limitation, it shall be assumed that driver architecture 5900 is fora storage driver stack, even though other types of driver stacks may beused.

I/O request packets (“IRPs”) 5901 are obtained by one or moreupper-filter drivers 5912. Such IRPs may be provided from a userapplication or another driver higher in a storage driver stack. Thus,user applications or higher-level drivers may provide IRPs to one ormore upper-filter drivers 5912. Such IRPs 5901 may be modified by one ormore upper-filter drivers 5912 before being passed to a next lower-leveldriver as IRP 5902. Such next lower-level driver may be another storagefilter driver or may be a storage class driver, such as storage classdriver 5913. It should be understood that filter drivers may monitorperformance of an underlying device.

Storage class driver 5913 may be configured to build one or more SCSIRequest Blocks (“SRBs”) 5903 responsive to such one or more IRPs 5901.Storage class driver 5913 may provide such one or more SRBs 5903 to oneor more lower-filter drivers 5914. Such one or more lower-filter drivers5914 may modify SRBs 5903 to provide SRBs 5904 to storage port driver5915. Storage port driver 5915 may provide bus-specific commandsresponsive to such one or more SRBs 5904 or may further modify SRBs 5904to provide one or more other SRBs. Thus, storage port driver 5915 mayoutput bus-specific commands or SRBs 705.

It should be understood that such one or more upper-filter drivers 5912,unlike lower-filter drivers 5914, can intercept IRPs 5901 sent to aclass driver, such as storage class driver 5913, and can alter such IRPs5901 before forwarding them to a next-lower level device object. So, anupper-filter driver 5912 can intercept read or write IRPs and transformdata of such read or write IRPs, as well as define additional I/Ocontrol codes (“IOCTLs”) for example to cause a user application tosupply passwords or other related information.

FIG. 60 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional device objects (“DO”) generation flow 6000. DO generationflow 6000 is for a Windows driver system; however, other driver systemsmay be used. Optionally, at 6001 a disk encryption filter device object(“DO”) may be generated, such as by a disk-encryption filter driver.

Disk partition device objects (“PDOs”) respectively at 6002-1 through6002-3 may be generated as respective partitions, namely partition 1,partition 2, and partition 3. Such disk PDOs may be generated by a diskclass driver. Such disk class driver may generate a functional DO(“FDO”) for partition 0 at 6003. In other words, a disk class drivercreates an FDO for a disk as a whole and PDOs for each partition on suchdisk.

At 6004, a disk PDO is generated by SCSI port/miniport driver, and at808, a SCSI adapter FDO is generated by such SCSI port/mini port driver.Examples of other DOs that may be generated include those at 6005through 6007. More particularly, at 6005, a CD ROM FDO may be generatedby a CD ROM driver; at 6006, a CD audio filter DO may be generated by aCD audio filter driver; and at 6007, a CD-ROM PDO may be generated bysuch SCSI port/miniport driver that generated DOs at 6004 and 6008. At6009, a SCSI adapter PDO may be generated by a PCI bus driver.Optionally at 6010, a DO for an IEEE 1394 controller may be generated byan IEEE1394 controller driver. At 6011, a 1394 adapter PDO may begenerated by a PCI bus driver employed at 6009, and such PCI bus drivermay generate a PCI bus FDO at 6012.

FIG. 61 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional packet format 6100. Packet format 61006100 includes anEthernet header 6101, an IP header 6102, a TCP header 6103, an iSCSIheader 6104, iSCSI payload or data 6105, and cyclic redundancy check(“CRC”) bits 6106. Accordingly, packet format 61006000 is an iSCSIpacket format.

It should be appreciated that FIGS. 59 through 61 provide a generalcontext for the description of FIGS. 65-77. Additional general contextfor the description of some of the figures of FIGS. 65-77 may beobtained with reference to FIGS. 62-64.

More particularly, FIG. 62 is a block diagram depicting a conventionalHyper-V architecture 6200, and FIG. 63 is a block diagram depicting aconventional Hyper-V architecture 63006300 for a storage model.

With simultaneous reference to FIGS. 62 and 63, in Microsoft's Hyper-Vhypervisor-based virtualization architectures 6200 and 6300, ahypervisor or virtual machine monitor (“VMM”) 6201 is generally ahardware virtualization that allows multiple operating systems orvirtual machines to run concurrently on a host computer. Such hardwarevirtualization is used to support isolation in terms of a parentpartition 6202 and a child partition 6203. It should be understood thata physical device may be controlled by an existing device driver withouthaving to create a new device driver by using such a hypervisor.

A virtualization stack generally runs in a parent partition and hasdirect access to hardware devices. Such parent partition 6202 createsone or more child partitions 6203 which may host one or more guestoperating systems. Child partitions 6203 do not have direct access tohardware resources 6205, such as disk storage 6204 for example, but dohave a virtual view of such resources in terms of virtual devices.Requests to virtual devices may be redirected via a virtual machine bus(“VMBus”) 6206. Parent partitions 6202 execute a Virtualization ServiceProvider (“VSP”) 6207, which connects to a VMBus 6206 and handles deviceaccess requests from one or more child partitions 6203. Generally, a VSP6207 runs within a parent partition 6202 or other partition that owns ahardware device, such as disk storage 6204. A VSP 6207 may communicatewith a device driver, and act as a multiplexer for offering hardwareservices. Child partition 6203 virtual devices execute a VirtualizationService Client (“VSC”) 6208, which redirects requests to one or moreVSPs 6207 in a parent partition 6202 via a VMBus 6206. Generally, a VSC6208 consumes a service.

There may be a VSP/VSC pair per device type. A device protocol may bespecific to a device type, but generally operating system agnostic.Microsoft-provided VSP/VSC pairs include pairs for storage, network,video input, and Universal Serial Bus (“USB”) uses.

As described below in additional detain, VSP/VSC pairs for storage andnetworking are used. As such Hyper-V architectures of FIGS. 62 and 63and VSP/VSC pairs are well known, they are not described in unnecessarydetail herein for purposes of clarity.

In an embodiment, the Hyper-V architectures of FIGS. 62 and 63 may beintegrated with a secure data parser. For example, the Hyper-Varchitectures of FIGS. 62 and 63 may be integrated with a secure dataparser as described with respect to FIGS. 48-50.

FIG. 64 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of aconventional VM server architecture 6400. More particularly, VM serverarchitecture 6400 is for a VMware Server, available from VMware, Inc.,of Palo Alto, Calif., which partitions a physical server into multiplevirtual machines 6401.

Generally, a VMware Server 6402 is a layer that exists between anoperating system (“OS”) 6403 and virtual machines 6401. An OS, such asWindows or Linux, runs on a hardware platform 6404, such as a servermotherboard. Thus, a VMware Server installs and runs as an applicationon top of a host Windows or Linux operating system.

A thin virtualization layer partitions a physical server to allowmultiple virtual machines 6401 to be run simultaneously on such a singlephysical server. Computing resources of such a physical server may betreated as a uniform pool of resources that may be allocated to suchvirtual machines 6401 in a controlled manner. A VMware Server 6402isolates each virtual machine 6401 from its host and other virtualmachines 6401, which leaves each operating virtual machine 6401unaffected if another virtual machine 6401 in the group were to crash orexperience an attack as described with respect to virtual machines 4810(FIG. 48).

Moreover, data does not leak across virtual machines 6401, andapplications 6405 of such virtual machines 6401 may communicate overconfigured network connections. A VMware Server 6402 encapsulates avirtual machine environment as a set of files, which may be backed-up,moved, and/or copied.

In an embodiment, using the secure data parser, virtual machine 6401 maysecurely communicate with one or more servers or end users. Inaccordance with this embodiment, secure data access may be deployed tousers by providing the users with secure access to virtual machineimages. This embodiment may allow for on demand information sharingwhile assuring confidentiality and integrity of the data.

Having this context borne in mind, the following descriptions ofembodiments of a kernel mode, a driver stack, and a software flow, amongothers, should be more clearly understood.

FIG. 65 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of akernel-mode flow 6500 for accelerator system 5500 of FIG. 55. Dashedline 6520 indicates a hardware/software partition. Dashed line 6520 mayindicate a bus, such as a PCIe bus 5611 as previously described withreference to FIG. 56. Above dashed line 6520 is kernel-mode flow 6500.Below dashed line 6520 is a block diagram representing acceleratorsystem 5500 of FIG. 55. It should be understood that this representationof such accelerator system 5500 is simplified in order to more clearlyunderstand kernel-mode flow 6500.

An IRP 6511 is received by class driver 6501. A general-purposeprocessor, such as CPU 5315 as previously described with reference toFIG. 54 for example, may execute a user application in an applicationmode causing such user application to provide one or more IRPs, such asIRP 6511, to a class driver 6501 in a kernel mode.

In kernel-mode flow 6500, in addition to class driver 6501, there is afilter driver 6503, a network software stack 6505, a network miniportdriver 6507, and a device driver 6509. Device driver 6509 may follow aframework for device drivers introduced by Microsoft, known as a WindowsDriver Model (“WDM”). Within such WDM framework, there are devicefunction drivers, including class drivers and miniport drivers. Furtherwithin such WDM framework, there are bus drivers and optional filterdrivers. An upper-level filter driver is located above a primary driverfor a device, such as a class driver, while a lower-level filter driveris located below such class driver and above a bus driver. Thus, filterdriver 6503 is a lower-level filter driver.

It should be understood that filter driver 6503 and device driver 6509are not provided by Microsoft; however, filter driver 6503 and devicedriver 6509 are written to work within Microsoft's WDM framework. Filterdriver 6503 and device driver 6509 are written to support acceleratorsystem 5500.

In contrast, class driver 6501 and network software stack 6505 areprovided by Microsoft. Furthermore, network miniport driver 6507 may beprovided by a an independent hardware vendor (“IHV”) of networkinterface 5410. Accordingly for purposes of clarity and not limitation,generally only inter-workings of filter driver 6503 and device driver6509 are described below in additional detail.

Even though the following description is in terms of a WDM framework forpurposes of clarity and not limitation, it should be understood thatother driver models may be used for operating with operating systemsother than a Windows-based operating system. Along those lines, itshould be understood that an operating system, such as Linux, may havesimilar software components to those of a WDM framework as describedherein. Thus, filter driver 6503 and device driver 6509 are applicableto operating systems other than Windows. Moreover, drivers 6503 and 6509may be implemented as virtual drivers, such as in a virtual drivermodel, and thus are applicable to virtual operating systems.

Again, it should be understood that a secure data storage application isdescribed for purposes of clarity and not limitation, as otherapplications involving accelerated data processing may be used. So eventhough a network software stack 6505 and a network miniport driver 6507are described, it should be understood that another type of stack driverand/or another type of miniport driver may be used in otherapplications. For example, if storage devices were locally coupled,namely not coupled through network interface 5410, then network softwarestack 6505 would be a storage software stack 6505, and network miniportdriver 6507 would be a storage miniport driver 6507. However, for FIG.65 it shall be assumed that a network interface is used forcommunicating with multiple storage devices, such as in cloud storagefor example, for purposes of clarity and not limitation.

For this secure data storage application, data is encrypted and storedredundantly in multiple locations so that it may only be recovered by anauthorized user, yet such data may still be recovered if one or more ofthe storage devices is or becomes inoperable. For example, in someembodiments, the secure data storage application may operate similarlyto the cloud computing security solutions described with respect toFIGS. 42-45. In such embodiments, the secure data storage applicationmay be resilient because of the redundancy offered by the secure dataparser (i.e., fewer than all separated portions of data are needed toreconstruct the original data). Other details regarding such secure datastorage application may be found in the above-referenced provisionalpatent application.

For this secure data storage application, when a user application issuesa write or read, such as to write or read a file of information, itissues such command as if such data file was stored locally on a storagedevice, such as a hard disk drive for example, of a host system hostingsuch user application. Thus, IRP 6511 from outward appearances may be awrite or read for a data file stored locally on a hard disk drive forexample. However, such file data is encrypted, parsed, split, storedwithin, and/or recombined from multiple storage devices, such asmultiple hard disk drives, and such multiple storage devices may be atlocations remote with respect to a computer system executing such userapplication. Even though the example of a hard disk drive is used, itshould be understood that any of a variety of storage devices, many ofwhich are listed elsewhere herein, may be used.

For a write command of a data file, IRP 1311 may include payload data1360. Class driver 1301 passes an SRB 1313 responsive to IRP 1311 tofilter driver 1303. Such SRB may include a command and a payload pointerfor such write command. Filter driver 1303 provides a command 1361responsive to IRP 1311, or more particularly SRB 1313, to device driver1309. Command 1361, which may be an Application Program Interface(“API”) command, may include a “system” payload pointer pointing topayload data 1360, such as payload data in system memory for example.Such system payload pointer indicates an address where a host systembelieves such data file, namely payload data 1360, is located. Filterdriver 1303 may pass such API command 1361 to device driver 1309, wheresuch API command 1361 includes a system payload pointer pointing topayload data 1360. Device driver 1309 in communication with PLD 301invokes an API responsive to such API command 1361 to obtain andprocesses payload data 1360 responsive to command 1361. Such payloaddata 1360 is obtained by PLD 301 using such system payload pointer asgenerally indicated by dashed lines 1377 and 1378.

Such payload data 6560 may be parsed, split, and/or separated into twoor more parts or portions by PLD 5501, and such parts or portions may beencrypted by PLD 5501 for storing in local DRAM 5503 as parsed payloaddata 6510. Once parsed payload data 6510 is written into local DRAM5503, PLD 5501 provides a notice of completion signal to device driver6509, and device driver 6509 provides such complete signal 6517 tofilter driver 6503.

To recapitulate, IRP 6511 may represent a single read or write command.Class driver 6501 may pass IRP 6511 to filter driver 6503 as an SRB6513. Alternatively, IRP 6511 may be intercepted by filter driver 6503.Such SRB 6513 includes such single read or write command, and suchsingle read or write command includes a system payload pointer. Suchsystem payload pointer points to or indicates where a host systembelieves such payload is locally stored.

Continuing the example of IRP 6511 representing a single write command,filter driver 6503 generates multiple write commands with payloadpointers, namely commands 6515-1 through 6515-N, for N a positiveinteger greater than one (collectively and singly “commands 6515”).Generally, such multiple commands 6515 are passed from filter driver6503 to network software stack 6505, and network software stack 6505passes such commands 6515 to network miniport driver 6507. Networkminiport driver 6507 provides such commands 6515 to network interface5410.

It should be understood that filter driver 6503 in generating payloadpointers associated with commands 6515 effectively replaces a systempayload pointer with local payload pointers for pointing to local DRAM5503, as generally indicated by dashed line 6599. Such local payloadpointers are in read commands 6515 for reading local DRAM 5503.

In this example application, network interface 5310 uses such localpayload pointers to read out parsed payload data 6510, namely to readout encrypted data blocks. It should be understood that for this securedisk storage application, redundancy information may be appended topayload data 6560, and thus parsed payload data 6510 may besignificantly larger than payload data 6560. Such redundancy informationmay be appended to the payload data 6560 in accordance with the presentinvention to allow for the restoration of the payload data 6560 usingfewer than all of the portions of payload data 6560, and such redundancydata may be stored in different remotely located storage devices.Furthermore, as mentioned above, such payload data 6560, as well as suchredunancy data thereof, may be parsed, split, and/or separated intosmaller parts or portions. Filter driver 6503 when generating localpayload pointers for commands 6515 accounts for payload size informationin each command, as such pointers have to account for payload size afterprocessing by PLD 5501.

It should further be understood that filter driver 6503 in generatingcommands 6515 accounts for storing parsed payload data 6510 in multiplestorage devices, one or more of which may be for redundancy, usingaddress information provided by a user application. More particularly,with reference to FIG. 535, such user application in an embodiment is anRPU administrative configuration application 1504, and such userapplication provides addressing information for both reads and writes.Such addresses or pointers may be in one or more generated SRBs, asdescribed below in additional detail.

Network interface 5310 may be coupled to a network 1363 as generallyindicated for communication with such multiple storage devices. Networkinterface 5310 may be a host bus adapter/communications (“HBA/COM”)chip. As network interface 5410 receives each storage command associatedwith commands 6515 having traveled down a software stack into a miniportdriver, network interface 5410 performs a DMA operation to read parsedpayload data 6510 using local payload pointers in commands 6515. Suchretrieved parsed payload data 6510 may be combined with commandinformation in such storage commands to provide packets, such as SRBsmentioned above and described below, and such assembled packets may betransferred over a network to multiple storage devices.

If IRP 6511 were for a read operation, namely a read command, then suchIRP 6511 would not include payload data. A user application may issuesuch a read command, namely a single read command, as if the data to beread, such as a data file, were located on a local storage device, suchas a local disk drive.

IRP 6511 is provided to class driver 6501, and class driver 6501 passesIRP 6511 to filter driver 6503 as an SRB 6513. Alternatively, IRP 6511may be intercepted by filter driver 6503, as generally indicated bydashed line 6573.

Filter driver 6503 generates multiple read commands 6515 responsive toIRP 6511 or SRB 6513. Such read commands 6515 include addressinformation for retrieval of data stored on multiple storage devices ina network cloud. Such commands 6515 are passed down through networksoftware stack 6505 to network miniport driver 6507. From such multiplestorage devices, network interface 5410 obtains data blocks, and networkinterface 5410 asserts a DMA command for passing such data blocks tolocal DRAM 5503 for writing thereto as parsed payload data 6510.

After parsed payload data 6510 is written back into local DRAM 5503 vianetwork interface 5410, PLD 5501 provides a notice of completion signalto device driver 6509, and such notice of completion signal 6517 isprovided to filter driver 6503. Filter driver 6503 provides a readcommand 6561 to device driver 6509 in response to IRP 6511 or SRB 6513.Device driver 6509 provides read command 6561 to PLD 5501.

In response to read command 6561, PLD 5501 reverse processes parsedpayload data 6510, such as for example decrypts data and then restoresthe data using the restore functions of the secure parser 5700 toprovide payload data 6560 as a single data file or single data block,such as originally received for example. For example, the data may berestored according to any of the techniques described with respect toFIG. 34.

PLD 5501 transfers such single data block as payload data 6560 inresponse to such IRP 6511 from a user application. In an embodiment, PLD5501 uses a DMA transfer into system memory 5316 to write payload data6560 therein. PLD 5501 asserts a notice of completion signal 6517 todevice driver 6509 for filter driver 6503 to indicate such writing ofpayload data 6560 to system memory 5316. In response to notice ofcompletion signal 6517, filter driver 6503 indicates to a userapplication that such read request has been completed.

Accordingly, it should be understood that such secure data storageapplication as described may operate transparently with respect to auser application. In other words, a user application may issue read andwrite requests as though requesting operations to be performed on alocal storage device without knowledge that such above-describedoperations are performed for providing parsed payload data 6510 forexample. It should further be appreciated that because of parsing and/orredundancy, parsed payload data 6510 may be significantly larger thanpayload data 6560, and thus data transferred over network interface 5410may be significantly more voluminous than payload data 6560, namely dataseen by a user application.

Furthermore, locally temporarily stored or maintained data may beprocessed in an accelerated manner by PLD 5501 by instantiating one ormore data processing algorithms in programmable logic, where suchalgorithms are effectively replicated in circuitry. Along those lines,only original payload data 6560 for a write operation or process data torestore such original payload data 6560 for a read operation istransferred over system PCIe bus 5611, such as for going from or tosystem memory 5316. Thus the data handling and/or data processing burdenon one or more motherboard system resources as previously describedherein is significantly reduced. Such burden reduction may enhanceoverall operational efficiency of a host system.

FIG. 66 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of adriver stack 6600 for kernel mode flow 6500 of FIG. 65 and acceleratorsystem 5500 of FIG. 55. In FIG. 66, a user mode 6610 is delineated froma kernel mode 6620, and kernel mode 6620 is delineated from a hardwaresection, as indicated by PCIe bus 6611. Accordingly, it should beappreciated that kernel mode 6620 corresponds to kernel mode flow 6500of FIG. 65.

Application 6601 is in communication with class driver 6501, and classdriver 6501 is in communication with filter driver 6503. Again forpurposes of clarity and not limitation, the example of a secure datastorage application is used, and accordingly filter driver 6503 isparenthetically indicated as a secure parser. This secure parser mayprovide functionality substantially similar to secure parser 5700 ofFIG. 57. Filter driver 6503 is in communication with device driver 6509and port driver 6605. Port driver 6605 is in communication with miniportdriver 6607. Port driver 6605 and miniport driver 6607 respectivelycorrespond to software stack 6505 and miniport driver 6507. Miniportdriver 6607 is in communication with network interface 5310, and devicedriver 6509 is in communication with RPU 5320.

Application 6601, which is a user application, communicates with classdriver 6501. Class driver 6501 communicates with filter driver 6503.Class driver 6501 may pass what may be termed “plaintext” to filterdriver 6503. Filter driver 6503 separates a control path from a datapath, as described below in additional detail.

PCIe bus 5611 is the relative location at which software componentstransition to hardware blocks. Accelerator system 5500 of FIG. 55 isgenerally represented by network interface 5310 coupled to switch 5402,and switch 5402 is coupled to RPU 5320. Accordingly, RPU 5320 includesDRAM 5503. Switch 5402 may be thought of as a point-to-point bus (“P2Pbus”). Communication between network interface 5310 and RPU 5320 throughswitch 5402 may be generally thought of as a data-only path 6663.

Filter driver 6503 is in communication with device driver 6509 via acommand and data path 6671. Device driver 6509 is in communication withRPU 5320 via command and data path 6672. Command and data paths 6671 and6672 may be referred to as “cleartext” paths. In contrast, data-onlypath 6663 is an encrypted only data path, namely a “ciphertext” path.RPU 5320 is further in communication with device drivers 6509 viacommand-only path 6682. Device driver 6509 is further in communicationwith filter driver 6503 via command-only path 6681. In other words, onlycommands are passed via paths 6681 and 6682.

Command-only paths 6681 and 6682 are cleartext paths. Moreover, commandsprovided via command-only paths 6681 and 6682 are parsed out commandsfrom a single command as previously described with reference to FIG. 65.In other words, commands provided via command-only paths 6681 and 6682may be thought of as “N shares” corresponding to N parts or portions ofdata stored in DRAM 5503. Thus, filter driver 6503 may provide N sharesof commands via command-only path 6681 for device driver 6509, anddevice driver 6509 may pass such N shares of commands to RPU 5320 viacommand-only path 6682. N shares of commands may be passed from filterdriver 6503 to port driver 6605, as previously described with referenceto FIG. 65.

FIG. 67 is a block/flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of asoftware flow for driver stack 6600 of FIG. 66 for accelerator system5500 of FIG. 55. In FIG. 67, application 6601 of user mode 6610 isbroken out into four separate software components or applications 6701through 6704. Network application 6701 allows a user application totransfer data over a network using facilities of accelerator system5500. User request for file I/O 6702 allows a user application totransfer data to a type of storage media using facilities of acceleratorsystem 5500. ISCSI initiator configuration application 6703 isresponsible for designating a correct storage media to use andinitiating a data transfer using an iSCSI storage protocol. RPUadministrator configuration application 6704 is responsible for settingup and initializing filter driver 6503, device driver 6509, and hardwareof accelerator system 5500.

In kernel mode 6620, class driver 6501 is broken out into four partsprovided by Microsoft, namely a transport driver interface/winsockkernel (“TDI/WSK”) module 6711, and I/O manager forwards requests tofile system module 6712, a file system driver processes and forwardsmodified request module 6713, and an I/O manager 6714. Generally,commands and data to be transferred over network go through module 6711,and commands and data going to or from storage media go through modules6712 and 6713. Commands to configure and initialize an iSCSI initiatorgo through I/O manager 6714. Other known details regarding class driver6501 are not provided for purposes of clarity and not limitation.

Commands and data from class driver 6501 are provided as cleartext toone or more filter drivers 6503. Commands to set up and initializefilter driver 6503 and device driver 6509 are respectively provided viapaths 6771 and 6772. Commands to set up and initialize RPU 5320 areprovided via path 6772 to device driver 6509 for RPU 5320 via PCIe bus5611 using command and data path 6672.

One or more filter drivers 6503 are used to separate command informationfrom data so such separate types of information may take separate pathsthrough software and hardware, as previously described. One or morefilter drivers 6503 are in communication with port driver 6605 viacommand-only path 6681.

Port driver 6605 may generally be separated out into two software stacksof Microsoft software components, namely one for network commands andanother one for storage device commands. The stack for network commandsfollows a TCP/IP protocol, and the stack for storage device commandsfollows a SCSI protocol. Port driver 6605 for network commands includesa TCP/IP module 6721, a TCP offload engine bus 6723, and a networkdriver interface specification (“NDIS”) module 6725. Port driver 6605for storage commands includes volume manager 6722, partition manager6724, and disk manager 6726. Other known details regarding port driver6605 are not provided for purposes of clarity and not limitation.

Miniport driver 6607, which may be supplied by a vendor of acommunication device or storage device depending on whether suchminiport driver is for a network interface or a storage deviceinterface, likewise may be separated out as was port driver 6605. Asoftware stack for network commands of port driver 6605 is incommunication with an NDIS miniport driver 6731 of miniport driver 6607.More particularly, NDIS miniport driver 6731 is in communication withNDIS module 6725. NDIS miniport driver 6731 is used to manage a networkinterface, such as a NIC, including sending and receiving data throughsuch a NIC.

A software stack for storage device commands of port driver 6605 is incommunication with a SCSI miniport driver 6732 of miniport driver 6607.SCSI miniport driver or HBA driver 6732 manages an HBA for SCSIcommands, data and processing. SCSI miniport driver 6732 is incommunication with disk manager 6726 and I/O manager 6714.

Both an NDIS miniport driver 6731 and a SCSI miniport driver 6732 may beused as supplied by an IHV of a network interface, such as a NIC. Itshould be understood that miniport drivers 6731 and 6732 bothcommunicate with a hardware network interface device. Other knowndetails regarding miniport driver 6607 are not provided for purposes ofclarity and not limitation.

In FIG. 67, such hardware network interface device is shown as separateboxes depending on whether commands are for network traffic or storagetraffic. For network traffic, NDIS miniport driver 6731 is incommunication with one or more COM devices 6741. Any of a variety of COMdevices 6741 may be managed by NDIS miniport driver 6731. Examples ofsuch COM devices 6741 include without limitation an Ethernet NIC, a WiFidevice, a WiMax device, an iWARP device, a WSD device, an RNDIS device,and a TOE device. For storage traffic, SCSI miniport driver 6732 is incommunication with one or more storage interface devices 6740. Any of avariety of storage interface devices 6740 may be managed by SCSIminiport driver 6732. Examples of storage interface devices 6740 includewithout limitation an iSCSI device, a SCSI device, and an FCoE device.

It should be understood that a single IC may be used to provide both anetwork interface and a storage device interface covering one or moreprotocols of each of such interfaces. Thus even though two separateboxes are illustratively depicted for one or more COM devices 6741 andone or more storage interface devices 6740, such two separate boxes maybe implemented in a single IC 6773. Such a single IC 6773 may havenetwork I/O interface 6772 and storage I/O interface 6763. PLD 5501 ofRPU 5320 may include a DMA module 6750 for communication with DRAM 5503.Again communication between PLD 5501 and IC 6773 with respect to data isvia data-only path 6663. Furthermore, as previously indicated, there maybe some address translation or remapping of an SRB with a data buffer topoint to DRAM 5503, as generally indicated by line 6727 spanning portdriver 6605 and miniport driver 6607 as well as pointing to theinterface between switch 5402 and DRAM 5503. Additionally, suchremapping at 6727 may involve a remap of cleartext logical unit number(“LUN”) and logical block addressing (“LBA”) SCSI parameters.

FIG. 68 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of astorage area network (“SAN”) 6800 for accelerator system 5500 of FIG.55. However, in this embodiment DRAM 5503 is used as a RAM disk.

User application 6801 may be in communication with a file system 6803and a disk driver 6804. For purposes of clarity by way of example andnot limitation, it shall be assumed that a SCSI protocol is used;however, other types of storage protocols may be used. Accordingly, diskdriver 6804 may be a SCSI class driver. File system 6803 is incommunication with disk driver 6804. It should be understood that filesystem 6803 and disk driver 6804 may be provided by Microsoft, and userapplication 6801 may be any compatible user application. Accordingly,user application 6801, file system 6803, and disk driver 6804 are notdescribed in unnecessary detail for purposes of clarity and notlimitation.

Lower filter driver 6805 is in communication with a RAM disk devicedriver 6808, disk driver 6804, SCSI device driver 6806, and iSCSI devicedriver 6807. RAM disk device driver 6808 is additionally incommunication with secure parser 6809, iSCSI device driver 6807, and asecurity application 6802. Secure parser 6809 is in communication withsecurity application 6802 and RPU 5320. Security application 6802 may beapplication 6601 as previously described with reference to FIGS. 14 and15. Secure parser 6809 may provide functionality substantially similarto secure parser 5700 of FIG. 57.

Lower filter driver 6805 may receive an SRB from disk driver 6804, aspreviously described. Lower filter driver 6805 may monitor drivers 6806through 6808. SCSI device driver 6806 may be in communication with localhardware storage 6841, such as one or more storage devices using a SCSIprotocol. iSCSI device driver 6806 may be in communication with one ormore storage interface devices 6740, as previously described withreference to FIG. 67. One or more storage interface devices 6740 may befor communicating with one or more remotely located hardware storage6842, such as one or more storage devices in a network cloud. It shouldbe understood that device drivers 6806 and 6807 may be obtained frommanufacturers of storage devices.

Secure parser 6809, RAM disk device driver 6808, and lower filter driver6805 in combination may be operate as previously described withreference to filter driver 6503 and device driver 6509, but with theaddition of a RAM disk operation of DRAM 5503 as generally indicated bya dashed line 6871 extending between RAM disk device driver 6808 andDRAM 5503. Additionally, RAM disk device driver 6808 may communicatewith iSCSI device driver 6807 via an M-to-1/1-to-M (“M: 1/1: M”) SCSIcommand bus 6872.

Effectively, RAM disk device driver 6808 is configured by securityApplication 6802 to treat DRAM 5503 like a local RAM disk drive. Thus, aread or write request from user application 6801 may be provided to RAMdisk device driver 6808 for writing to DRAM 5503. As previouslydescribed, such read or write request may involve one or more ofencrypting, parsing, splitting, decrypting, recombining or restoringdata. Thus for example, parsed payload data 6510 in DRAM 5503 may beprovided to or be obtained from hardware storage 6841 and/or hardwarestorage 6842 as generally indicated by dashed lines 6843 and 6844,respectively. Other details regarding operation of SAN 6800 werepreviously described elsewhere herein, and thus are not repeated forpurposes of clarity and not limitation.

FIGS. 69-71 are block diagrams depicting respective exemplaryembodiments of network I/O systems for hypervisor-based virtualization.In FIG. 69, network I/O system 6900 is for a virtual operating system(“OS”). A management OS layer 6901 may have running thereon VM switch6902, filter driver 6904, miniport driver 6906, and device driver 6905.Management OS 6901 represents a parent partition, as previouslydescribed with reference to a hypervisor virtualization.

VM switch 6902, such as from Microsoft, may include a routing virtualLAN (“VLAN”) filtering data copy module 6903, and multiple ports, suchas port 1 (“P1”) and port 2 (“P2”). Module 6903 is in communication withVM buses 6942 and 6941 of VM bus module 6940, such as from Microsoft. VMbus module 6940 may be used by VM switch 6902 to switch betweendifferent VM network blocks, such as network virtual machines 6965,using VLAN tagging provided by module 6903.

Multiple network virtual machines 6965, namely in this exemplaryembodiment 128 network virtual machines VM1 through VM128, are coupledto VM bussing of VM bus module 6940. Each network virtual machine, suchas VM1 for example, includes a respective TCP/IP module 6913 and arespective VM network interface (e.g., “NIC1” for VM1 and “NIC128” forVM128). VM switch 6902, VM bus module 6940, and network virtual machinesare known, and thus are not described in unnecessary detail herein. Itshould be understood that 128 network virtual machines have switchedaccess to two VM buses, namely VM buses 6941 and 6942, for access toports P1 and P2, respectively.

Filter driver 6904 is a virtualization of filter driver 6503 of FIG. 65,and device driver 6905 is of virtualization device driver 6509 of FIG.65. Miniport driver 6906 is a virtualization of a network miniportdriver, such as miniport driver 6607 of FIG. 66. As generally indicatedby line 6950, filter driver 6904 is in communication with module 6903,and filter driver is in communication with device driver 6905.Furthermore, as generally indicated by line 6950, device driver 6905 isin communication with a queue 6922 of RPU 5320. Thus, commands and datamay be passed to and from queue 6922 to module 6903.

RPU 5320 may have one or more encryption and decryption(“cryptographic”) engines 6921 therein, including without limitationinstantiated therein in programmable logic, coupled to queue 6922.Cryptographic engines 6921 may advantageously perform cryptographicfunctions such as those disclosed with respect to FIG. 1-8. As generallyindicated by line 6951, queue 6922 of RPU 5320 is in communication withdevice driver 6905, and device driver 6905 is in communication withfilter driver 6904. Furthermore, as generally indicated by line 6951,filter driver 6904 is in communication with miniport driver 6906, andminiport driver 6906 is in communication with queue 6924 of networkinterface 5310. Thus, commands and data may be passed to and from queues6922 and 6924.

In addition to queue 6924, network interface 5310 includes channelswitch 6923 and a plurality of media access controllers 6925. Forpurposes of clarity, the terms “media access control” and “medium accesscontroller” are used interchangeably herein, and either or both arereferred to as a “MAC.” Channel switch 6923 is for coupling queue 6924to a selected MAC of MACs 6925 for communication via Ethernet 1730. Eventhough four MACs 6925 are illustratively depicted, fewer or more MACs6925 may be used.

For a secure data storage application, data to and from VM switch 6902and queue 6922 may be unencrypted; however, data from queue 6922 toqueue 6924 generally would be encrypted by one or more of cryptographicengines 6921 for a transmit direction. In a receive direction, encrypteddata from queue 6924 provided to queue 6922 would be decrypted by one ormore cryptographic engines 6921 for providing to VM switch 6902.

In FIG. 70, network I/O system 7000 is similar to network I/O system6900 of FIG. 69, and thus generally only the differences between the twosystems are described for purposes of clarity and not limitation. Innetwork I/O system 7000, module 6903 is omitted.

VM switch 6902 has P1 through P128 ports of ports 7055 in communicationwith Q1 through Q128 queues of queues 7022 of RPU 5320. Thus, ports 7055correspond to network virtual machines 6965, and ports 7055 correspondto queues 7022. Furthermore, queues 7022 correspond to queues 7024.

Ports 7055 are in communication with queues 7022 through filter driver6904 and device driver 6905. In other words, ports 7055 are incommunication with filter driver 6904 through 128 paths, filter driver6904 is in communication with device driver 6905 through 128 paths, anddevice driver 6905 is in communication with queues 7022 through 128paths.

RPU 5320 includes multiplexing circuitry 7021 for selectively couplingone or more cryptographic engines 6921 to a selected queue of queues7022.

Queues 7022 are respectively in communication with queues 7024 ofnetwork interface 5310 through device driver 6905 and miniport driver6906. More particularly, Q1 through Q128 of queues 7022 are incommunication with device driver 6905 through 128 paths; device driver6905 is in communication with miniport driver 6906 through 128 paths;and miniport driver 6906 is in communication with queues 7024 through128 paths.

Network interface 5310 includes Q1 through Q128 queues of queues 7024.One or more of queues 7024 are selectively coupled to a MAC of MACs 6925via channel switch 6923.

In FIG. 71, network I/O system 7100 is similar to network I/O system7000 of FIG. 70, and thus generally only the differences between the twosystems are described for purposes of clarity and not limitation. Innetwork I/O system 7100, VM switch 6902 is replaced with a VM monitor7102 having a port P0. Furthermore, VM switch 6902 is omitted, and ports7055 run on management OS 6901 directly, and not through switch accessvia a VM switch. Accordingly, VM bus module 7140 may have respectivechannels for virtually respectively coupling each of ports 7055 to eachof virtual machines 6965. VM monitor 7102 is in communication withfilter driver 6904 via port PO for monitoring such driver.

It should be understood that in each of systems 6900 through 7100cryptographic engines 6921 encrypt and decrypt all data traffic from andto networking VMs 6965, or more particularly to or from a targetnetworking VM 6965. Furthermore, even though an example of 128 VMs wasused, it should be understood that fewer or more networking VMs 6965 maybe used.

FIG. 72 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of avirtual machine ware (“VMWare”) storage and network interface stack7200. Stack 7200 includes VM's 7201-1 through 7201-4, VMWare VM monitor674010, VM 7202, and VM 7203. Stack 7200 uses Single Root I/OVirtualization (“SR-IOV”).

Each VM 7201-1 through VM 7201-4 respectively includes an RPU NIC filterdriver 7211, an RPU storage filter driver 7212, an NIC switch driver7213, and a SCSI switch driver 7214. SCSI switch drivers 7214 are incommunication with VMWare VM monitor 7210. NIC switch driver 7213 of VM7201-3 is in communication with VMWare VM monitor 7210.

VM 7202 includes a PCIe RPU SR secure parser 7221 and a PCIe SR NIC7222. VM 7203 includes a PCIe RPU secure parser 7223 without SR and aPCIe SCSI HBA 7224 without SR. VMs 7202 and 7203 are in communicationwith VMWare VM monitor 7210. NIC switch drivers 7213 of VMs 7201-2 and7201-4 are in communication with SCSI HBA 7224. RPU NIC filter drivers7211 of VMs 7201-2 and 7201-4 are in communication with secure parser2023. In an embodiment, PCIe RPU SR secure parser 7221 and PCIe RPUsecure parser 7223 may provide substantially the same functionality assecure data parser 4930 of FIG. 49.

NIC switch drivers 7213 of VMs 7201-1 and 7201-3 are in communicationwith NIC 7222. RPU NIC filter drivers 7211 of VMs 7201-1 and 7201-3 arein communication with secure parser 7223.

RPU NIC filter drivers 7211 and RPU storage filter drivers 7212 areadded to VMs 7201-1 through 7201-4, where such VMs 7201-1 through7201-4, apart from such drivers 7211 and 7212, are obtained from VMWare,Inc. Secure parsers 7221 and 7223 are added to VMs 7202 and 7203,respectively, where such VMs 7202 and 7203, apart from such parsers 7221and 7223, are obtained from VMWare, Inc. VMWare VM monitor 7210 isobtained from VMWare, Inc. Drivers 7213 and 7214, as well as an NIC 7222and SCSI HBA 7224, are obtained from the vendor or manufacturer of anassociated NIC and/or SCSI interface. Drivers 7211 and 7212, as well assecure parsers 7221 and 7223, may be virtualizations of filter driver6503 and device driver 6509 of FIG. 65 for used in a VMware serverenvironment.

FIG. 73 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a writethrough a filter driver flow 7300. Filter driver flow 7300 may be forfilter driver 6503 of FIG. 65. As filter driver 6503 communicates withclass driver 6501 and device driver 6509, those drivers are mentioned inthe following description of filter driver flow 7300. For purposes ofclarity and not limitation, filter driver flow 7300 is described furtherwith simultaneous reference to FIGS. 57, 65, and 73.

At 7301, one or more SRBs are provided from storage class driver, suchas storage class driver 6501. For purposes of clarity by way of examplenot limitation, it shall be assumed that a single SRB is processed, eventhough multiple SRBs may be processed at a time.

At 7302, such SRB is interrogated to determine whether it is for a writecommand. For purposes of clarity by way of example not limitation, itshall be assumed that a SCSI protocol is used, even though in otherembodiments other protocols may be used. Thus, for example, at 7302 anSRB is interrogated to determine whether it is a SCSI write command. Ifat 7302 it is determined that such SRB is not a SCSI write command, thenat 7303 it is determined whether such SRB is a SCSI read command. If itis determined at 7303 that such SRB is for a SCSI read command, thenprocessing of such SCSI read command is described with reference to aread through a filter driver flow 7400 of FIG. 22. If, however, it isdetermined at 7303 that such SRB is not a SCSI read command, then at7328 such SRB is provided to one or more lower-order filter(“lower-filter”) drivers.

If, however, it is determined at 7302 that such SRB is for a SCSI writecommand, then at 7304 an envelope structure is allocated for such SRB.At 7305, such envelope is linked to such a SCSI write SRB allocated frommemory mapped adapter DRAM. At 7306, such write SRB is enqueued, namelyadded to a queue. At 7307, output buffer pointers are initialized foreach SRB, and a data pointer of such SRB obtained from class driver 6501is passed as a data buffer pointer. At 7308, output buffers areallocated from memory mapped DRAM, such as DRAM 5503. At 7309,MAC/digest buffers are allocated, and a MAC/digest pointer isinitialized. At 7310, a share stride is initialized. In this exampleembodiment, a stride of eight shares is used; however, in otherembodiments fewer or more than eight shares may be used.

At 7311, an encryption key (“encKey)”, an encryption initializationvector (“encIV”), an information dispersal algorithm key (“idaKey”), aMAC mode, and MAC key, and a MAC initialization vector are initialized.At 7312, a parse data call for RPU 5320 is composed with the envelopestructure or envelop initialized or allocated at 7304. At 7313, a devicedriver function call is made by device driver 6509 to RPU 5320 toperform data encryption and secure parsing operations on such data. Aspreviously described elsewhere herein, such secure parsing operationsmay include parsing and splitting such data into any size data units.Again, it is understood that the components of the present invention maymodularly provide parsing functionality, splitting functionality, or anysuitable combination of parsing and splitting functionalities. Forexample, the parsing and splitting operations of the present inventionmay include, but are not limited to, 1) cryptographically split,disperse and securely store data shares in multiple locations; 2)encrypt, cryptographically split, disperse and securely store datashares in multiple locations; 3) encrypt, cryptographically split,encrypt each share, then disperse and securely store data shares inmultiple locations; and 4) encrypt, cryptographically split, encrypteach share with a different type of encryption than was used in thefirst step, then disperse and securely store the data shares in multiplelocations.

At 7315, device driver 6509 invokes an application programming interface(“API”) at 7314 for communicating with RPU 5320 for such secure parsingoperations. At 7316, such secure parsing operations having beencompleted by RPU 5320, device driver 6509 returns control to filterdriver 6503. At 7317, filter driver 6503 receives an indication that RPU5320 as completed secure parsing operations and updates results fromsuch secure parsing operations such envelope structure allocated at7304.

At 7319, it is determined whether MAC authentication was successful. Ifat 7319 it is determined that MAC authentication was not successful,then filter driver flow 7300 provides an error status (“errors out”) at7318. If, however, it is determined that MAC authentication wassuccessful at 7319, then at 7320 an SRB queue is searched for anenvelope matching such envelope updated at 7317.

At 7321, it is determined whether an envelope obtained from such searchat 7320 matches such envelope updated at 7317. If such envelopes do notmatch as determined at 7321, then such searching resumes at 7320 until amatching envelope is located. If, however, a matching envelope islocated as determined at 7321, then at 7322 the matching envelopecontaining SRB is dequeued from such SRB queue searched at 7320.

At 7323, a command to compose a number of new SRBs respectively for eachof the shares of securely parsed data is asserted. For purposes ofclarity by way of example and not limitation, it shall be assumed thatthere are eight shares. However, in other embodiments, fewer or morethan eight shares may be used.

At 7324, a new SRB is constructed for each share. For construction of anSRB for a share, a current SRB path identifier, namely a path identifierobtained from such SRB provided from storage class driver 6501, is setequal to an share (“new”) SRB path identifier(“DrcSrb->PathId=SRB->PathId”), and a current SRB target identifier isset equal to a new SRB target identifier. Further, for thisconstruction, a current SRB LUN is set equal to a new SRB LUN. Suchnewly constructed SRB's data buffer pointer is set equal to suchenvelope structure's output data buffer pointer indexed by share number(e.g., share number 1 of 8).

At 7325, it is determined whether a share number value or share numberindex has reached 8, namely is less than eight. If it is determined at7325 that the share number is less than eight, then composition ofanother share SRB at 7323 is commenced for subsequent construction ofanother share SRB at 7324. If, however, it is determined at 7325 that ashare number index is not less than eight, then at 7326 the 8 newlyconstructed share SRBs, are sent to one or more lower-filter drivers forreceipt at 7328. In other embodiments, fewer or more than eight new SCSIwrite commands may be sent at 7326, as fewer or more share SRBs may beconstructed. Furthermore, at 7326, DRAM memory 5503 may be cleared orotherwise made available when such write commands have completed. Inother words, such output buffers having such eight SRBs respectivelystored may be indicated as being available for reuse.

FIG. 74 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a readthrough a filter driver flow 7400. Filter driver flow 7400 may be forfilter driver 6503 of FIG. 65. As filter driver 6503 communicates withclass driver 6501 and device driver 6509, those drivers are mentioned inthe following description of filter driver flow 7400. For purposes ofclarity and not limitation, filter driver flow 7400 is described furtherwith simultaneous reference to FIGS. 58, 65, and 73.

At 7401, one or more SRBs are provided from storage class driver, suchas class driver 6501. For purposes of clarity by way of example notlimitation, it shall be assumed that a single SRB is processed, eventhough multiple SRBs may be processed at a time.

At 7402, such SRB is interrogated to determine whether it is for a SCSIread command. For purposes of clarity by way of example not limitation,it shall be assumed that a SCSI protocol is used, even though in otherembodiments other protocols may be used. Thus, for example, at 7402 anSRB is interrogated to determine whether it is for a SCSI write command.If such SRB is for a SCSI write command as determined at 7402, then suchcommand is processed as previously described with reference to filterdriver flow 7300. If, however, it is determined at 7402 that such SRB isnot for a SCSI write command, then at 7403 it is determined whether suchSRB is for a SCSI read command

If at 7403 is determined that such SRB is not for a SCSI read command,then at 7410 such SRB is passed down to a next lower-filter driver. If,however, at 7403 it is determined that such SRB is for a SCSI readcommand, then a share number is initialized, such as equaling zero forexample, at 7404.

At 7406, it is determined whether such share number is less than eight.Again, it should be understood that in other embodiments, such sharenumber may be less or more than eight. If such share number is not lessthan eight as determined at 7406, then at 7405 eight new SCSI readcommands are sent to a next lower-filter driver for receipt at 7410. Inother embodiments, the number of new SCSI read commands sent at 7405 maybe fewer or more than eight corresponding to the share number.

It should be understood that each share may be associated with any sizedata unit, and shares may be associated with any size data units, wheresuch data units have been parsed and split from a single set of datainto two or more portions or shares of data, as previously describedelsewhere herein. If, however, at 7406 it is determined that the sharenumber is less than eight, then at 7407 memory mapped DRAM 5503 isallocated to a share indexed by share number.

At 7408, an SRB for such indexed share is constructed. For constructionof an SRB for a share, a current SRB path identifier, namely a pathidentifier obtained from such SRB provided from storage class driver6501, is set equal to an share (“new”) SRB path identifier(“DrcSrb->PathId=SRB->PathId”), and a current SRB target identifier isset equal to a new SRB target identifier. Further, for thisconstruction, a current SRB LUN is set equal to a new SRB LUN. Suchnewly constructed SRB is passed to a data buffer, where such data bufferis as an address space or portion of DRAM 5503 allocated at 7407. Inother words, a share has its own data buffer or buffer address space forstoring its SRB as indexed by its share number (e.g., share number 1 of8).

At 7409, a new SCSI read command is composed for a share. After suchcomposition, it is determined again at 7406 whether or not the sharenumber index is less than eight. This loop continues until it isdetermined at 7406 that the share number is not less than eight. In thisexample embodiment, this loop continues until eight share SRBs have beenconstructed. In other words, after completion of this loop there areeight share SRBs respectively indexed from 1 to 8, respectivelyallocated a data buffer, and each with an associated SCSI read command.

If at 7406 is determined that the share number is not less than eight,then at 7405 such at SCSI read commands composed as previously describedare sent to a next lower-filter driver at 7210. At 7411, control of SCSIreads of such shares is returned to filter driver 6503 from such one ormore lower-filter drivers. It should be appreciated that such one ormore lower-filter drivers 7410 may be for one or more storage devices,as previously described herein.

At 7412, a SCSI read complete indexed to share number is updated by ashare number for each of the shares read using one or more lower-filterdrivers 7410. At 7413, it is determined whether such SCSI read completeindex is less than eight. If at 7413, it is determined that such SCSIread complete index is less than eight, then at 7414 nothing is done,rather filter driver flow 7400 is in a wait state waiting for completionof the last of such SCSI reads.

If, however, at 7413 it is determined that the share number is not lessthan eight, then at 7415 an envelope structure for such read shares isallocated. At 7416, such envelope structure allocated at 7415 is linkedto such read SRBs for each of such shares. At 7417, such read SRBs areenqueued. At 7418, output buffer pointers are initialized for each shareSRB for passing as a data buffer pointer.

At 7419, pointers for input buffers are initialized for each share ofallocated memory mapped DRAM 5503 allocated at 7407. At 7420, MAC/digestbuffers are allocated, and a MAC/digest pointer is initialized. At 7421,a share stride is initialized.

At 7422, an encryption key, an encryption IV, an ida key, a MAC mode, aMAC key, and a MAC IV are all initialized. At 7423, a restored data callfor RPU 5320 is composed with such initialized for allocated and shareSRB linked envelope. At 7424, a function call to device driver 6509 ismade by filter driver 6503 for a restore data function of RPU 5320 witha parameter of an envelope structure pointer.

At 7426, device driver 6509 invokes an API at 7425 for communicatingwith a restorer of RPU 5320 for restoring encrypted data to a singleunencrypted set of data, such as for example unpacking share SRBs, byfirst recombining, then decrypting such data obtained therefrom. At7427, such restoring application invoked at 7315 is completed by RPU5320, and RPU 5320 provides a notice of completion to device driver6509. In an embodiment, the data that is restored by the restorer of RPU5320 may not be encrypted. Each portion of parsed data may be uniquelysecured in any desirable way provided only that the data may bereassembled, reconstituted, reformed, decrypted to its original or otherusable form. Accordingly, restoring the data may involve reversing anynumber of steps used to secure the data in accordance with thedescription herein.

At 7428, a return of control to filter driver 6503 from device driver6509 is provided as a single data block is restored. At 7429, completionof such restoration by RPU 5320 is recorded by updating a result in suchan envelope structure links at 7416 to read share SRBs.

At 7430, it is determined whether MAC authentication was successful. IfMAC authentication was not successful at 7430, then filter driver flow7400 errors out at 7431. If, however, MAC authentication was successfulat 7430, then at 7432 an SRB queue is search for and envelope matchingsuch envelope updated at 7429. At 7433, it is determined whether anenvelope obtained from such SRB queue at 7432 matches such envelope of7429. If at 7433 it is determined that there is not a match between suchenvelopes, then searching continues at 7432. This loop continues until amatch is found.

If, however, at 7433 it is determined that such envelopes match, thenthe matching envelope obtained from such SRB queue at 7432 is dequeuedfrom such SRB queue at 7435. At 7436, SCSI read control is returned fromfilter driver 6503 to storage class driver 6501 at 7401.

FIG. 75 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a parsedata through a device driver flow 7500. For purposes of clarity and notlimitation, filter driver flow 7400 is described further withsimultaneous reference to FIGS. 57, 65, and 73.

At 7314, an API for RPU 5320 is invoked as previously described. At7502, a spinlock is acquired. At 7503 a sequence identifier isincremented, such as incremented by one for example. Such sequenceidentifier may be incremented for each invocation of device driver flow7500, and thus such sequence identifier may be used as a tag forsubsequent reference. At 7504, an envelope is enqueued for a sequenceidentifier as incremented at 7503.

At 7505, an encryption command is set up. Such set up includesinitialization of each of the following: a share number, an encryptionmode, an ida mode, an MAC mode, an encryption key, an encryption IV, anida key, and a MAC key.

At 7506, it is determined whether return status was successful. Ifreturn status failed as determined at 7506, then device driver flowerrors out at 7507, and such error status is indicated as a pipelinestatus at 7527. At 7528, it is determined whether a package queue hasoverflowed. If it is determined that a package queue has overflowed at7528, then an error out is asserted at 7529. If after either assertionof an error out at 7529 or a determination that a package queue has notoverflowed at 7528, at 7530 is determined whether such a pipeline isfull. If it is determined that such pipeline is full at 7530, then anerror out is asserted at 7531. After either an error out is asserted at7531 or it is determined that a pipeline is not full as determined at7530, spinlock acquired at 7502 is released at 7532. At 7316, control isreturned to filter driver 6503, as previously described.

If, however, it is determined at 7506 that return status was successful,then such encryption command set up at 7505 is sent at 7508. At 7509, itis determined whether return status was successful. If it is determinedthat 7509 that return status was not successful, then an error out isasserted at 7510 and processing continues as previously describedstarting from 7527.

If, however, it is determined at 7509 that return status was successful,then DMA status is disabled at 7511. Furthermore, at 7511, an interruptis disabled. At 7512, it is determined whether data length is eithergreater than a maximum length allowed or equal to zero. If it isdetermined at 7512 that data length is either greater than a maximumlength allowed or equal to zero, then an error out is asserted at 7513and processing continues as previously described starting from 7527.

If, however, it is determined at 7512 that data length is neithergreater than a maximum length allowed or equal to zero, then it isdetermined at 7514 whether a share number is not equal to eight. Again,the number of shares, such as for example the number of portions ofdata, in other embodiments may be less than or greater than eight. If at7514 it is determined that the share number is not equal to eight, thenat 7515 and error out status is asserted and processing continues aspreviously described starting from 7527.

If, however, at 7514 is determined that the share number does equaleight, then at 7516 a command to set up RPU 5320 to read enciphered orencrypted data after such data has been parsed is sent. At 7517, it isdetermined whether return status was successful. If it is determined at7517 that return status was not successful, then at 7520 an error out isasserted and processing continues as previously described starting from7527.

If, however, at 7517 it is determined that return status was successful,then at 7518 a command is sent to RPU 5320 to write data of read shareSRBs by RPU 5320 as cleartext. At 7520, it is determined whether returnstatus was successful. If at 7520 it is determined that return statuswas not successful, then at 7521 an error out is asserted and processingcontinues as previously described starting from 7527.

If, however, at 7520 it is determined that return status was successful,then at 7522 DMA status indication is activated, and an interruptgeneration is activated. At 7523, a command is sent to read a messagedigest of RPU 5320 for writing to a digest memory buffer. Such digestmemory buffer may be in system memory, such as system memory 5316 forexample, as may be associated with Message Signaled Interrupts (“MSI”).

At 7524, it is determined whether return status was successful. If at7524 it is determined that return status was not successful, an errorout is asserted at 7525 and processing continues as previously describedstarting from 7527. If, however, it is determined at 7524 that returnstatus was successful, the encryption and MAC keys set up at 7505 aredeleted at 7526. After such deletion, processing continues as previouslydescribed starting from 7527.

FIG. 76 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a restoredata through device driver flow 7600. For purposes of clarity and notlimitation, filter driver flow 7400 is described further withsimultaneous reference to FIGS. 58, 65, and 73.

At 7425, device driver 6509 invokes a data restore API for RPU 5320 aspreviously described. Operations 7602 through 7611 respectivelycorrespond to operations 7502 through 7511 of FIG. 75, except thatrather than sending an encryption command at 7508, a decryption commandis sent at 7608. Accordingly, the remainder of the description ofoperations 7602 through 7611 is not repeated for purposes of clarity.After disabling DMA status and disabling an interrupt at 7611, at 7612 acommand is sent to RPU 5320 to read data, where such data is cleartextas having been decrypted at 7608.

At 7613, it is determined whether return status was successful. If at7613 it is determined that return status was not successful, then anerror out is asserted at 7614, and an indication of pipeline status isprovided at 7627. As operations at 7627 through 2432 respectivelycorrespond to operations 7527 through 7532 of FIG. 23, description ofthose operations is not repeated for purposes of clarity.

If, however, at 7613, it is determined that return status wassuccessful, then at 7615 it is determined whether data length is eithergreater than a maximum share length allowed or equal to zero. Aspreviously described with reference to FIG. 75, a maximum data lengthwas for a single set of data to be parsed. A maximum share length is foreach share, such as for example a maximum length of a subset of suchsingle data block.

If at 7615 it is determined that data length is either greater than amaximum share length allowed or equal to zero, then an error out isasserted at 7616 and processing continues starting from 7627. If,however, at 7615 it is determined that data length is neither greaterthan a maximum share length allowed or equal to zero, then at 7617 isdetermined whether a share number does not equal eight. Operations at7617 and 7618 respectively correspond to operations at 7514 and 7515 ofFIG. 23, and thus description of those operations is not repeated forpurposes of clarity. If at 7617 it is determined that share number doesequals eight, then at 7619 a command is sent to RPU 5320 to write splitor parsed shares as a single data block. At 7620 it is determinedwhether return status was successful. Operations 7620 through 7626respectively correspond to operations 7520 through 7526 of FIG. 75,except that activating DMA status indication and activating an interruptgeneration at 7622 is for DMA write operations for writing a single datablock. In contrast, activating DMA status indication and activating aninterrupt generation at 7522 of FIG. 75 was for DMA read operations foroutput of parsed encrypted shares to be written to storage devices, asdescribed elsewhere herein. Additionally, it should be understood thatkeys deleted at 7626 were set up at 7605 for device driver flow 7600.The remainder of the description of operations 7620 through 7626 is notrepeated for purposes of clarity.

FIG. 77 is a flow diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of a devicedriver interrupt service routine (“ISR”) and deferred procedure call(“DPC”) flow 7700. FIG. 77 is described with simultaneous reference toFIGS. 57, 58, 65, and 77.

At 7701, an MSI interrupt service routine for RPU 5320 (“RpuMsiIsr”) isinitiated. At 7702, an MSI interrupt is claimed. At 7703, an interruptDPC is scheduled for RPU 5320. Dashed line 2551 generally indicatesinitiation of such scheduled RPU DPC at 7705.

At 7704, control of an MSI-ISR portion 7750 of flow 7700 is returned toan OS. It should be understood that an MSI-ISR portion 7750 is at asignificantly higher priority level than the remainder of flow 7700,namely a DPC portion. By separating MSI-ISR and DPC portions, controlfor such MSI-ISR portion can be returned to a host system OS as quickly,while allowing continuation of DPC portion to limit performance impacton such host system.

At 7705, a DPC for RPU 5320 is initiated. At 7706, a spinlock isacquired. At 7707, data is processed for secure parsing thereof, andsuch processed data is written, as previously described elsewhereherein.

At 7708, it is determined whether DMA status has a valid identificationand sequence number. In other words, although in this embodiment DMAprocesses only one transaction at a time, it is capable of queuingmultiple DMA commands. This way DMA can process DMA transactions withoutgaps to reduce overhead. However, the number of multiple DMA commandsqueued is limited to a maximum number, and at 7708 it is determinedwhether such maximum number has been reached. If it is determined at7708 that DMA status is valid, then at 7709 it is determined whetherthere is any DMA interrupt queued.

If it is determined at 7709 that there is any DMA interrupt queued, thenat 7710 each envelope for each DMA interrupt sequence identifier isdequeued. At 7711, a function call is made for secure parsed datacompletion with a call back with each envelope dequeued at 7710. From7711, it is again determined at 7708 whether DMA status is valid.

If at it is determined either that DMA status is not valid at 7708 orthat there is no DMA interrupt in a queue at 7709, then at 7712 it isdetermined whether DMA command entries are less than or equal to amaximum number of commands (e.g., a “high water mark”). If at 7712 it isdetermined that DMA command entries are less than or equal to such ahigh water mark, then at 7713 a pipeline is full flag is cleared or leftin a clear state. If, however, at 7712 it is determined that DMA commandentries are greater than such a high water mark, then at 7714 suchpipeline full flag is set or left in a set state.

After setting or clearing such pipeline full flag as previouslydescribed at 7714 and 7713, respectively, at 7715 the spinlock acquiredat 7706 is released. At 7716, another spinlock is acquired. It should beunderstood that the spinlock acquired at 7706 is for a data parsing andencrypting portion; however, the spinlock acquired at 7716 is for a datadecrypting restore portion.

At 7717, a command to read and restore securely parsed data isinitiated. Operations at 7718 through 7720 correspond to operations at7708 through 7710, and thus repetition of such description is avoidedfor purposes of clarity.

After dequeuing at 7720, at 7721 a share number index is initialized,such as set to zero for example. At 7722, it is determined whether suchshare number index is less than eight. Again, it should be understoodthat a share number less than or greater than eight may be used in otherembodiments.

At 7723, a digest from a restore engine of RPU 5320 is copied to anenvelope digest buffer for storing therein information on a share. Aftercopying at 7723, it is again determined at 7722 whether a share numberindex is less than eight. Accordingly, this loop continues until adigest from restore engine of RPU is copied to an envelope digest bufferfor storing therein information on each of the shares read.

If at 7722, it is determined that a share number index is not less thaneight, then at 7724 a function call is made to indicate completion ofread data having been restored. Such function call may include a callback with a dequeued envelope. From 7724, it is determined again whetherDMA status is valid at 7718.

If it is determined that either DMA status is invalid at 7718 or no DMAinterrupt is in a queue at 7719, then it is determined whether DMAcommand entries are less than or equal to a high water mark at 7725.Operations 7725 through 7728 respectively correspond to operations 7712through 7715, and thus description of operations 7725 through 7728 isnot repeated for purposes of clarity. After the spinlock acquired at7716 is released at 7728, flow 7700 may return at 7729, such as forexample to a host system OS from which it was called.

FIG. 78 is a block diagram depicting an exemplary embodiment of acomputer system 7800. Computer system 7800 may include a programmedcomputer 7810 coupled to one or more display devices 7801, such asCathode Ray Tube (“CRT”) displays, plasma displays, Liquid CrystalDisplays (“LCD”), projectors and to one or more input devices 7806, suchas a keyboard and a cursor pointing device. Other known configurationsof a computer system may be used.

Programmed computer 7810 may be programmed with a known operatingsystem, which may be Mac OS, Java Virtual Machine, Linux, Solaris, Unix,or a Windows operating system, among other known platforms. Programmedcomputer 7810 includes a central processing unit (“CPU”) 7804, memory7805, and an input/output (“I/O”) interface 7802. CPU 7804 may be a typeof microprocessor known in the art, such as available from IBM, Intel,ARM, and Advanced Micro Devices for example. Support circuits (notshown) may include cache, power supplies, clock circuits, dataregisters, and the like. Memory 7805 may be directly coupled to CPU 7804or coupled through I/O interface 7802. At least a portion of anoperating system may be disposed in memory 7805. Memory 7805 may includeone or more of the following: random access memory, read only memory,magneto-resistive read/write memory, optical read/write memory, cachememory, magnetic read/write memory, and the like, as well asnon-transitory signal-bearing media as described below.

I/O interface 7802 may include chip set chips, graphics processors, anddaughter cards, among other known circuits. An example of a daughtercard may include a network interface card, a display interface card, amodem card, and/or a Universal Serial Bus (“USB”) interface card.Furthermore, I/O interface 7802 may include a daughter card 5301 or67401, as described herein.

I/O interface 7802 may be coupled to a conventional keyboard, network,mouse, display printer, and interface circuitry adapted to receive andtransmit data, such as data files and the like. Programmed computer 7810may be a server computer or a workstation computer. Thus, computer 7810may be coupled to a number of client computers, server computers, or anycombination thereof via a conventional network infrastructure, such as acompany's Intranet and/or the Internet, for example, allowingdistributed use for interface generation.

Memory 7805 may store all or portions of one or more programs or data toimplement processes in a non-transitory machine-readable medium inaccordance with one or more embodiments hereof to provide any one ormore of filter driver 6503, device driver 6509, lower filter driver6805, RAM disk device driver 6808, secure parser 6809, filter driver6904, device driver 6905, NIC filter driver 674011, storage filterdriver 674012, secure parser 7221, secure parser 7223, filter driverflow 7300, filter driver flow 7400, device driver flow 7500, devicedriver flow 7600, and/or ISR-DPC flow 7700 as program product 7820.Additionally, those skilled in the art will appreciate that one or moreembodiments hereof may be implemented in hardware, software, or acombination of hardware and software. Such implementations may include anumber of processors or processor cores independently executing variousprograms and dedicated hardware or programmable hardware.

One or more program(s) of program product 7820, as well as documentsthereof, may define functions of embodiments hereof and can be containedon a variety of non-transitory signal-bearing media, such ascomputer-readable media having code, which include, but are not limitedto: (i) information permanently stored on non-writable storage media(e.g., read-only memory devices within a computer such as CD-ROM orDVD-ROM disks readable by a CD-ROM drive or a DVD drive); or (ii)alterable information stored on writable storage media (e.g., floppydisks within a diskette drive or hard-disk drive or read/writable CD orread/writable DVD). The above embodiments specifically includeinformation downloaded from the Internet and other networks. Suchnon-transitory signal-bearing media, when carrying computer-readableinstructions that direct functions hereof, represent embodiments hereof.

Although some applications of the secure data parser are describedabove, it should be clearly understood that the present invention may beintegrated with any network application in order to increase security,fault-tolerance, anonymity, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. Additionally, other combinations, additions, substitutionsand modifications will be apparent to the skilled artisan in view of thedisclosure herein.

1. A secure data storage system, comprising: a bus; an acceleratorcoupled to the bus having a Programmable Logic Device (“PLD”) having anapplication function block instantiated in whole or in part inprogrammable logic resources of the PLD; and a network interface coupledto a storage network, wherein the application function block is operableto: generate at least two portions of data from a data set; communicatethe at least two portions of data over the network interface to thestorage network; and store the at least two portions of data within thestorage network, wherein the data set is restorable from at least aplurality of the at least two portions of data by recombining data fromthe plurality of the at least two portions of data.
 2. The system ofclaim 1, wherein the storage network is a cloud computing storagenetwork that includes at least two respectively remote storage devices.3. The system of claim 2, wherein the application function block isfurther operable to generate a virtual machine image, wherein thevirtual machine image is operable to access the data set within thecloud computing storage network.
 4. The system of claim 3, wherein theapplication function block is further operable to transmit the virtualmachine image to a second system, wherein the second system is operableto access the data set within the cloud computing storage network. 5.The system of claim 2, wherein the cloud computing storage networkfurther comprises at least one resilient networked storage device. 6.The system of claim 5, wherein the first system is further operable toregenerate a data portion stored on the at least one resilient networkedstorage device from other networked storage devices.
 7. The system ofclaim 1, further comprising a switch coupled between the bus and theaccelerator and between the accelerator and the network interface;memory accessible by the application function block via the accelerator;wherein the bus is a host system-side peripheral interconnect bus;wherein the switch provides the data set to and from the peripheralinterconnect bus and the accelerator; and wherein the switch providesthe at least two portions of data to and from the memory and the networkinterface.
 8. The system of claim 7, wherein: the switch is configuredto control peer-to-peer routing between the accelerator and the networkinterface for retrieval of the at least two portions of data from thememory by the network interface; and the switch is further configured tocontrol peer-to-peer routing between the network interface and theaccelerator for storage of the at least two portions of data in thememory by the network interface.
 9. The system of claim 7, furthercomprising at least one transmitter or transceiver coupled to thenetwork interface for transmitting the at least two portions of data.10. A host system, coupled to the data processing system according toclaim 9, for providing commands and the data to the switch via theperipheral interconnect bus.
 11. The host system according to claim 10,wherein the at least two portions of data do not pass to the networkinterface via the peripheral interconnect bus.
 12. The host systemaccording to claim 10, wherein the network interface includes a directmemory access controller to read and write the at least two portions ofdata from and to the memory.
 13. A computer system, comprising: ageneral-purpose processor for execution of a user application in anapplication mode and kernel-mode drivers in a kernel-mode, wherein thekernel-mode drivers include a class driver and a filter driver; anaccelerator system coupled to the general-purpose processor via a firstbus; wherein the class driver is in communication with the userapplication to receive a request packet to provide a request block inresponse to the request packet; wherein the filter driver is incommunication with the class driver to receive the request block;wherein the request block includes a system payload pointer that pointsto a first location of a data set stored in system memory and one of awrite command or a read command; and wherein for the write command aconfigured Programmable Logic Device of the accelerator system is to:retrieve the data set from the system memory using the system payloadpointer; generate at least two portions of data from the data set; andstore the at least two portions of data in local memory of theaccelerator, wherein the data set is restorable from at least aplurality of the at least two portions of data by recombining data fromthe plurality of the at least two portions of data.
 14. The system ofclaim 13, wherein: the kernel-mode drivers include a device driver, astack driver, and a port driver; and the filter driver generates firstcommands and second commands responsive to the command, each of thefirst commands and the second commands include a same set of localpayload pointers generated by the filter driver; the device driver is incommunication with the filter driver to receive the system payloadpointer and the first commands; and the device driver is incommunication with the accelerator system to provide the first commandsand the payload pointer to the accelerator system.
 15. The system ofclaim 14, wherein the at least two portions are stored at locations inthe local memory of the accelerator pointed to by the local payloadpointers of the first commands.
 16. The system of claim 14, wherein: thestack driver is in communication with the filter driver to receive thesecond commands; the port driver is in communication with the stackdriver to receive the second commands; and the accelerator system is incommunication with the port driver to receive the second commands. 17.The system of claim 14, wherein: the port driver is in communicationwith a network interface of the accelerator system; the networkinterface is coupled to the local memory using the local payloadpointers of the second commands to transmit the at least two portions ofdata for storage in storage devices coupled to a network.
 18. The systemof claim 17, wherein the network is a cloud computing storage networkthat includes at least two respectively remote storage devices.
 19. Thesystem of claim 17, wherein for the read command: the network interfaceis responsive to the second commands to: retrieve the at least twoportions of data from the storage devices; and store the at retrieved atleast two portions of data in local memory at the locations pointed toby the local payload pointers of the second commands; and theProgrammable Logic Device is configured to: retrieve the at least twoportions of data from the local memory at the locations pointed to bythe local payload pointers of the first commands; and restore theretrieved at least two portions of data responsive to the first commandsto provide the data set.
 20. A method for processing data, comprising:providing a data set and a system payload pointer from a host system toan accelerator system; generating at least two portions of data in theaccelerator system; storing the at least two portions of data in memoryof the accelerator system; converting the system payload pointer into atleast one local payload pointer for the storing; passing the at leastone local payload pointer to an interface; accessing the at least twoportions of data from the memory by the interface using the at least onelocal payload pointer; and transmitting the at least two portions ofdata accessed by the interface, wherein the data set is restorable fromat least a plurality of the at least two portions of data by recombiningdata from the plurality of the at least two portions of data.
 21. Themethod according to claim 20, wherein: the at least one local payloadpointer is passed to a driver stack; the driver stack passes the atleast one local payload pointer to the interface; and the interfacegenerates packets for the transmitting of the at least two portions ofdata.
 22. The method according to claim 21, wherein: the driver stack isa Small Computer System Interface (“SCSI”) driver stack; and the packetsare SCSI packets.
 23. The method according to claim 22, wherein: thepackets are Internet SCSI packets (“iSCSI”) for remote storage of the atleast two portions of data in a cloud computing storage network; and theinterface is a network interface having access to the at least twoportions of data locally stored in the memory of the accelerator systemwithout having to provide the interface with the system payload pointer.24. A method for processing data, comprising: providing a command and apayload pointer to an accelerator system; obtaining, by the acceleratorsystem, a data set responsive to the payload pointer; generating atleast two portions of data from the data set by the accelerator systemresponsive to the payload pointer; storing the at least two portions ofdata locally in memory of the accelerator system; initiating a memoryaccess by a network interface of the accelerator system; obtaining theat least two portions of data from the memory responsive to the memoryaccess; and transmitting the at least two portions of data obtained bythe network interface to a cloud computing storage network, wherein thecloud computing storage network includes at least two respectivelyremote storage devices, and wherein the data set is restorable from atleast a plurality of the at least two portions of data by recombiningdata from the plurality of the at least two portions of data.
 25. Themethod of claim 24, wherein: the memory access is a direct memoryaccess; the direct memory access and the at least two portions of dataobtained in response thereto are routed peer-to-peer by a switchcoupling the network interface and Programmable Logic Device (“PLD”) toone another; and the memory is coupled to the PLD.
 26. The method ofclaim 25, further comprising: retrieving, using the network interface,the at least two portions of data from the cloud computing storagenetwork; and storing the retrieved at least two portions of data in thememory for subsequent processing by the PLD.
 27. The method of claim 24,wherein generating the at least two portions of data and transmittingthe at least two portions of data to the cloud computing storage networkis substantially transparent to the accelerator system.